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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF POST-ACQUISITION AUTONOMY UPON SMALL TO MEDIUM
ENTERPRISE INTEGRATION SUCCESS
by
Robert Weichel Reich

Most theories in merger and acquisition (M&A) research use an individual or
group level of analysis and address behavioral issues in M&A integration and adaptation.
Relatively few studies apply a firm level analysis to investigate strategic issues pertaining
to autonomy and decision-making authority. This study used neo-institutional theory to
investigate the relationship between acquired firm autonomy and integration success at
the firm level. It also sought to identify possible moderating impacts of an acquired
firm’s pre-acquisition organizational archetype, e.g. professionally managed private, or
founder owned and operated, as well as the acquired firm’s leadership experience with
previous M&A integration. Furthermore, unlike the majority of extant M&A literature,
which commonly takes the perspective of the acquirer firm, I explored the perspective of
the acquired firm. The study focused on middle market firms acquired by public
corporations to provide variation of acquired firm organizational archetypes. Our results
underscore the complexities of measuring a relationship between autonomy allocation
and integrations success. It additionally expands the exploration of causal antecedents
that influence that relationship.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The integration of acquired firms into existing organizations continues to be a
challenging enterprise (Bergh, 1997; Brouthers & Dikova, 2010; Colombo & Delmastro,
2004; Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; Jarrell, Brickley, &
Netter, 1988; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004; Puranam &
Srikanth, 2007; Raghavendra Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; Schoenberg, 2006; Zollo &
Singh, 2004). Seventy-five percent of acquisitions fail to achieve the targeted benefits for
the acquiring firm (Marks, Mirvis, & Brajkovich, 2001). Over one third of acquisitions
are divested or dissolved within seven years due to failure to meet expectations (Kaplan
& Weisbach, 1992; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1989). The integration process can be
encumbered by control change, employee allegiances, strategic shifts and cultural
modifications (Graebner, 2004).
To enhance ownership transitions, assimilation processes should recognize
autonomy dynamics, which support the acquired company integration while
incorporating new strategies, visions, processes and decision-making authority
(Brockhaus, 1975; Graebner, 2004). Autonomy implies that the management of the
acquired firm has the freedom of influencing events and making the day-to-day operating
decisions without excessively close control or restraint by the parent company (Hayes,
1979). Influences of new ownership may be particularly disruptive when smaller
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businesses are acquired by larger, publicly traded corporations (Raquib, Musif, &
Mohamed, 2003b). In this scenario, a change in managerial authority has been identified
as a complicating dynamic during integration (Bezrukova, Thatcher, Jehn, & Spell, 2012;
Stahl & Voigt, 2005). Smaller firms often allocate greater decision-making authority to
managers than larger, publicly traded firms (Ahlers, Hack, & Kellermanns, 2012;
Mintzberg & Bourgault, 2000). Accordingly, it is important to recognize how employees
of acquired firms react to changes in autonomy allocation in order to better plan
integration into a new organizational model (Nelson, 2003). This dissertation suggests
that founder owner-operator leaders have less success integrating into public corporations
than professionally managed private firm leaders (Schein, 1983). The study also
investigates possible moderating effects of prior experience with acquisition. “There is a
real role for management academics here… It is strategies’ job to link corporate,
structural, operational and behavioral conditions and choices” (Nelson, 2003, pp.
722,723).
Substantial research has been conducted concerning the social and cultural aspects
of merging groups. Leadership influences, in-group/out-group dynamics, communication,
trust factors and emotional quotients are common areas of merger and acquisition study
(Bezrukova, et al., 2012; Stahl & Voigt, 2005). Merger and acquisition research is
frequently focused on individual and group response to being acquired. Less research has
addressed the implications of autonomy allocation such as the freedom to plan, pace,
execute the integration plan without undo parental interference and its relationship to
integration success (Meyer, 2001; Teerikangas, 2012). This study contributes to closing
that gap. Additionally, no prior research addressed the unique institutionalized
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heterogeneity of dissimilar organizational archetypes upon acquired firm integration
success. Specifically, this dissertation extends research of post-merger integration by
providing an acquired firm perspective and exploring the moderating effect of preacquisition organizational archetypes on an acquired firm perceived assimilation success.
An ‘archetype’ refers to a configuration of structures and systems that are embedded in
the political and organizational structure of the firm and are organically sustained to
ensure conformity and sustainability (McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). Configurations are sets
of practices that share common praxis along operational characteristics such as policy,
structure, and decision processes (Ferguson & Ketchen, 1999). The study is framed in
small and middle market acquisitions to provide a focused perspective on professionally
managed private and founder owned and operated organizational archetypes (Daily &
Dollinger, 1992; Filion, 1990; Gelinas & Bigras, 2004). The dissertation fills the current
literature gap in three ways: First, it explores the acquired firm leaders’ perspective of
post-acquisition autonomy allocation upon integration success. Second, it assesses a
possible moderating effect of previous organizational management type, i.e. private
professionally managed firm or founder-owned and operated firm on integration success.
Third, it investigates potential influence of the acquired firm’s top management team
(TMT) recent acquisition experience on perceived integration performance of the
acquired firm.
The foundation of this dissertation is built upon institutionalism of organizational
type and new-institutional theory. Institutional theory of the firm suggests the sociology
of organizations is necessary to understand the substance of interactions between
governance mechanisms and responses to signals and actions in an attempt to maintain
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relevance to those affected (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2008). Formal
organizations operate as systems of coordinated and controlled processes existing within
predetermined networks of practices and procedures defined by the culture and nature of
the organizational type (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The neo-institutional school further
develops institutional research around how the agent is managed or controlled by the
organization to further the institutional values (Commons, 1921; Simons & Ingram,
1997). Particular concern of neo-institutionalism is associated with economic transactions
within rules and processes that affect individuals and contribute to the development of
organizational culture, practices and success (Scott, 2008a, 2008b; Williamson, 1985;
Zucker, 1977).
Within the tenets of neo-institutional theory are the isomorphic concepts of forced
coercion, normative best practice adoption and mimetic replication. Institutional
isomorphism refers to an organizational structure imposed by internal or external forces
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism regards forces from a dominant
entity as drivers of culture and actions. Such forces may be derived from government or
regulatory statutes, but may also be imposed by other forces of control such as an
acquiring owner (Benders, Batenburg, & van der Blonk, 2006). Mimetic forces
encourage imitation of preexisting conditions that are diffused through interaction with
other professionals, organizations or institutions (Bala & Venkatesh, 2007; Oliver, 1991).
Normative pressures are brought about by professional organizations’ institutional norms
and standard operating procedures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1977). Such
pressures are commonly transferred through organizational assimilation, cultural
adaptation or institutional inducement (Ang et al., 2007; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
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Oliver, 1988). These pressures are endemic to the organization from an institutional
perspective and are implied and enforced through governance mechanisms such as
decision-making authority (Knudsen, 1995; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2012;
Nelson & Winter, 1995).
This dissertation makes the case for the existence of embedded coercive
institutional and bureaucratic influences that subsist within organizations to sustain and
promote the institutionalism of the firm that consequently have significant effect on
leaders from different organizational archetypes and is particularly evident when exposed
to change (Adler & Borys, 1996; Mintzberg, 1979). Change is understood in
organizational archetype theory as the blending, borrowing, instituting or leveraging
artifacts and learnings between archetypes (Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003). The use of
organizational archetypes for identifying autonomy change dynamics supports merger
and acquisition research and is relevant to research of comparative governance
mechanisms (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Compartmentalizing organizational
decision-making control and authority through the use of archetypical organizations
provides succinct differentiation of institutional differences for analysis (Miller &
Friesen, 1980; Vosselman, 2002). Archetypical categorization is useful in merger and
acquisition research to recognize differences in organizational response to integration
strategies of an acquiring firm (Pinnington & Morris, 2002).
Small and medium enterprise (SME) organizational structures often are simpler
than those of larger public firms (Gelinas & Bigras, 2004). The founder-operator in
particular is more likely to be directly in control of operational functions and decisionmaking (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Fahlenbrach, 2010). The owner-manager is also the
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person who develops and carries out visions and controls activities, demanding a high
need for independence and autonomy (Filion, 1990). Conversely, the need for
independence and autonomy, combined with a low propensity to delegate or consult, may
be obstacles to participatory management or decision sharing resulting in a perceived
reduction autonomy and power (Mickelson & Worley, 2003). As a result, the SME
managers may be likely to regard integration with new control management as a threat, a
loss of freedom, an imposition of standards, and a risk to pre-acquisition authority
(Gelinas & Bigras, 2004).
The theoretical hypotheses presented are explored through perceived change of
autonomy and its relationship to integration success of acquired firms from the
perspective of the acquired firm leadership within specific organizational archetypes. The
dissertation addresses small and medium enterprises defined as businesses employing
fewer than 500 employees at time of acquisition (United States International Trade
Commission, 2010). Ownership change of small to medium enterprises often results in
dynamics which produce turbulence within the acquired company (Puranam & Srikanth,
2007). The ensuing turbulence can interfere with the efficient and economic flow of
production (Zollo & Singh, 2004).
Subject firms include professionally managed private firms and founder owned
and operated businesses acquired by publicly traded companies. Professionally managed
private firms and founder owned and operated firms typically represent distinct sources
of power and cultural institutionalization within the firm (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Nelson,
2003; Schein, 1983; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). The concentration on small to medium
enterprises facilitates the study of the impacts of decision-making authority change on the
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ability of smaller acquired firms to meet new owner objectives and adapt to decisionmaking control changes operationalized by the acquiring firm (Bains, 2007; Gelinas &
Bigras, 2004; Van Teeffelen & Peek, 2008). The dissertation does not measure the effects
of resource allocation provided to the acquiring firm, but instead, it focuses on the impact
of institutional control changes upon the acquired organization and its influence on shortterm integration performance. The results contribute to merger and acquisition literature
of middle and small market firms in relation to the timing of integration and assimilation
effects of heterogeneous organizational types from the perspective of leadership of the
acquired firm. The study also provides insight for practitioners in the development of
integration processes of smaller firms of differing organizational legacy.
The next section provides a review of current literature identifying various
behavioral, social, cultural and institutional treatments of acquisition and integration
research. The review of social and behavioral theory is important to understand how
institutional mechanisms affect human reaction to environmental change and conscious
or unconscious emic response related to perceptions, actions and performance (Van
Teeffelen & Peek, 2008). The literature review continues with an examination of studies
reflecting neo-institutional isomorphic treatment of acquired firm autonomy. The
subsequent section presents the hypotheses regarding the effects of autonomy on the
perceived success of the integration process with support from a neo-institutional view of
organizations as institutions. The methodology section provides a description of intended
empirical approach along with the data sources. The completed research concludes with
discussion, limitations and implications for practitioners along with additional research
suggestions.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature supporting the development of this proposal was sourced from
databases accessed through Google Scholar, EBSCO, Horace W. Sturgis Library at
Kennesaw State University and the University of Georgia library system, ELSEVIER,
Scopus and Science Direct, JSTOR, Sage Publications among others. Key word searches
included, but were not limited to, mergers, acquisitions, autonomy, decision-making
authority, post-acquisition integration, acquisition value, consolidation, power, change
management, organizational change, acculturation, business integration, institutionalism
and neo-institutionalism.
Several theoretical lenses regarding organizational change emerged from the
review of the literature using above keywords. Much of the merger and acquisition
literature examines the human impact of organizational change. Many articles addressed
reactions of individual and groups to changes in authority resulting from integration or
assimilation by a new organization. Although these studies relied on behavioral or
economic choice theories, they serve best to create a foundation for understanding the
antecedents of reaction to change subsequent of a merger or acquisition (Teerikangas,
2012).
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Adaptation to Organizational Change
The literature indicates that post-acquisition assimilation success is significantly
dependent upon individual leadership reaction to changes in authority and decisionmaking privileges (Bezrukova, et al., 2012; Brock, 2003; Brockhaus, 1975; Graebner,
2004; Stahl & Voigt, 2005). Discontinuity with former roles, decision-making allocations
and perceived standing among peers often leads to dysfunctional or unsuccessful
outcomes (Evans & Reiser, 2004; King, 2002; Krug & Aguilera, 2005).
Decision-making authority within an organization is often regulated by the rules,
practices and controls enforced by the firm (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Scott, 2008a;
Veliyath & Hermanson, 1997; Zucker, 1983). Neo-institutional theory explains how
rules, practices and hierarchies become entrenched within organizations (Reed, 2001;
Suddaby, Elsbach, Greenwood, Meyer, & Zilber, 2010; Weber, 1947; Zucker, 1983).
Neo-institutionalism refers to the analysis of organizational bureaucracy within the
cultural institutionalism of organizations as a subset of institutional development
(Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000; Reed, 2001; Scott, 2008a, 2008b; Suddaby, et al.,
2010; Weber & Glynn, 2006). Organizations may have common structure based upon
ownership orientation and/or environmental guidelines (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002;
Zucker, 1983). The perpetuation of an ascribed organizational type is often ensured
through the rules of operation, established control mechanisms and entrenched
hierarchies (Knudsen, 1995; Suddaby, et al., 2010). These observations support the
theoretical basis of the dissertation in that institutionalized organizations represent subinstitutions or archetypes that are persistent and identifiable. A deeper examination of
organizational archetypes is presented in the following section.
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Organizational Archetypes
Organizational archetypes are specific groups of formal and informal collective
actions, rules and structures, which are monitored and regulated (Ferguson & Ketchen,
1999; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004; Reed, 2001). This dissertation argues that the existence of
embedded coercive institutional and bureaucratic influences that exist within
organizations to sustain and promote the institutionalism of the firm have significant
effects on leaders from different organizational archetypes (Adler & Borys, 1996; Kraatz
& Block, 2008; Mintzberg, 1979).
Change is understood in archetype theory as involving processes of interpretive
de-coupling and re-coupling of movements within and between archetypes (Kirkpatrick
& Ackroyd, 2003). The use of archetypes that are subject to similar and dissimilar
governance mechanisms is appropriate to measure the dynamics of organizational change
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Neo-institutional theory is the selected literature to
determine if the acquired firms’ organizationally embedded pre-acquisition, decisionmaking control mechanisms have an effect upon integration success of an acquired firm.
It is not uncommon for the terms mergers and acquisitions to be applied
interchangeably when referring to the joining of two separate business entities (Mehta &
Hirschheim, 2004). Technical differences however, maybe important in some cases.
Acquisitions typically refer to the purchase of one firm by another firm, whereas a
merger is considered an agreement between two or more companies to combine into one
organization (Raquib, Musif, & Mohamed, 2003a). Despite such technical differences,
management studies often do not make such distinctions when evaluating the effects of
combining two organizations because the distinction between mergers and acquisitions in
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organizational practice is principally only a legal definition (Van Knippenberg, Van
Knippenberg, Monden, & de Lima, 2002). Mergers are often promoted as the combining
of two equals to the employees and stakeholders impacted by the activity; however, from
a psychological perspective, mergers generally take on the characteristics of a takeover
by one entity or the other (Cartwright & Cooper, 1992; Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991; Van
Knippenberg, et al., 2002). In the event of a merger of equals, fights for organizational
and cultural control will likely ensue (Bower, 2001). Regardless of positioning, theories
of organizational dominance suggests that there will always be a stronger or more
authoritarian entity in every duopoly (Panchal & Cartwright, 2001; Van Knippenberg, et
al., 2002). Even in the merger of equals, there is a cultural dominator, and it is common
to expect social, cultural, institutional, and governmental differences to interfere with
integration (Bower, 2001; Buono, Bowditch, & Lewis III, 2002; Sidanius, Pratto, van
Laar, & Levin, 2004). Based on these observations, the terms merger and acquisition are
used interchangeably throughout this document and will refer to the change of structural
control based on an agreed-to exchange of value.
To provide a behavioral foundation for the neo-institutional framework of this
proposal, a summary of non-institutionally based merger and acquisition literatures is
presented next. The summary highlights key concepts that might be considered
antecedents to leader behavior when encountering changes within the embedded
organizational institutionally specific control mechanisms. The interpretations make
important contributions toward understanding the multifaceted and inter-reliant impact of
perceived autonomy on merged and assimilated organizations and help to establish a
platform from which individual response to change will be viewed through a neo-

24
institutional perspective. It is important to introduce these literatures early in the literature
review to demonstrate how exposure to organizational change can affect acquired leaders
and link perceived levels of autonomy, or autonomy change when the rules of the
organization are changed through acquisition or assimilation. Accordingly, part of the
literature review already highlights the link to institutional and neo-institutional theory,
which is discussed after this subsequent section. The review of this literature is
summarized in Appendix I.
Relevant Behavioral and Economic Literatures
Extant research has demonstrated how the impression of external control over
personal situations can affect individuals’ sense of commitment (Bacon & Hoque, 2005),
self-efficacy (Ajzen, 2002; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Kowal & Fortier, 1999; Mael
& Ashforth, 1995), and effective leadership (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Waldman,
Ramirez, House, & Puranam, 2001). A behavioral response is compelled when change is
forced upon individuals (Greenberg, 1987; Hall & Mansfield, 1971).
Organizations are recognized as institutional mechanisms, which hold and retain
power to promote survival of the structure (Scott, 2008b; Stinchcombe, 1968).
Institutional perspectives are important to understand the effects of power and control
change in organizations (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Institutions are legitimized and
characterized by shared normative frameworks. Individuals are expected to adopt
organizational value proposition and maintenance mechanisms as a condition of
membership. Such a commitment is not just implied, but imposed on members of the
organization, willingly or unwillingly (Scott, 2008b; Simon, 1997). Acquired members
must make a conscious shift by adapting to organizational values, mechanisms and
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traditions of the organization. Alteration of decision-making authority may have
significant and unsettling effect on acquired management (Lewin, 1951). A change in
organizational context redefines the normative structures familiar to the employee and
may affect decision choice. Another impediment is the power of new organizational
positions and the changing status of individual organizational members (Zucker, 1983).
Changes of control within an organization can disrupt the individual automatic response
to situational choice and may be intensified when organizations merge or must adapt to
new controls and processes (Scott, 2008b). Such consequences are particularly germane
to retained leaders of acquired organizations.
Transfer and integration of new practices requires the release of one set of values,
processes and experiential learnings with the acceptance of new procedures, controls and
institutions of the acquiring firm. Integration processes may disrupt the flow of economic
decision-making and create disruption in the organization since it is no longer
accomplished automatically or by way of established routines (Krasner, 1988; Nelson &
Winter, 1995).
Employees identify with their organization to the extent that they see an overlap
between the identity of the organization and their individual identity (Foreman &
Whetten, 2002; Meyer, 2001). A core principle of social identity theory is that individuals
generally view themselves as extensions of the groups in which they are a part of and
particularly when an individual is a key member of that group (Dyer Jr & Whetten,
2006). When individuals or groups experience change, they may react proactively or
defensively (Cameron, 2008). Change evokes emotional resistance that may result in a
threat to self-image and significant discomfort (Antonacopoulou & Gabriel, 2001).
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Individual and group feelings of defeat and unwilling assimilation may occur during
transfer of ownership whether a merger occurs in related or unrelated organizations
(Antonacopoulou & Gabriel, 2001; Swanson & Power, 2001; Zaheer, Schomaker, &
Genc, 2003). The merging of groups typically requires significant adjustment and
accommodation among the acquired individuals (Amiot, Terry, Jimmieson, & Callan,
2006). Meyer and Rowan (1977) criticized what they referred to as “prevailing”
economic theories which assume that control of activity and authority are the critical
dimensions on which formal organizations have succeeded. Meyer and Rowan (1977)
later conceded that the essence of a bureaucratic organization lies in the impersonal
character of structural controls.
The entrenchment of power and control mechanisms requires the acculturation
and adaptation of new members to be successful (Datta, 1991; Datta & Grant, 1990).
Individuals faced with adjusting to new organizations are subject to political pressures
and underlying power distributions that protect the existing institutions of the dominant
organizations (Scott, 2008b).
Re-socialization and acculturation are unavoidable when separate operating
communities are aggregated as one (Carroll & Richard Harrison, 2002; Weber &
Camerer, 2003). Groups rely on leaders to direct and guide the socio-political and
operational practices (Bass, 1990; DiGeorgio, 2001; Piccolo & Colquitt, 2006; Schraeder
& Self, 2003). A feeling of belonging to a specific organization can become displaced
during assimilation into new organizations and therefore the individual must reorient to
the new institutional organizational values, practices and methods of controlling
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economic interests. Perceived problems in performance may arise from functional,
political and social organizational changes (Oliver, 1992).
Coercive means of enforcing institutional change, be it regulatory coercion or
organizational coercion, can create pushback from the embedded cognitive responses of
the affected employee that may lead to disruption and uncertainty (Fligstein, 2001).
“Indeed, it is the interaction of the cost of transacting with the distribution of coercive
power that shapes the development of institutions” (North, 1986, p. 233).
Organizational controls within institutionalized firms are compelled to ritual
conformity, from both internal and external sources (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The
consistent operation of an organization is managed through coercive application of
institutionalized check and balance systems which exist within its structures (Hannan &
Freeman, 1977). Organizations and institutions may constrain or empower behavior.
Organizations by their nature, emerge to control and dispense power through rules,
regulations, checks and balances; they are enforced by the bureaucratic structure of the
body itself. The coercive function of organizational bureaucracy is accentuated in
mergers and acquisitions because it exists primarily to limit and control individual
autonomy (Adler & Borys, 1996). Changes of control within an organization have been
demonstrated to disrupt the automatic response of actors affected (Krasner, 1988). This
can easily be the case when organizations merge or must adapt to new organizational
controls and processes. The next section discusses potential behavioral reactions to
organizational change and individual response to changes in organizational behavior.
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Behavioral and Economic Choice Inferences
The behavioral and economic-choice synopsis of literatures associated with
merger and acquisition illuminate potential effects of human behavior under
organizational change. The brief overview demonstrates how organizations are humanly
concocted systems containing constraints that structure the political, economic and social
interactions of employees (North, 1990). Organizations are comprised of both formal and
informal codes of conduct. The success of the organization is dependent upon human
cooperation within a particular system (North, 1990; Olson, 1965). The formal decisionmaking constraints are specified and enforced by political institutions within the
particular organization. Formations of human behavior are the product of rational choice
theory (North, 1990). The motivation of personnel is more complicated and their
preferences less constant than traditional economic theory of organizations might suggest
(Hatch, 2010; Schein, 2010). Less understood are the assumptions that all employees
have the cognitive and emotional presence to respond to organizational controls and
systems, which produce the economic outcome anticipated by the organizational structure
(North, 1990). The literature further demonstrates that human behavior is affected by the
individual’s perceived ability to interact within the matrix of stature and choice with
personal confidence and satisfaction (Boen, Vanbeselaere, Brebels, Huybens, & Millet,
2007; Clark, Gioia, Ketchen Jr, & Thomas, 2010; Datta, 1991; Hambrick, 2007;
Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993; Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1999; Very, Lubatkin,
Calori, & Veiga, 1997). It is not difficult to consider the potential for disparate human
interaction (temporary or permanent) within incompatible or simply different
organizational protocol based on the aforementioned literatures. To test this potential, the
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study relies on a neo-institutional paradigm of organizational institutionalism, which
seeks to isolate demonstrable characteristics unique to commonly structured
organizational archetypes. Table 6 in Appendix I provides additional synthesized reviews
of literatures associated with post-acquisition impact on acquired leaders. The remainder
of this section examines the origins of neo-institutional thought and discusses how the
neo-institutional perspective applies to organizational archetypes.
Core Theoretical Literatures: Institutional and Neo-Institutional Theory
Institutional theory has become the dominant macro-perspective on organizational
development (Suddaby, 2010; Tolbert & Zucker, 1999; Wooten, 2008). Institutional
theory supports a platform to explain the outcomes of environmental pressures that shape
trades, industries and conventions (Scott, 2008a; Zucker, 1983, 1988a). The concept of
external pressures regulating or limiting choice is the seed for development and
perpetuation of the institutions, which are a result of natural or created external forces
(Oliver, 1991). The neo-institutional concept facilitates a more granular perspective from
which theorists may study the influences of actors inside an organization on the
development, evolution and personality of a particular firm within the rational choice
boundaries of the macro environment (George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006).
Neo-institutional perspectives help to explain individual organizational culture and
cultural differences within institutional boundaries (Dobbin, 1994; Pedersen & Dobbin,
2006). The following review of institutional and neo-institutional literatures within a
historical and interspersed context demonstrates the similarities, nuances and
transformations of institutional and neo-institutional theory.
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Early institutionalism recognized that behavior was governed by habit and
convention (Dacin, et al., 2002; Scott, 1987, 2008a). “Not only is the individual’s
conduct edged about and directed by his habitual relations to his fellows in the group, but
these relations, being of an institutional character, vary as the institutional scene varies
[sic]” (Veblen, 1909, p. 245). Neo-institutional perspectives emerged to help understand
the patterns of power and control in organizations (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Neoinstitutional theory plays an important role for the study of organizational change
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Scott, 2008b). The dependency upon human interaction
provides support for the development of institutional boundaries and the recognition of
distinct institutional and organizational behavior (Commons, 1921; Veblen, 1898).
Commons (1924) suggested that that the exertion of power in an organization is two or
more ambitions competing, persuading, and coercing within an existing environment of
rules of conduct and limited bounds of behavior that are governed by the institution.
Subsequent reviews of Commons’ (1924) work further developed the concept of
institutionalized organizations and concluded that institutions are simply organizational
solutions that consist of a set of rights and duties and authority for enforcing them (Van
de Ven, 1993).
Stemming from works of Philip Selznick in the 1940s, institutional theory began
to take greater traction among organizational scholars (Selznick, 1948). Selznick
recognized the tension between relational needs and commitment requirements of actors
within an organization. The inherent strain of a formal organization to ensure consistent
actions along common missions could conflict with the individual need for self-efficacy
and self-determination. This individualistic tendency is based on Freudian concepts of
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man as an individually motivated organism stimulated a view of organizations as
cooperative institutions (Selznick, 1948).
Cooperative firms must measure the formal controls over individuals while
providing managers sufficient authority to meet their innate needs and contribute in a
willing, motivated and cooperative manner (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000; Selznick,
1948). Cooperative organizations are dependent upon stability (Clark, et al., 2010;
Hamilton, 2010). The introduction of new elements, such as new organizations, can upset
the stability or equilibrium of an existing institution and its power base (Bellinger &
Hillman, 2000; Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005). The fear of that destabilization
could lead to authoritative controls and formal measures over the potentially destabilizing
entity (Selznick, 1948). From such foundational constructs and the contributions of
organizational pioneers such as Merton (1938), Davis and Moore (1945) and Weber
(1946, 1947), emerged the neo-institutionalism of DiMaggio and Powell (1983).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) introduced the proposition of institutional
isomorphism. Institutional theory of the firm suggests the sociology of organizations is
necessary to understand the substance of the interactions between governance practices
and hierarchies and to understand how the form is sustained in the organization (Cohen,
et al., 2008). Institutional isomorphism is of particular relevance to firms developing new
organizations whether internally developed, merged or acquired. DiMaggio and Powell
(1983) described such use of isomorphism as a constraining process that controls
behavioral actions under common environmental conditions. The concept of constraining
forces however goes much further. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) assigned three
typologies of isomorphism to their neo-institutional theory. The relationship of economic
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transactions within rules or processes that affect individuals and contribute to the
development of organizational culture, practices, and success is often found to be of
particular interest of neo-institutional studies (Scott, 2010). The contemplation of
isomorphic pressures on organizational development is germane to the dissertation to
support how organizational archetypes develop and preserve their character and how
individuals respond within a given archetype (Gelinas & Bigras, 2004).
Institutional isomorphism is anchored in the concept that organizations compete
for not only resources and markets, but also political power and legitimacy. The
isomorphic pressures encountered by an organization can lead to governance practices
that provide legitimacy or reduce uncertainty over improving performance (Beckert,
2010).
The first of the isomorphic typology is coercive isomorphism, which stems from
political, regulatory or control mechanisms that influence the universe of decision choice.
Coercive isomorphism is generally understood to originate from outside sources such as
governmental or regulatory edicts. Organizational institutions may be interpreted as
structures controlled by those holding power with rules established to protect and retain
their power (Stinchcombe, 1968). The organization also will have embedded mechanisms
utilized by management of the organization to retain that power and assert power over
others (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Early institutional researchers recognized the significance
of organizational control on institutional levels even through coercive dictums of the
organization (Dacin, et al., 2002; Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Luoma & Goodstein,
1999; Parsons, Bales, & Shils, 1953; Scott, 2008b; Stinchcombe, 1968).
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The second is mimetic isomorphism. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggested that
mimetic isomorphism emulates from responses to uncertainty. Mimetic isomorphism is
often applied to organizations that enter new markets unfamiliar to the experience or
resource base of the existing institution. By adopting the structure, processes and
strategies of the market leaders, the uncertainties are mitigated.
Normative isomorphism is associated with professionalization of the organization.
Professionalization refers to the adoption of best practices found in that industry or
market. These practices stem from commonalities of professional standards, education or
regulatory controls. Such normative environments might be expected to transcend
organizational nuances, particularly in related industries and therefore should pose little
concern for integration of related acquisitions (Datta & Grant, 1990; DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991).
Among the neo-institutional isomorphic pressures, the effects of coercive
isomorphic practices in particular, can have significant effect on performance (Heugens
& Lander, 2009). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) defined coercive pressure as conformist
forces on an organization emanating from other organizations upon which it depends for
critical resources or from institutions upholding the cultural expectations of the
organization in which it operates. These coercive pressures exist both internally as well as
externally (Zucker, 1983). Coercive isomorphism is driven by pressures from external
institutions on which a focal organization is dependent and an organization's internal
pressure to conform to the operational expectations of the owners (Brannen & Peterson,
2008; Sitkin & Pablo, 2005). Coercive isomorphism, therefore, is analogous to
constructions of a resource dependence model view in that organizations are viewed as

34
constrained by those on whom they depend for resources (Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 2003). Institutionalized organizations attempts to control and coordinate
integration activities can lead to individual separation from the implementation process
and result in excessive attention toward establishing personal power and autonomy
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Such constraints in DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) theory
include pressures to bring an organization's structure in line with the demands of those
who already hold the power and can be particularly obstructive during post-acquisition
integration (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Neo-institutional theory explains how embedded
organizational controls maintain the character of a firm or firm type (Suddaby, 2010;
Suddaby, et al., 2010; Zucker, 1977).
Neo-institutional studies often examine how an agent is managed or controlled by
the institution to further the institutional and organizational values (Hasselbladh &
Kallinikos, 2000; Scott, 2008b). The perpetuation of institutional boundaries are
supported, adhered to and evolve through active learning (Knudsen, 1995). Neoinstitutionalism suggests that economic transactions within rules and processes affect
individuals and contribute to the development of organizational culture and practices
(Dobbin, 1994; Langlois, 1989; North, 1986). Within a neo-institutional framework,
organizations can be reasoned to capture gains arising from specialization and division of
labor (Scott, 2008a, 2008b). Newly acquired individuals, such as those brought in
through merger or acquisition, may accept rank and duty voluntarily or through coercive
pressures (Kraatz & Block, 2008; North, 1986).
Central to the proposition that acquired firms are subject to influences of
archetypical institutions, the potential for coercive isomorphism leveled by the acquiring
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firm during assimilation could be reflected through autonomy allowed to the acquired or
new entity (Miller & Friesen, 1980; Pinnington & Morris, 2002; Vosselman, 2002).
When organizational assimilation or integration occurs, subjection to the dominant
standard practice is likely (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh,
1988; Ranft, Butler, & Sexton, 2011). Enforcement of the acquirer’s modus operandi and
best practices may be forced upon the newly acquired firm (Cartwright & Cooper, 1990;
Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Nikandrou, Papalexandris, & Bourantas, 2000). Those
exercises might differ from the historic practices of the acquired operation (Nikandrou, et
al., 2000; Pinnington & Morris, 2002). Governance reconfigurations during acquisition
integration center on the allocation of decision-making and autonomy authority (Fogarty
& Dirsmith, 2001). Perception of coercive isomorphism may also manifest itself in the
division of labor and allocation of decision-making power that can be manipulated by the
assignment of roles or authority (Dannefer, 1984).
Deci and Ryan (1987) described the more positive effect allocation of autonomy
has on motivation, trust and cognitive flexibility over external control. Much of the
behavioral study regarding locus of control, relative standing and upper echelons
discussed in earlier sections have dealt with the intrinsic motivation of individuals and
their perceived degree of self-efficacy. Considering the assimilation of new groups, selfefficacy and motivation much more influence on individual choice and behavioral
outcomes (Ajzen, 2002; Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993; Rotter, 1966; Very, et al., 1997).
Deci and Ryan (1987).These concepts are supported by the behavioral literature
regarding human effects of merger and acquisition integration processes. It has been
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demonstrated that the impact of internal and external organizational forces influence
behavior and affect performance.
Merger and acquisition could be considered a reflection of institutional change.
The coordination and control of structure is the critical dimensions on which formal
organizations succeed and continue. This point is reinforced by Meyer and Rowan (1977,
p. 342) through the statement that, “The essence of a modern bureaucratic organization
lies in the rationalized and impersonal character of structural elements and of the goals
that link them”. Individuals faced with adjusting to new organization are often subject to
deeply embedded political mechanisms, which promote the underlying distribution of
power and reinforce the existing institution (Scott, 2008b). Re-socialization and
acculturation are unavoidable when separate operating communities are aggregated into a
single entity (Carroll & Richard Harrison, 2002; Weber & Camerer, 2003). A member’s
sense of belonging can be obfuscated and require reorientation to the new institutional
organizational values, practices and methods of controlling economic interests when
organizations are merged or assimilated. Groups rely on leaders to direct and guide the
socio-political and operational practices and hierarchies (Bass, 1990; DiGeorgio, 2001;
Piccolo & Colquitt, 2006; Schraeder & Self, 2003). Perceived problems in performance
may arise from functional, political and social organizational changes (Oliver, 1992).
Neo-institutional theory connects microelements of cognitive reinforcements that
are both voluntary and involuntary but hold fast to residuals of automatic response (Scott,
2008b). To manipulate or change the foundations created and employed by institutional
distinctions takes time, method, manipulation and even coercion (Hirsch, 1997; Scott,
2008b). Coercive means of enforcing institutional change, be it regulatory coercion or
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organizational coercion may create a pushback from the embedded cognitive responses
leading to disruption and uncertainty (Fligstein, 2001). The uniform operation of an
institutional organization is managed through coercive application of institutionalized
control systems (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Kraatz & Block, 2008). It is the effectiveness
of coercive power that shapes the development of institutions and organizations (North,
1986). Organizational structures and processes are dedicated to ritual conformity (Meyer
& Rowan, 1977).
Accepting that organizations contain embedded infrastructures that are
institutionalized within the organization, adapting to new organizations can become
troublesome for groups and individuals, particularly in the occasion of large scale and
abrupt change. The next section more specifically reflects the application of a neoinstitutional perspective regarding embedded characteristics of organizations and the
complications, which arise with institutional and organizational change resultant of
mergers and acquisition.
Neo-institutional Adaptation and Integration
Leveraging the literatures of Zucker (1983, 1987, 1988b) and Oliver (1992), the
neo-institutional concept of de-institutionalization can be associated with the assimilation
of an acquired organization into a new organization. Considering the mechanisms of
institutional form on individual organizations, the de-commissioning of one organization
and rebuilding of it within another organization has similar pressures (Oliver, 1992).
Functional, political and social concerns arise from perceived problems in performance
associated with organizational changes (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). A retained employee
of an acquired firm, hereafter referred to as an acquired employee, must re-orient to the

38
new organization’s institutionalized values, practices and methods of controlling
economic interests. Individuals faced with adjusting to new organizations are subject to
political pressures and underlying power reinforces the existing institutional
arrangements (Cartwright & Cooper, 2005; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Nahavandi &
Malekzadeh, 1988). Although institutions represent continuity and persistence within
their individual organization, newcomers must learn to adapt to be a successful member
of the new organization (Scott, 2008b).
Autonomy is both desirable and critical during the integration of acquired firms
(Appelbaum, Gandell, Shapiro, Belisle, & Hoeven, 2000; Datta, Grant, & Rajagopalan,
1991; Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993). Essential for an investigation of post-acquisition
autonomy is the recognition of intended degree of integration. Level of organizational
integration is defined as the degree of post-acquisition change in an organization’s
administrative, operational and cultural structures (Pablo, 1994). Not all firms are
acquired with full integration as a strategic objective (Ellis, 2011; Ranft & Lord, 2000).
Firms that are acquired for diversification strategies may not be integrated as thoroughly
as tactical acquisitions such as acquisitions made for supply, capacity or market control
initiatives (Pablo, 1994; Singh & Zollo, 1998). The degree of integration is also
dependent upon values assessed upon human capital and organizational relationships of
the target firm during the due-diligence stage (Coff, 2002; Harding & Rouse, 2007). The
degree of integration is important to successful acquisitions (Whitaker, 2012). High
levels of integration may theoretically enhance synergistic potential, but it can also result
in negative outcomes in the form of increased coordination costs and/or interorganizational conflicts (Pablo, 1994).
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Firms are acquired for many different reasons, including new market penetration,
capacity expansion, diversification, access to technology and even opportunism (Napier,
2007; Veugelers & Cassiman, 1999). Research has shown that the buying firm rarely
allows the acquired top management team full autonomy, especially when the motivation
to acquire originated from the belief that new management can better utilize the acquired
firm's physical and human capital (Lubatkin, et al., 1999). Datta and Grant (Datta &
Grant, 1990) measured acquired firm autonomy and performance results in related and
unrelated acquisitions. Their conclusions acknowledged the importance of post-merger
autonomy under degree of firm relatedness. Findings indicated that unrelated acquired
firms received greater decision-making authority than firms acquired in industries or
processes familiar to the acquirer. Datta and Grant (1990) also concluded that firms
wishing to integrate or expand a familiar process into existing operations are more likely
to merge the acquired business and its processes into the existing institutional structure
under preexisting control and decision mechanisms.
Firms acquiring unfamiliar processes or market positions will rely on the acquired
institutional structure by allowing greater autonomy and decision-making authority of the
management team (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). The success of post-acquisition
integration depends on managerial action exercised and communicated during the process
(Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy, 2003). Even considering a methodical, integrative process, local
activities are managed in an interdependent way. The integration approach and execution
of integration activities require local management and decisions (Birkinshaw, Bresman,
& Håkanson, 2000; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Contrary to this view, Faulkner, Child
and Pitkethly (2003) suggested that even in traumatic integration events in which the
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acquired firm feared losing its identity and autonomy, that fear was eventually overcome.
This may not be the case when firms acquire to expand their organizational knowledge.
The acquisition of human capital is frequently a strategic aim of the acquisition; however,
in the face of loss of autonomy, talent often leaves (Krug & Aguilera, 2005; Lubatkin, et
al., 1999; Siehl & Smith, 1990). Additional studies have indicated the rate of
entrepreneurial innovation declines post-acquisition when autonomy is removed
(Paruchuri, Nerkar, & Hambrick, 2006). The most important qualifier for level of
integrations is how capable the existing resources are in the management of the acquired
company (Wernerfelt, 1984). If the acquisition was undertaken for plant, property and
equipment and not the softer side of a firm such as people, relationships and creativity,
the firms are likely to experience a greater degree of integration and, therefore, less
decision-making autonomy (Ellis, 2011; Ranft & Lord, 2000).
Acquisitions made to diversify risk are commonly decentralized and allowed
greater autonomy to run and manage the operations (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988;
Zaheer, Castañer, & Souder, 2011). Firms acquired outside the acquiring firm’s
knowledge base are typically allowed more autonomy (Datta, 1991; Datta, et al., 1991;
Datta & Grant, 1990). Because this study is intended to assess the acquired firm
perspective, the acquiring firms planned strategy is difficult to identify with certainty.
Managements’ perceived degree of post-acquisition decision-making authority does
however; infer the acquirer’s evaluation of human capital through identifying the
retention of acquired talent. The perceptions of individual autonomy are the mechanisms
influencing success in post-acquisition integration (Colman, 2008; Graebner, 2004;
Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993). The possibility that perception of integration success
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could be negatively associated with higher levels of autonomy may none-the-less, exist
(Ranft, et al., 2011). Extant research however, overwhelmingly extols the inferences of a
positive relationship between local decision-making authority and integration regardless
of the level of prescribed integration or relatedness of the acquisition (Haspeslagh &
Jemison, 1991; Zaheer, et al., 2011). The review and interpretation of literatures to this
point has highlighted the effect integrations and the rigidness of organizational practice,
particularly internal coercive enforcement of embedded rules, can have on individuals
and groups. The next section consolidates and reduces the findings into an integrated set
of hypotheses, which emerged from those literatures.
Hypotheses
Successful post-acquisition integration is significantly dependent upon the
acquiring and acquired firm leadership (Gadiesh, Buchanan, Daniell, & Ormiston, 2002).
It is not uncommon for pre-acquisition leaders to be retained during a transition period to
support the specific business and interpersonal relationships acquired by the new firm
(Graebner, 2004). The perceived capabilities of the acquired management team have
great bearing upon the level of autonomy and freedom of decision-making power allowed
to the acquired leaders (Walsh, 1989). Situations where pre-acquisition diligence has
identified leadership issues with the target company may base the acquisition opportunity
in upgrading or changing management (Harding & Rouse, 2007; Hellmann, 1998;
Hellmann & Puri, 2002). In situations where the opportunity to extract greater rents from
an underperforming operation may be considered a result of weak management, those
managers are not likely to be retained (Antila, 2006; Siehl & Smith, 1990). The preacquisition human capital evaluation is invariably an element of autonomy and decision-
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making allocation for those preserved (Bertoncelj & Kovač, 2007; Harding & Rouse,
2007; Teerikangas, 2012).
Firms deemed underperforming despite adequate financial and material resources
are typically acquired with the specific objective to enhance the management of the target
operation (Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994; Manne, 1965). In the most severe situations,
leadership is not retained; however, in moderate circumstances the leadership is retained
during a transitional period to facilitate the change of management, accommodate
relationship transfers, and provide unique and specific insights for a new operating team
(Bergh, 2001; Manne, 1965).
Not all leaders of the acquired teams agree to remain under new management
(Siehl & Smith, 1990; Walsh, 1988). A retained leaders’ inability to adjust to new control
mechanisms, strategies or organizational dictums can result in an involuntary change of
leadership (Bordia, Hunt, Paulsen, Tourish, & DiFonzo, 2004). Some instances of
choosing not to retain leadership teams at acquisition can be symbolic to signify a change
of control in decision-making authority within the acquired firm (Pfeffer, 1981; Walsh &
Ellwood, 1991). Alternatives to retaining embedded acquired firm leadership include
parent company assignment of internal candidates (Cannella Jr & Hambrick, 1993),
hiring outside leaders (Shimizu & Hitt, 2005), or replacing pre-acquisition leadership
with other acquired firm candidates (Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997; Shimizu & Hitt,
2005).
The appearance of forced assimilation may also have detrimental effect on
integration and performance (Bacon & Hoque, 2005; Liang, Saraf, Hu, & Xue, 2007).
The integration processes may be viewed by those assimilated as coercive due to the
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conveyances of new institutional and organizational practices (Auster & Sirower, 2002;
Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, 2008). To overcome the appearance of a coercive take-over,
the acquired leader is often retained in some form to facilitate a transition. The argument
in favor of keeping an acquired leader/manager is typically supported by a desire to
maintain the market and organizational relationships the acquired firm has built upon
(Krug, 2003). Preserving relationships depends upon the decision-making authority of
local leaders. Despite the best intentions of acquiring leaders, a change in authoritative
hierarchy may be imposed by the new organizations’ embedded control mechanisms,
which may appear coercive or demonstrative to the acquired leadership. Citing earlier
studies along these lines, Puranam (2006, p. 7) remarked “Even if they [acquired
management] are retained via highly powered incentive systems, lowered intrinsic
motivation due to lowered task autonomy following structural integration can lead to
similar [lower performance] results”.
Effective leaders manage transitions with greater comfort when their self-efficacy,
locus of control and relative standing continue to meet their individual needs (Joslin,
Waters, & Dudgeon, 2010; Kim, Lee, & Carlson, 2010). When personal sociopsychological needs are not met, a leader may become resistant or uncooperative
(Antonacopoulou & Gabriel, 2001; Risberg, 2001). The discomfort exhibited by the
leader is sometimes reflected upon the group with negative ramifications upon the
transition and group assimilation (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004).
Successful mergers and acquisitions are highly dependent upon integration
transitions (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Howell & Hall-Merenda, 1999). Established leaders
who enjoy significant autonomy and decision-making power in their current positions
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develop a comfort in their role (Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993). Strategic decisions are
based on prior experiences and rational evaluation, which reinforces the security of those
decisions and the confidence to make them (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). A change in
an unfamiliar direction and inability to execute on those experiences can have detrimental
effect on the leader’s sense of control, and relative standing among peers and
subordinates (Antonacopoulou & Gabriel, 2001; Kormanik & Rocco, 2009; ShiversBlackwell, 2006; Wageman, 1995). The effects could result in negative impact for
cooperation, influencing leadership and followers.
Bureaucracies inherent in institutionalized organizations are measured by the
degree of formalization applied to authority allocation (Adler & Borys, 1996; Kraatz &
Block, 2008). Authority is both arbitrary and legitimized (Suchman, 1995). The influence
of organizational controls for the execution of power and decision-making authority are
defined through the rules, regulations and processes maintained by the formal
institutionalized organization and are enforced through behavioral compliance
(Commons, 1931). Coercion is a driver of compliance albeit not the only motivation for
compliance, it is a significant and ever present force (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Hirsch,
1997; Sutinen & Kuperan, 1999). Exposure to forced transitions or coercive acculturation
by the acquiring (dominant firm) may intensify perceived loss of power, deepen
resistance to assimilation by the leaders and/or work groups (Auster & Sirower, 2002;
Datta, 1991; Judge, et al., 2008). Integration success and output performance could
therefore be negatively affected. Coercive isomorphism within institutional change
theoretically explains the potential trickle-down effect of the leaders’ perceived impact to
self and group when autonomy and decision-making authority changes. The perception of
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coercion in concert with loss of autonomy often accompanies integration. Dominant
coercive institutional forces were described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 150) as
resulting from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations. The impacts
of apparent coercion can range from a perceived dominance to extreme and overt
occurrences (Hambrick & Cannella Jr, 1993). Acknowledging the potential obstacle a
loss of perceived autonomy in a post-merger organization among acquired firm leaders,
stratified subunits or groups may have on the assimilation or reorientation toward new
owners, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H1: Higher perceived levels of post-acquisition autonomy by the acquired firm leaders
will be positively associated with perceived post-acquisition integration success.

Supporting a neo-institutional perspective, the ensuing discussion makes the case
for publically traded, professionally managed privately held and founder owned and
operated organizational archetypes as micro-institutions in and of themselves. The
dissertation proposes that differentiation between organizational governance, formats,
mechanisms, processes, and decision-making allocations are sufficiently distinctive to be
considered institutionalized within the individual organization and exacerbate disruption
when transfers from one archetype to another are forced (Bachmann, 2001; Hasselbladh
& Kallinikos, 2000).
Mechanism logics provide a practical perspective to explore institutional
conformity among archetypical business types such as public for-profit, professionally
managed privately held and founder owned and operated firms. “While power and
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politics are present in all organizations, the sources of power, its meaning, and its
consequences are contingent on higher-order institutional logics” (Thornton & Ocasio,
1999, p. 802). Institutional logics are defined as the formal and informal rules by which
executive power is managed or lost within organizations. Such logics, which appear in all
organizations, may be more alike in some types of businesses than others are and hold a
unique codification based on their organizational type (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000;
Kraatz & Block, 2008; Suddaby, et al., 2010). This dissertation investigates effects of
generalized business types to determine if the commonalities are discernible and produce
like-effect in a merger and acquisition integration event.
It is important to use a moderately granular definition of these archetypes to
demonstrate the macro-categorization of the institutions they represent through common
structuration of such institutions (Giddens, 1984; Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000). There
are many and varied definitions of a public company. Public companies often refer to
publicly traded for-profit firms or government entities (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Perry &
Rainey, 1988). For purposes of this study, the concern is with for-profit nongovernmental limited liability organizations therefore, the following definition is applied
to the term “public company” as described in the Model Business Corporation Act of The
American Bar Association (2011). A U.S. publicly traded company is a limited liability
company that offers company securities including but not limited to; stocks, bonds and
other equity backed instruments for sale to the public, typically through a security
exchange and is subject to the rules, regulations and jurisdiction of the Security and
Exchange Commission (Sale, 2011).
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A professionally managed private firm in the U.S. is a non-public firm whose
ownership is closely held and not available to the public through an open trading
exchange, is owned by fewer than 500 stockholders and the firm is not required to meet
the strict Securities and Exchange Commission filing requirements of public companies
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005). Professionally
managed private companies may issue stock and have shareholders; however, shares are
not traded on public exchanges and are not issued through an initial public offering
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lubatkin, et al., 2005). An example of a professionally
managed private for-profit company could be typified by the corporate holding of assets
by a private investor, private investment group or consortium operated by a team of
professional managers e.g. privately held equity groups or venture capital firms with
controlling equity of multiple firms (Hellmann, 1998; Hellmann & Puri, 2002).
Professionally managed private equity and venture capital firms acquire and hold firms
by means of executing convertible security loan covenants (Bascha & Walz, 2001).
Bascha and Walz (2001) point out that private equity acquired firms are managed with
increased parental involvement, and this may result in a significant change in acquired
firm strategy and control and operate differently from owner-managed and publicly
traded firms. Privately held, professionally managed equity and venture capital
investment firms could have a significant degree of family ownership but individual
assets may not necessarily be directly operated or managed by family owners (Schein,
1995). Professional managers from larger corporations are very different from founder
owner-operators (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). Professional managers typically hold little
direct ownership stake in the firm.The distinction is ultimately one of agency
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responsibilities in distinguishing professional owner operators and professional managers
(Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Leung, Zhang, Wong, & Foo, 2006). Companies led by
professional non-owners are more likely to accept multi-authoritative decision-making
structures than a previously autonomous founder owner-operators (Fligstein, 1985;
Leung, et al., 2006; Useem & Gottlieb, 2006).
The founder owned and operated business will represent decision-making
autonomy of the founder organizational archetype. “Founder – CEOs firms are likely to
have more influence and decision-making power and thus the impact of differences in
managerial characteristics on corporate behavior and performance should be particularly
strong in founder-CEO firms” (Fahlenbrach, 2010, p. 440). There are over 17 million sole
proprietorships in the U.S., referring to an unincorporated business owned and operated
by a single person (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella Jr, 2007). To support
such focus, the recent definition depicting CEO owned and operated business of
(Fahlenbrach, 2010) will be used for the founder owner-operator archetype. Founder
owner-operator CEOs typically have more organization-specific skills because the
founder has shaped and managed their organizations from inception; therefore,
differences in managerial characteristics are particularly strong in founder-owned and
operated firms (Schein, 1983). Founder-owner operators are also known to have more
influence and decision-making power than other organizational forms therefore represent
an ideal organizational archetype for comparison (Fahlenbrach, 2010).
Founder owner operated firms are typically classified among family business
groups (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2010; Schein, 1995). It is recognized
that family owned businesses also fall into the private and public arena. The management
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characteristics and decision-making freedoms of institutionalized firms are significantly
influenced by external isomorphic pressures such as security and exchange rules and
shareholder controls that promote a distinction (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Peng &
Jiang, 2010). Because such crossovers could portend blurring of archetype boundary
interpretations, the founder-owner operated business represents a less-fettered way a
leader-manager could be empowered or constrained by shared normative systems (Scott,
2008b). Clear distinctions have been identified between the founder owner-operator and
the professional manager (Schein, 1995). Professional managers are usually identified as
non-family and as non-owners and typically have less authoritative decision-making
freedom than owner operators have (Jain & Tabak, 2008; Schein, 1995).
Within the particular archetypical business structures of public, professionally
managed private and owner-operated firms, the modes and methods of controls are
relatively common, making for institutions in and of themselves (Greenwood & Hinings,
1993, 1996; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003). Individuals and organizations are relatively
stable entities with supporting structures, systems and routines that can be upset in the
midst of change (Ellis, 2011). This is particularly true of governance mechanisms
controlling the decision-making authority of leaders and managers (Greenwood &
Hinings, 1993). Moves within archetypes might provide familiar levels of autonomy
control mechanisms. Moves across archetypes may be unfamiliar and require significant
and possibly disruptive adaptation (Wissema, Van der Pol, & Messer, 1980).
The nature of publicly traded companies marks agency controls at every level of
leadership (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Publicly held corporations
invoke formal levels of control and decision-making approvals. Much of the governance
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structures of public firms are exogenously imposed by regulators and investors.
Exogenous sets of governance requirements decreed by the Securities Exchange
Commission dictate freedoms, install checks and balances and insert oversight that limit
individual autonomy (Boot, Gopalan, & Thakor, 2006). Private firms, even those with
greater than 500 owners, have far fewer intrusive controls dictated by outside agencies
(Boot, et al., 2006; Daily & Dollinger, 1992). Founder owner-operators, by nature of their
equity stake enjoy individual freedom to manage risk, make decisions and conduct
business with relatively individual discretion (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Fahlenbrach,
2010).
It has been demonstrated that leaders of professionally managed privately held or
founder owned and operated companies typically have far greater autonomy and less
oversight than those in larger public firms (Miller, et al., 2007; Pieper & Klein, 2007;
Pieper, Klein, & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Zellweger, Eddleston, & Kellermanns, 2010;
Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). Founder owner-operators generally have significant
autonomy and decision-making authority (Pieper, 2003; Zellweger, et al., 2010). Ownermanagers exercise virtually autonomous discretion over the use of their firm’s assets
(Lubatkin, et al., 2005).
Leaders and professional managers of professionally managed privately owned
companies may have other owners to answer to and justify actions to, but they also
frequently enjoy relative freedom to choose and act on their own (Boot, Gopalan, &
Thakor, 2008). Leaders who have enjoyed great pre-acquisition autonomy are often faced
with the loss of post-acquisition autonomy when ownership changes (Puranam &
Srikanth, 2007).
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It is conceivable that individuals possessing experience with the more
bureaucratic levels of decision and control could be less affected by a change in
governance by another corporate institution. One may contend that the more aligned the
decision-making authority, or decision-making controls are pre and post-acquisition, the
less affected the acquired leader and acquired group may be to a change in ownership or
organization. Conversely the less familiar the imposed control system is to the new
allocation of decision-making controls, the potentially more disruptive the change may be
on the individual leaders and hence, the group. The disruption may have negative effects
on the integration success or rate of integration. To investigate these assumptions the
related hypothesis states:

H2: The relationship between perceived post-acquisition autonomy and postacquisition integration success is moderated by the organizational archetype of a firm
acquired by a public company; specifically, higher levels of perceived success will be
experienced by leaders of professionally managed private firms than leaders of founder
owned and operated firms.

Previous experience with organizational integration may provide significant
lessons learned to all parties involved. The recognition of integration challenges, are
often learned through experience. Leaders who have recent memory of organizational
change, merger initiatives and integration processes may be better equipped to manage
the nuance of organizational change on both an individual and organizational level.
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Organizational learning refers to the processes of institutionalizing rules,
practices, routines and conventions of an organization (Levitt & March, 1988; March,
1991). Crossan, Lane and White (1999) described a framework of organizational learning
as four processes: intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing. Learning
processes are viewed as inter-linked practices at individual, group and organizational
levels. It involves tensions between the assimilation of new learnings and reinforcement
of historic learnings (Crossan, et al., 1999). Established learnings are supported through
the conventions and routines institutionalized within the organization. Routines are
conveyed through socialization, formal education, imitation, professionalization,
personnel exchange, and mergers and acquisitions (Levitt & March, 1988). Such
experiences are acquired through experience within other organizations (Levitt & March,
1988).
First-order organizational learnings are routines and processes that serve to
maintain organizational stability and sustain existing rules (Lant & Mezias, 1992; March,
1981). Second-order organizational learnings are characterized by the exploration of
alternative routines, rules, technologies, goals, and improved efficiency. Second-order
learning emerges from the realization that historical experiences and practices may not be
applicable to the current situation or organizational structure (Lant & Mezias, 1992;
Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy, 2003).
Organizational learning in merger and acquisition studies takes two distinct
tracks. One is focused on how experience with assimilation of new groups has a higher
propensity for success when the participants have greater experience with integration and
the other is the benefit from incorporating knowledge and experience assets into the
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acquiring company’s repository (McDonald, Westphal, & Graebner, 2008). According to
McDonald, Westphal and Graebner (2008), the value of experience is recognized and
dependent upon successful integration in both streams. The importance of retaining that
knowledge from both acquired management and other firm resources is broadly
recognized. Human capital resources are an integral element of the resource-based view
of the firm and contribute greatly to organizational learning (Barney, 1991a; Barney,
2001a, 2001b; Coff, 2002).
Acquired business autonomy is recognized by Meyer and Lieb-Dóczy (2003) to
facilitate second-order learning in both directions. Their research further demonstrates the
benefits of extracting the human capital of the acquired firm while the enterprise benefits
from the additional resources provided by the new owners. Meyer and Lieb-Dóczy
(2003) emphasize that organizational and behavioral learning is a two way process of
give and take, but concluded that learning and knowledge-sharing required higher level
of autonomy, particularly when associated with significant cross-cultural and specific
localization experience is involved.
Organizational learning and experience with integration should also lead to
recognition of the depth and degree of integration. Pablo (1994) pointed out that
experienced acquirers would better understand the degree of integration needed and
therefore will allocate autonomy level better according to need. This concept brings into
view the perceived human capital of the acquired firm and equates that with the resource
base already in possession. The greater equipped the purchasing company is with tacit
knowledge of the firm acquired and the market, the less need for autonomy of the
acquired firm exists (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992).
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Another perspective associated with the degree of organizational learning
perceived as necessary by the acquiring firm, is the opportunity to retain managers.
Recognition of this parental choice may motivate retained leaders to cooperate regardless
of how much autonomy is given to the acquired organization. If the acquisition is
primarily motivated by access to undervalued or underexploited assets, the decision to
allocate autonomy to acquired human capitol may be nominalized and more complete
integration may be expected (Zollo & Singh, 2004). To further the concept of effects
acquired leadership on perceived integration performance, one should consider the
organizational and experiential learning of the acquired firm leadership team. The
purpose of structure with an organization is to specify rights and obligations and to
delineate the steps of the decision process among its agents. Institutionalized structures
distinguish organizations from one another (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Familiarity with such
structural decision elements and their outcomes may better prepare acquired leaders for
the structural organization changes that occur in the transfer from one organizational
archetype to another.
Organizational learning is imparted to the organization through individual and
group experience (Pfeffer, 1983). Firms also gain learnings from the acquisition of new
employees and retain learnings from employees after their departure. Organizational
learnings become embedded formally by incorporating learnings into archival data,
practices, structures and informally through cultural practices promoted and supported by
members of the firm, consciously or unconsciously (Cohen, 1991; Malone, 2002; Vince,
2001). Within the context of organizational learning, it is the individual who extracts,
retains, executes and bases decision-making activities from experiential learnings (Kolb,
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Boyatzis, & Mainemelis, 2001; Walsh & Ungson, 1991). Past experiences may have
considerable effect on individual choice and individual response to stimuli (Lähteenmäki,
Toivonen, & Mattila, 2002). It has been argued in organizational learning literatures that
only individuals learn and impart knowledge and experience to organizational archives
and collections (Argyris & Schön, 1999; Lähteenmäki, et al., 2002; Shrivastava, 2007)
These learnings are collected and systemically integrated into the logic of action
(Thomas, Sussman, & Henderson, 2001).
The ability to recall and apply learnings of an acquired firm’s leadership past
organizational experiences might facilitate an individual’s recognition of situations and
affect reactions to them. Therefore, it is rational to assume that previous experience with
mergers and acquisitions could impart significant experiential learnings from both a
personal level and an organizational level (López, Peón, & Ordás, 2005). Such learnings
might be leveraged by an acquired firm’s leadership to recognize potential pitfalls during
the integration process, provide experientially based decision options and enhance the
success of the integration. It is plausible then, to expect the relationship of perceived
acquired firm autonomy and integration success to be influenced by former
organizational learnings of previous M&A experiences (Datta, 1991; Datta & Grant,
1990; Golden, 1992; Schwenk, 1985). To avoid weakening of associations and minimize
temporal interference of recall, a near-term M&A experience is preferred to measure the
possibility of such influences (Shrivastava, 2007). Near-term M&A experience, thirty six
months from the event (Capron & Shen, 2007), should be applied to allay recall concerns,
and remain consistent with other temporal boundaries of perceptual measures as
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recommended by the literatures. Based on the literatures associated with organizational
and individual learnings discussed, it is hypothesized that:

H3: The relationship between perceived post-acquisition autonomy and postacquisition integration success is moderated by the previous experience with a merger
or acquisition of the acquired firm’s leadership.

Research Design
Figure 1 presented below represents the hypothetical main effect relationship of
post-acquisition autonomy (IV) and integration success (DV). Included are potential
moderating variables associated with acquired firm ownership and acquired firm
leadership teams’ recent experience with a merger or acquisition. The acquired firm
ownership moderation was measured by the type of firm acquired (professionally
managed private or founder owned and operated) as defined in the methods section. The
dependent variable was controlled for by previously identified effects relating to relative
size of the acquired firm, industry relatedness, acquisition experience of acquiring firm,
retained leader post-acquisition ownership of acquired firm and acquiring firm
performance. The description and analysis methodology of the proposed model are
presented in the following chapter.
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Control Measures
Acquired Firm previous
organizational archetype:
(private non-owner operated
business unit or founder
owned and operated
business unit)

Recent acquisition
experience of acquired firm
leadership

- Relative size
- Industry relatedness
- Acquisition experience
of acquiring firm
- Degree of integration

Acquired leadership
perceived post-acquisition
integration success

Acquired leader perceived
post-acquisition autonomy

Figure 1: Theoretical model

Summary
In summary, neo-institutional research has identified institutionalized elements of
bureaucracy in all organizations (Scott, 2008a, 2008b). Such elements can be the effect of
internal and external isomorphic forces (Zucker, 1983). The bureaucracy of a particular
firm will share similar governance mechanisms with comparable organizational models
(Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000; Reed, 2001; Zucker, 1983). Formal control
mechanisms are implemented through embedded rules of management (Hasselbladh &
Kallinikos, 2000). Mechanisms can be deemed coercive in the sense that they exist to
reinforce predetermined decision-making authority (Dacin, et al., 2002). When
individuals are confronted with a change in autonomy, imbedded automatic response
structures may be disrupted, particularly if subjected to unfamiliar bureaucratic controls
(Dacin, et al., 2002; Stinchcombe, 1965). Individuals may experience changes to their
personal socio/psychological sentiments that result in detrimental impacts to the postacquisition environment. Effects on acquired leaders may result in disruption, uncertainty
and turmoil among extended workgroups and impede the integration success. These
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consequences are representable through measuring leadership transfers within acquired
organizations. This research evaluates perceived integration performance through
measuring perceived post-acquisition autonomy of acquired firm leaders. Applying the
distinct and unique organizational and bureaucratic institutions generally associated with
public for-profit firms, professionally managed private firms and founder owned and
operated firms, the perceived change of autonomy and perceived integration success are
contrasted to determine if a moderating affect exists among institutionally dissimilar
organizational archetypes. An additional evaluation of acquired firms leaders’ recent
experience with a merger or acquisition moderates the main effect.

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Sample
Primary data was obtained from a survey sent to top management team (TMT)
members of professionally managed privately held and founder owned and operated
firms that have been acquired by publicly traded U.S. firms within the past 18 - 24
months from the survey period (Datta, 1991; Datta & Grant, 1990).
While leadership literature often focuses primarily on the individual leader, some
recent research has begun to examine the role of leadership teams as a representation of
firm leadership (Ensley, Pearson, & Pearce, 2003; Hambrick, 1997). TMT leadership
represents the united influence, cohesiveness and collective power of leadership teams
(Ensley, et al., 2003; Jansen, Tempelaar, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009). TMT
characteristics are aggregated influences on firm strategy and decision-making choice
between members of the TMT (Michalisin, Karau, & Tangpong, 2004; Pearce & Ensley,
2004). Cohesion is the binding of knowledge and unity of action demonstrated by the
TMT in response to stimuli and decision choice (Hambrick, 1997; Michalisin, et al.,
2004). Collective vision is the common mental model of organizational strategy and
culture promoted by the TMT (Colbert, Kristof-Brown, Bradley, & Barrick, 2008; Dess,
2006). Such characteristics may be uniquely predominant in small to medium enterprises
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due to the size of the firm and typical size of the top management team (Lubatkin,
Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006). To enhance input opportunity from target SME firms,
TMT was used as a representation of the leadership team and acted as a proxy for
leader/leadership effects discussed throughout the dissertation (Hambrick, 1981). The use
of top management team members, including CEO if available, provides greater
likelihood of responses to survey requests from target firms and adequately represent
leadership characteristics in the analysis (Amason, 1996; Melnyk, Page, Wu, & Burns,
2012).
Responses from more than one TMT member of the acquired firm were paired
and averaged whenever possible. Such practice is encouraged by Golden (1992) who
recommends that firm-specific perceptions may be more reliable when obtained from
multiple representatives due to temporal recall issues and therefore, sourcing data from
one or more top management sources avoids “retrospective inaccuracies” (Bowman &
Ambrosini, 2002; Golden, 1992, p. 850). In the event that only one survey is returned
from the subject firm TMT, the response was included and deemed sufficiently valid for
analysis; however, it is recognized as a potential limitation of the study (Hambrick, 1981;
Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980). The near period measurement (18 to 24 months) is used to
mitigate temporal recall issues that could distort responses and allow for a reasonable
assimilation period (Datta, 1991; Datta & Grant, 1990; Golden, 1992; Schwenk, 1985;
Vasilaki & O'Regan, 2008).
Perceptual measures were used to mitigate the difficulties of accessing pre and
post-merger data from published corporate reports. Often pre-merger data, especially
from private companies, are not publicly available (Siegel, Simons, & Lindstrom, 2009).
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Post-merger financial data regarding acquired subunits are typically incorporated into
aggregate financial statements of the parent firm (Siegel & Simons, 2010).
Measurement bias, elevated co-variation and response inflation associated with
self-reported perceptual measures could be considered a limitation in quantitative
evaluations (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).
The method continues to be widely used in merger and acquisition research (Bowman &
Ambrosini, 2002; Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980). Subjective performance measures are often
used in studies of privately held firms where public information is lacking and have been
shown to correlate with objective performance data in SME firms (Ling & Kellermanns,
2009; Love, Priem, & Lumpkin, 2002). The perceptual measures methods are equally
valid in the absence of quantitative data (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers & Nakos, 2004;
Crampton & Wagner, 1994; Panchal & Cartwright, 2001). Both perceptions of acquired
firm autonomy and perceptions of post-merger integration success have been previously
used in merger and acquisition research conducted by Datta (1991), Burgman (1983),
Kitching (1967), Zaheer et al. (2011), and Weber (1996). “Self-report measures are a
useful tool to tap conscious experience and empirically measure cognitively relevant
constructs” (Vinski & Watter, 2012, p. 451). Perceptual outcomes, such as the
effectiveness of the integration process, are useful in that they provide direct access to the
impressions and recollections of those actors most affected (Weber, 1996).
Very et al. (1997) also point out that data drawn from the acquiring firm provides
little insight into explaining any change in the ability of the acquired business to perform
as a result of being acquired. Their research highlights the importance of researching
acquisition phenomena at the business level rather than the corporate level. Grounded in
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these findings, the data for this study are perceptually based and sourced from the
acquired firm TMT.
To maintain a small to medium enterprise focus, the dissertation limits target
firms to acquired firms employing fewer than 500 workers at time of acquisition, aligned
with other SME studies (Buckley, 1989; Dickson, Weaver, & Hoy, 2006; Hussinger,
2010; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004). Small and medium sized enterprises are
not consistently defined in research; they are typically bound by the number of
employees, fewer than 500 in North America and fewer than 250 in the European Union
(Ayyagari, Beck, & Demirguc-Kunt, 2007; Buckley, 1989; OECD, 2012; USITC, 2010).
European Union definitions additionally cap SMEs with an annual turnover at 85 million
Euros to qualify as an SME (OECD, 2012) but such a limit was not found to be applied to
U.S. domestic studies within the literature reviewed. The standard methodology in most
M&A research places a lower limit on deal value, typically in the range of $10MM to
$50MM (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; McCarthy & Weitzel, 2009; Schlingemann,
2004). This dissertation follows suit by placing a lowermost transaction limit of $10MM
dollar as a foundation. There was no ceiling limitation for the transaction price.
At the organizational level, hurdles to effectively manage disruptive change are
higher in larger firms and lower in smaller firms (Moore & Manring, 2009). However,
making a transition from a small firm to a larger enterprise control and management
system may show a greater difference in the response to changes in autonomy (Child,
1973; Datta & Grant, 1990; Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy, 2003). SME organizational structures
are often simpler than those of larger public firms (Gelinas & Bigras, 2004). The founder
owner-operator in particular, is more likely to be directly in control of operational
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functions and decision-making. The founder owner-operator is also the person who
develops and carries out visions and controls activities demanding a high need for
independence and autonomy (Filion, 1990). The need for independence and autonomy
could be an obstacle to the introduction of integration success factors such as
participatory management or decision sharing resulting in reduced autonomy and power
(Pablo, 1994; Schraeder & Self, 2003). As a result, the SME and founder-managers may
be likely to regard integration with new control management as a threat from loss of
freedom, the imposition of standards, and risks to pre-acquisition authority (Gelinas &
Bigras, 2004). The focus on small to medium enterprises provides opportunity to identify
moderating effects of public, professionally managed private firms or founder owned and
operated firms on autonomy allocation post-merger. The study therefore produces
adequate generalizability to other large and small SME businesses within the country of
study, which is the aim of the research (Brouthers & Nakos, 2004; Dickson, et al., 2006;
Omerzel & Antoncic, 2008).
The survey questionnaire contained questions representing four constructs; (1)
perceived autonomy, (2) perceived integration success, (3) organizational type of preacquisition target and, (4) recent acquisition experience of acquired firm TMT. The
survey invitations were mailed by post to current leaders and top team managers of the
acquired company as indicated by most recent information accessed through the Capital
IQ™ database. Web addresses linking to the survey were included in the invitation letter.
User codes were provided for firm identification and subject access to survey. Quick
response codes (QR) were inserted for access to provide hand-held device access to the
web based surveys (Ashford, 2010; Macer, 2011). The initial invitation mailing was
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complemented by an identical e-mailed invitation to subjects whose email addresses
could be identified. The invitation was based on social and professional association and
opportunity to receive findings with no other tangible incentives offered (Crittenden,
2011) (additional detail follows this section).
Challenges to this method may result from leadership and TMT turnover at the
acquired firm level, lack of interest, insufficient incentive to participate, fear of
retribution, loss of confidentiality, or the necessity to input the web-address manually.
Emailed invitations contained automatic links, which is intended to offset issues of web
address transfer. It is also noted that mature targeted subjects, sixty years of age or older,
may not be as comfortable using internet or web-based surveys, but this is becoming less
of an issue in a modern business environment (Hair Jr, Celsi, Money, Samouel, & Page,
2011).
To mitigate trust concerns, participant confidentiality was assured in the invitation
letter and within the survey instructions (Crittenden, 2011). Confidentiality appears to be
more readily accepted in web-based surveys (Hair Jr, et al., 2011). However,
confidentiality concerns may be increased due to distrust of electronic media and tracking
ability fears but are not anticipated to affect response rates (Andrews, Nonnecke, &
Preece, 2003; Couper, Traugott, & Lamias, 2001). In addition, time demand and ease of
use of web surveys have been demonstrate to enhance response rates and turnaround time
over postal mail (paper) surveys requiring physical return of the questionnaire (Andrews,
et al., 2003; Couper, et al., 2001; Kiesler & Sproull, 1986; Sheehan & McMillan, 1999).
It was anticipated that a complementary mailing, ten to fifteen days after the initial
mailing enhanced participation (Kaplowitz, Hadlock, & Levine, 2004). Kaplowitz,

65
Hadlock and Levine (2004) demonstrated response rates of web-based surveys produced
results comparable to mailed paper surveys.
According to established standards for quantitative survey research, the minimum
ratio of observations to variables is five to one, however the preferred ratio is 15 to 20
observations per construct (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 176). Because the
model tested has nominal constructs, the target sample size represented a minimum of 20
returns with a goal of 80 or more usable responses. The number of usable surveys
exceeded this minimum. Simple regression can be effective with a sample size of 20
(Hair Jr, et al., 2011), but maintaining power at .80 in multiple regressions requires a
minimum sample of 50 and preferably, 100 observations (Hair, et al., 2010). Anticipating
a 10% response rate, the initial survey circulation was distributed to 1,000 potential
respondents representing 396 unique firms in an attempt to enhance the generalizability
of the findings by attempting to acquire 100 usable observations.
Data Source/Sample Identification
The sample population was derived from Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ™
(Capital IQ™) database. Capital IQ™ allows cursory search for acquiring firm and
targets filtered by purchase size, geographic area and transaction close date, which fits
sample criteria. The initial sample was supplemented with published announcements
reported in Mergers and Acquisition Magazine, Crain’s List, Bloomberg News, Reuters
Merger and Acquisitions (Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Van Ness, 2002). Sample selection was
limited to U.S. SME firms with fewer than 500 employees and acquired by registered
U.S. publicly traded firms. A middle market firm (SME) context is supported by
comments of Very and Schweiger (2001) who determined that decision-making is often
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more concentrated at the top of smaller companies. The acquirers were publicly listed
firms identified by Capital IQ™ during the event window. Initial screening included the
following descriptions: geographic locations of the acquired firms are contained within
the United States of America; acquired firms have fewer than 500 employees; total
transaction values of greater than $10M was the minimum limit to avoid non-operating
exchanges (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; McCarthy & Weitzel, 2009; Schlingemann,
2004); purchasing companies are registered U.S. public firms, and acquisition close-dates
were between 18 and 24 months. Deal value was also gathered and verified through
Thompson Reuter, Securities Data Company's U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database
as the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses in
accordance to the methodology of (Moeller, et al., 2004). This information was
considered for possible contributions to analysis and discussion.
Initial investigation of target opportunity including all of the previously
prescribed indicated a potential unqualified pool of 561 firms with 2,971 identified
current members of the acquired firm top management team as reported by Capital IQ™
on July 15, 2012. One thousand addressees were randomly selected from the qualified
population. The Capital IQ™ database was used to extract acquiring company
information for control variable data outlined in the following pages. Acquired leadermanagement and contact information was attained through Capital IQ™ company
records.
Data Collection
Survey instruments were mailed to acquisition contacts 18 to 24 months following
the acquisition close date grounded on studies conducted by Krug (2003) and Datta and
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Grant (1990) to remain consistent with the existing literature that indicates the primary
impact of acquisitions occur shortly after the acquisition (Krug, 2003). Further
justification for the near term follow-up was an attempt to avoid TMT turnover (Krug &
Hegarty, 2001) and capture recent memory recollection of events and avoid deterioration
in the quality of the data (Datta & Grant, 1990; Golden, 1992; Schwenk, 1985).
Main Effect Measures
Autonomy (IV): Autonomy refers to the level of decision–making authority
allocated to the acquired firm and its leadership. To measure the construct, all ten
autonomy related items were extracted from the autonomy removal scale of Very (1997).
The scale is applicable to assess the extent to which the buying firm involved itself in the
acquired firm’s key decisions. The items address the acquired firm’s goals, operational
and business level strategies, personnel practices, and policies about major capital
investment involvement, and were previously used in multicultural tolerance studies of
Chatterjee et al. (1992), Hambrick and Cannella (1993) and Ranft (2006). “Hambrick and
Cannella (1993) noted on p. 746 of their study that Chatterjee et al. tolerance construct
and autonomy removal are conceptually equivalent” (Very, et al., 1997, p. 603). Per the
reported results, the test on the responses for the Very et al. (1997) scale revealed the
construct is reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89. A seven-point response scale was
used, ranging from (1) [your firm decides] over (4) [consensus decides] representing the
midpoint, to (7) [parent firm decides]. The ten specific measurements included; setting
key performance goals, defining portfolio of business, setting key competitive strategies,
defining key administrative policies, defining marketing budgets, setting research and
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development budgets, setting production schedules, setting senior manager rewards,
defining recruitment and promotion policies, and defining social policies.
The original five-point Likert anchors of the Very et al. (1997) scales were not
retained. Scales were modified from five to seven points to enhance consistency,
reliability, validity and discriminating power (Preston & Colman, 2000). Previous
investigations demonstrated little difference between five and seven point scales in terms
of variation about the mean, skewness or kurtosis and determined that recalling between
the scales resulted in comparable and reliable results (Dawes, 2008). Further support for
the change follows studies conducted by Preston and Coleman (2000), who determined
that scales with six or more response categories yield scores with greater reliability.
Based on the scale anchors, a low score on the autonomy scale questions represents a
high degree of acquired firm autonomy.
Perceived post-merger integration success (DV): Perceived post-merger
integration success refers to meeting or exceeding the anticipated stage performance
expectations of the acquiring firm (Graebner, 2004). Such expectations include
operational, financial and social integration. Perceived post-merger integration success
was measured using the performance expectations scale of Pelham and Wilson (1996).
There may be no reliable or practical alternative to perceptual inputs for certain types of
SME research questions (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Dess and Robinson (1984b) found a
strong correlation between subjective assessments of performance and their objective
counterparts. Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986, 1987) found that informant
perception data exhibited less method variance than some archival data. Perceived
integration success measures are also endorsed and used by Graebner (2004) when
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historical data does not exist or is not available to the researcher. Perceptual performance
measures with an anchor relative to expectations, allows for greater comparability across
types of businesses with varying standards of acceptable performance (Pelham & Wilson,
1996). Due to the nature of the sampling of acquired SME firms, objective measures of
performance are not readily available due to the proprietary nature of small firms and
segregation of subunit financial performance detail. Alternative measurement scales of
Datta (1991) and Zaheer (2011) were considered. The Pelham scale was selected for its
parsimonious approach and mix of goal success factors including product, market and
financial measurements. The desirable feature of the Pelham and Wilson (1996) scale is
the incorporation of specific measures including financial elements. The measures
included; 1, product success (2 items) - new product/service development and market
development; 2, growth/share success (3 items) - sales growth rate, employment growth
rate, and market share; 3, return on assets, (5 items) - profitability, operating profits,
profit to sales (supply) ratio, cash flow from operations and return on investment. The
results of reliability test in the Pelham et al. (1996) study produced an alpha of .74 for the
category of perceived success. The original seven-point Likert scales of the Pelham &
Wilson (1996) scale were retained as a seven-point scale for consistency, reliability,
validity and discriminating power.
Moderators
Firm ownership identifies whether the acquired firm was privately held (not
publicly traded or made available through public offerings) or founder owned and
operated (not publically traded, founder controlled and managed) at the time of
acquisition (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lubatkin, et al., 2005; Sale, 2011). Ownership
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were measured via dummy variables (0 = professionally managed private firm; 1 =
founder owned and operated firm) based on dichotomous survey measures. The following
definitions were provided to respondents of the survey instrument:
“For purposes of this questionnaire, professionally managed private firm
ownerships refer to closely held business not available to the public
through open exchanges and are not required to meet the strict Securities
and Exchange Commission filing requirements of public companies.
Private companies may issue stock and have shareholders; however,
shares are not traded on public exchanges and are not issued through an
initial public offering. An example of a professionally managed private
company is the holding of assets by a private investor or private
investment group or consortium operated by a team of professional
managers such as found in privately held equity groups or venture capital
firms with controlling equity of multiple firms. A founder owned and
operated business is a firm that is actively operated by the founder-CEO
whose stock is closely held, majority controlled by founder, and not
available to public markets (copied from question twelve in the survey
instrument found in this document).”

A follow-up question for founder owned and operated firms asked the percentage
of pre-acquisition ownership was held by the founder, family members and non-family
members. The information was accumulated and addressed in the discussion section of
the final dissertation.
Acquisition experience refers to the number of acquisition events experienced by
the acquired firm TMT in the previous three years to minimize weakening of associations
and minimize temporal interference of recall (Capron & Shen, 2007; Shrivastava, 2007).
Acquired firm acquisition experience was a question on the survey instrument seeking
subjects’ previous near term acquisition experience of being acquired or involved in
acquiring others (Barrett, 1973; Capron & Shen, 2007). The question was posed as a
simple yes-no selection and read, “Have you had direct executive-level experience with
mergers or acquisitions?” If answered yes, a follow up question asked, “Please indicate
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how many merger or acquisition integration events in which you have actively
participated”.
Control Variables
Relative size of the acquired firms has been previously found to have a negative
impact on post-merger success. Kitching (1967) observed a strong relationship between
unsuccessful mergers of relatively small firms by larger concerns. Likewise, Biggakdike
(1979) found that larger acquisitions out-performed smaller acquisitions (Beckmann,
1977; Bergh, 2001; Biggadike, 1979). Acquired firm size was measured using the
number of employees of the acquired firm (Pelham & Wilson, 1996). Acquiring firm size
(number of employees) was retrieved from secondary data sources (Capital IQ™).
Relative size data was used to compare perceived success of the survey respondents and
compared to the ratio of relative size of the acquired firm to the acquiring firm for
correlation.
Degree of relatedness: Both the delegation of autonomy and acquisition success
has been associated with industry relatedness of acquirers and the acquired (Capron &
Shen, 2007; Chatterjee, 1986; Datta & Grant, 1990; Flanagan, 1996; Haleblian &
Finkelstein, 1999; Porter, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Trautwein, 1990). Previous
research involving the study of two-party publicly traded acquisitions relied on the
matching of published SIC codes. Because this study focused on smaller public and
private acquisitions, published SIC codes were not always available. To overcome this
obstacle, a simple question added to the questionnaire provided continuous data regarding
the perceived relatedness of the acquiring firm to the industry of the acquired. The
question read, “Using your best judgment, please rank the industry relatedness (industry
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segment, product offerings or process) of the pre-acquisition firm”. Ranking options
were; 0% not at all related, 50% somewhat related, to 100% very related on a continuous
choice scale for each category.
Acquisition experience of the acquiring firm: Recent acquisition experience of
the acquiring firm was determined by measuring acquiring firm M&A activity within the
last three years (Capron & Shen, 2007; Shrivastava, 2007). The experience term mirrored
that of the acquired firm TMT M&A experience. Records were sourced through the
Capital IQ database
Integrated: Several questions on the survey addressed the understood strategic
purpose for the acquisition. High levels of integration may enhance synergistic potential,
but it can also result in negative outcomes in the form of inter-organizational conflicts
(Coff, 2002; Ellis, 2011; Harding & Rouse, 2007; Pablo, 1994; Ranft & Lord, 2000;
Singh & Zollo, 1998). Questions regarding interpreted pre-and post-acquisition strategic
objectives are posed through exploration of communicated objectives. The following
question was presented to address the perceived degree of integration: “Do you feel the
performance goals of the acquiring firm have been sufficiently communicated to the
management team of the acquired firm?” Response options were provided in five
categories: thoroughly communicated, reasonably communicated, somewhat
communicated, vaguely communicated, not at all communicated. The information
gathered was used to assess confidence in the perceived integration performance (DV)
and to gauge how well performance objectives were communicated to the respondents.
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Survey Preparation
Minimal changes to the original scales were made for the perceptual constructs
utilizing existing scales (autonomy and integration success). Single-item measures were
crafted for the non-perceptual variables. Qualtrics™ designed web-based surveys were
used. Internet-based survey and online survey are often used in research studies
interchangeably (Shih & Fan, 2008). For purposes of this study, the terms web-based or
internet-based surveys are used interchangeably, denoting postal mail or electronic mail
(e-mail) notifications with links to a web survey. It has been noted that turnaround time
of e-mail and web-based surveys is extremely high and the automation of several
functions reduce collection errors often associated with hand coding (Cobanoglu, Warde,
& Moreo, 2001). See Appendix II for a summary of the survey.
Survey Invitation
The survey invitation was designed to induce the strong feeling of “social
exchange” consistent with Dillman’s (1978) notion of social exchange, in which he
demonstrated that respondents reciprocate by treating the project seriously and returning
the survey (Dillman, 1978; Hager, Wilson, Pollak, & Rooney, 2003; Trouteaud, 2004).
This approach is supported by Crittenden (2011) emphasizing the prior lack of focus on
the acquired firm perspective and the invitee’s opportunity to help fill that gap.
Other studies suggest that potential survey respondents are more likely to
participate when they feel a professional affinity with the sender or the subject matter
(Guéguen & Jacob, 2002). High subject matter salience with potential respondents has
been associated with stronger return rates (Kaplowitz, et al., 2004). Additionally, a
nominal tangible reward may not provide incremental incentive for well-compensated
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executives who associate social exchange meaning to the survey to be greater than a
financial incentive (Barón, Breunig, Cobb-Clark, Gørgens, & Sartbayeva, 2009; Groves,
Singer, & Corning, 2000). For these reasons the cover letter included an effort to connect
the survey to a community associated research context (Marks, et al., 2001). Appendix III
provides a copy of the survey invitation letter.
Survey Administration
One thousand printed survey invitations were mailed through the U.S. Postal
Service to the target population. Ninety-nine letters were returned as undeliverable or the
addressee was no longer at that address. Two hundred eleven additional surveys were
mailed electronically to an expanded target group of both U.S. and Canadian firms due to
slow response from initial domestic audience. Eighty-two were returned as undeliverable.
The inclusion of Canadian firms is not considered to be subject to significant cultural fit
concerns (Breinlich, 2008; Tung & Verbeke, 2010; Weber, Shenkar, & Raveh, 1996).The
additional survey targets were also not limited to transactions greater than ten million
dollars as reflected in the original mailing. Smaller SMEs, particularly transactions
involving founder owned enterprises often involve lower value transactions (McCarthy &
Weitzel, 2009).
An electronic reminder was sent to four hundred ninety two invitees
approximately two weeks following the ground mail invitations. One hundred sixteen
were returned as undeliverable. The total number of invitations sent by all methods
applied was one thousand two hundred eleven. One hundred eighty one were retuned as
undeliverable resulting in a best case assumed 85% delivery rate. The delivery rate does
not include electronic messages delivered to junk mail or spam folders of the recipients.
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Available literature on Web surveys and methods of response rate calculations
widely vary and have yet to be agreed upon due to rapidly changing technology, access to
technology, and corporate controls over use of technology (Johnson & Wislar, 2012; Sax,
Gilmartin, & Bryant, 2003). According to Eysenbach and Eysenbach (2004), internet
based survey responses should be measured as a view-completion ratio rather than an
invitation-response ratio. Reporting response rates using such a method is felt to be a
more accurate indication of receipt of the survey match to the ability to participate, not
just willingness to participate. When calculating the number of surveys view/starts (131),
to survey respondents (94) a 71% response rate was achieved. Data cleansing resulted in
eighty-two usable surveys for a 64% response rate. For reporting purposes in this
dissertation, calculations were based on invitations sent, less those returned as
undeliverable divided by the number of surveys started as per the American Association
for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) (AAPOR, 2011; Johnson & Owens, 2003;
Kaplowitz, et al., 2004).
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Respondent Results
Ninety-four survey cases were received achieving a 9% response rate. Eight cases
were incomplete, lacking responses beyond the instructions section and were removed.
Four cases, two each, were self-identified as responding to the same acquisition event.
The first response from each firm was chosen to represent the case. Two additional
responses regarding foreign firm transactions were removed. The sample cleansing
resulted in a net 8% response rate of eighty-two usable cases representing eighty-two
distinct firms (AAPOR, 2011). Due to the small response rate, a common test for
nonresponse bias was conducted. The following are the results and methods applied.

Table 1 Nonresponse bias analysis using an independent sample t-test
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Variable
First
First
Second
Second
t (81)
Mailing Mailing Mailing Mailing
Perceived Autonomy
4.87
1.700
4.69
1.586
.512
(avg. Q10)
Perceived Success
3.67
1.3207
3.93
1.632
-.820
(avg. Q11)
Strategic Objectives
1.87
.7486
1.649
.6332
1.430
Known (Q3)
Strategic Objective
1.78
.6964
1.78
.8542
-.007
Change (Q4)
†p < 0.1 *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 *** P < 0.001; n = 82

p
.610
.415
.157
.995

A common way to test for non‐response bias is to compare the responses of those
who respond to the first mailing of a questionnaire to those who respond to subsequent
mailings (Clendenning, Field, & Jensen, 2013; Groves, 2006). Those who return
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subsequent mailings are, in effect, a sample of non‐respondents (to the first mailing), and
under the assumption that they are representative of that group (Couper, Kapteyn,
Schonlau, & Winter, 2007). Typical uses of a T-test for two independent samples might
include testing for differences two groups (Hair, et al., 2010). Nonresponse bias was
tested by using this method. Four key perceptual measures were chosen which the
researcher felt were fair representations of the targeted population. The measures selected
were, average perceived autonomy (independent variable, Q10), the average perceived
success (dependent variable, Q11), awareness of the strategic objectives (random variable
Q3), and did the strategic objectives change (random variable Q4). Survey data received
from the original mailing was segregated from follow-up reminders and second mailing
targets. Means of the specific responses of the two groups were compared and analyzed
for statistical significance using a simple T-test. The results of the analysis did not
demonstrate a statistically significant difference between the responses of the two groups,
therefore, there is no evidence that nonresponse bias exists through this method of
analysis (Groves, 2006).
Missing Data
Very little data was missing for key response items. Twenty-four respondents did
not provide the name of the acquired firm. Eight of those respondents left contact
information and were contacted directly, researched through LinkedIn or associated
through Capital IQ with the acquired firm. Once the acquired firm was identified,
accessing the acquiring firm information, size and age accomplished through Capitol
IQ™. For cases in which neither the respondent information or the acquiring firm
information was readily available within the survey, the respondents’ internet protocol
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address recorded by Qualtrics™ supplied either a company name or a user name and the
information was traced back through Capital IQ or the company website in most cases.
Other missing data included parent firm data. Missing data for acquiring firm key
measurement items was acquired through secondary data from Standard and Poor’s
Capital IQ™, company websites and other web based data services including internet
protocol service such as Whois, MYIP.MS, IP-adress.com among others. Google Maps
was also used to track addresses and identify physical locations of the respondent in
many cases. Although the method was productive, some firms could not be identified and
were not used in the analysis. The remaining missing data was determined through
mathematical means as allocating item category averages or trending scores. Only four
instances were addressed in such manner among all cases. Excess missing data from
uncompleted surveys were dropped. Eighty-two surveys provided sufficient power for
analysis (Hair, et al., 2010).
Dummy and Composite Variables
Several variables were transformed to accommodate regression analysis. The first
variable, integration, delineated whether the acquired firm was integrated into the
acquiring firms existing physical operations or remained a stand-alone operation. If the
acquired firm was not integrated, it was transformed to zero; if it was integrated it
transformed into a one. A second dummy transformed three individual categorical
relatedness responses product, process and market, into a single dummy variable. The
new variable represented the degree of relatedness.
Relative size was transformed into ratios by dividing the acquired firm size into
the acquiring firm size represented by number of employees at both firms at time of the
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event (Pelham & Wilson, 1996). Archetype was transformed by combining professionally
managed responses from public and private firms into category one (1) to represent
professional, non-owner managers and founder owned and operated firms into category
zero (0). The composite average of perceived autonomy items represented the autonomy
variable. A composite average was also used for perceived integration success.
Statistical Analysis
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was executed on the two borrowed scales to
provide confidence that the Very (1997) autonomy factors and the Pelham and Wilson
(1996) perceived integration success factors indeed measure the intended variables of
interest. The Exploratory Factor Analyses are provided in Table 2. The process was
essential since the scale of the autonomy factor was modified from a five-point to a
seven-point scale (Reise, Waller, & Comrey, 2000; Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, &
King, 2006). Additionally, the two scales were used on a common survey instrument. The
use of EFA techniques to partition data from multi-trait or multi-method matrices into a
particular perception trait provided the reader with greater confidence in the reliability of
the instrument and modified scales (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).
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Table 2 Exploratory factor analysis
Rotated Component Matrix
Component
1
2

Cronbach’s
Alpha
.96

Perceived Autonomy
Goals

.72

.88

Profit

.72

.88

Strategy

.85

.88

Policy

.86

.88

Inventory

.86

.88

Budgets

.70

.88

Markets

.86

.88

R&D

.80

.88

Products

.77

.88

Bonuses

.84

.88

Recruitment

.87

.88

Advancement

.87

.88

Culture

.77

.88

Perceived
Integration Success
New Product

.83

.89

Marketing

.80

.89

Growth

.88

.89

Employment

.75

.89

Market Share

.88

.89

Profit

.90

.89

Sales

.91

.89

ROI

.91

.89

ROA

.92

.89

.96
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A principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted to assess the
underlying structure for the 13 items of the perceived autonomy variable and the ten
items associated with the perceived integration success variable. The assumptions of
independent sampling were met. The assumptions of normality, linear relationships
between variables and the variables being correlated were checked. The initial extraction
yielded a 3-factor solution. The first component explained 44% of the variance. The
second component explained 27% of the variance and the third component explained less
than 5% of the variance. 71% of the variance was explained using component one and
two. Two items, autonomy-culture and success-cash-flow produced third factor scores of
.37 and .37 respectively. Both items however, also produced significantly stronger scores,
.77 and .84, on their primary component factor. Removal of integration success cash flow
item resulted a robust two-factor component structure with all items achieving a
component score >.7 (Hair, et al., 2010) on all autonomy related items and integration
items separately. The two-factor solution with thirteen autonomy items and the nine
remaining integration success items explained 71% of the variance (combined).
Component one, autonomy explained 44% and component two, integration success
accounted for 27% of the variance.
Common Method Bias
Self-report bias could have been unavoidable due to the respondent providing the
response to these variables is the same (Podsakoff, et al., 2003). To overcome these
limitations, it was anticipated that sufficient returns from multiple respondents of each
firm will allow for a separation of responses regarding autonomy constructs and
performance constructs. The leaders’ responses to autonomy questions would have been

82
useful for the autonomy construct response and the perceived integration performance
construct could be gathered from top management team responses. Both sets of questions
were posed to all survey participants and responses could then have been segregated
during analysis. This opportunity did not avail itself as only two responses from two
different firms replied regarding the same acquisition event. Previous research of Datta
(1991), Burgman (1983) and Kitching (1967) encountered similar restrictions. Podsakoff,
et al. (2003) recommended a solution to single source respondents in such cases was to
obtain the cultural measures and seek performance measurements from archival sources.
This solution was not feasible for two very important reasons; first, integration
performance is not a typically measured or recorded data point; second, performance
measurements of acquired and subunit entities are most typically rolled into larger,
aggregated reports of the parent company and are therefore not available for public
access. Podsakoff and Todor (1985) suggested the use of data partialling technique to
address the common source bias concerns in a self-respondent analysis, however,
Kemery and Dunlap (1986, p. 259) concluded that partialling does not minimize the
possible effects of common method variance and goes to cite additional research that
supports their conclusion that it should not be used. An attempt at partialling
organizational archetype was conducted in post hoc testing but produced no significant
change in results.
Although common method variance could not be completely ruled out,
examination of other studies has determined the method to be acceptable without
additional controls or calculations (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Doty & Glick, 1998;
Evans, 1985; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; Spector & Brannick, 1995). While bias may be
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present and even unavoidable in some cases, particularly with SME studies, it may not
significantly affect results or conclusions (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008).
Further, self-report performance data has been strongly correlated with objective data
(Dess & Robinson Jr, 1984a; Love, et al., 2002). Future studies could take additional
steps to measure potential effects of single source self-respondent data on the analysis of
the findings. Descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Table 3.
Table 3 Correlations, means, and standard deviations
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Regression Results
To test my hypothesized relationships, I performed a hierarchical moderated
regression analysis and reported the variables in five steps (see Table 4 for results). The
results were the same when each interaction effect was calculated separately.
Model 1 represents the inclusion of four control variables, relative size, degree of
relatedness, acquired firm integration, and parent firm merger and acquisition experience.
This model explains 4% of the variance of the dependent variable. The R2 of Model 1
was .08 with an adjusted R2 of .036, R2Δ of .08 and a significance of .15.
To test Hypotheses 1, Model 2 adds perceived autonomy and the direct effect of
archetype. This model explains 8% of the variance. The R2 of Model 2 was .15 with an
adjusted R2 of .08, ΔR2 of .07 and a significance of .06.
Hypothesis 2 was tested with Model 3 including the interaction effects of
Autonomy and Archetype, explaining 8% of the variance. The R2 of Model 3 was .16
with and adjusted R2 of .08, ΔR2 of .01 and a significance of .41.
Model 4 introduced the direct effect of acquired firm leader prior merger and
acquisition experience to the independent variable, perceived autonomy. This model
represented 7.2% of the variance. The R2 of Model 4 was .16 with an adjusted R2 of .07,
ΔR2 of .00 and a significance of .59.
Model 5 tests the third hypothesis where the interaction effect of the firm leader’s
prior acquisition experience was added. Model 5 represented 7 % of the variance
explained. The R2 of Model 5 was .17 with an adjusted R2 of .07, ΔR2 of .01 and a
significance of .47.
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The results indicated statistical significance of only H1. The effect of perceived
autonomy on perceived integration success (H1) indicated a negative relationship
opposite to the hypothesized direction. H1, H2 and H3 were not supported.
The potential for multicollinearity between the independent variable, perceived
autonomy and dependent variable, perceived integration success with this study was
addressed. A multicollinearity analysis found all variance inflation factors were within
acceptable range (Hair, et al., 2010).
The possibility of a common method bias due to common source sampling was
addressed by a single-factor test using the procedure suggested by Podsakoff and Organ
(Podsakoff, et al., 2003; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). I performed an exploratory factor
analysis with a varimax rotation using the eigenvalue greater than one criterion and found
that no single factor was able to explain more than 20% of the variance. The first factor
captured 20% of the variance in the data. The second factor captured 18%. The third
factor represented 14% of the variance. Rotated sums of squared loading produced
similar results. Factor one sum of square loading equaled 19%, factor two, 18% and
factor three 15%. Common method concerns are further mitigated by the data
relationships created by my predicted interactions because respondents were unlikely to
recognize the moderation hypotheses or to respond in a manner that may lead to spurious
findings (Kotabe, Martin, & Domoto, 2003; Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006).
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Table 4 Hierarchical regression results

†p < 0.1 *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
n = 82 in all models
Model 1 = Controls
Model 2 = Model 1 + Autonomy + direct effect of Archetype
Model 3 = Model 2 + interaction Autonomy*Archetype
Model 4 = Model 1 + Autonomy + direct effect of Acquired leader experience
Model 5 = Model 4 + interaction Autonomy*Experience
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Post-Hoc Analyses
Because the regression analysis included public company archetypes to achieve
the power requirements for sample testing, a post hoc test was conducted on the
archetype factor. Particular attention was paid to responses that indicated the
organizational archetype of the acquired firm.
A Bonferroni one-way between groups analysis of variance was conducted to
explore the impact of including public acquired firms within the analyzed archetype
factor. A sample of eighty-two responses was tested. Twenty-four responses were
associated with public firms, twenty-eight with professional managers of private firms,
twenty-eight represented family founder owner-operators and two respondents indicated
they were non-founder managers related to the founder. Post hoc comparisons using the
Bonferroni tests indicated that public firms represented a Mean score of .29 with a SD
equal to .458. Professional managers of private firms represented a Mean score of .33,
with a SD equal to .48 and did not differ significantly from the founder owned and
operated group represented a Mean of .34 with a SD of .48. Both public and private
responses were determined to be significant at .000 and therefore the null hypothesis was
not supported. These findings indicate that the inclusion of acquired public firm
responses may be used for the regression analysis (Demšar, 2006; Hochberg &
Benjamini, 2006).
Additional confirmation of the linear regression findings were achieved through
analysis of data using Smart PLS™ Partial Least Square (PLS) analysis tools (Hair, Hult,
Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014; Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005). The analysis of data using PLS
produced 17% variance explained of the overall model compared to a 17% explanatory
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power of the complete regression model. Very similar to the regression results, the
relationship of perceived autonomy to perceived integration success was significant, but
also in a negative correlational direction producing a -.29 from the PLS compared to a .27 regression result. Concurrent with the regression analysis, moderation testing did not
produce a significant result for archetype or acquired firm experience in the PLS findings.
Inferential tests for curvilinear relationships as per Hair et al. (2010) were also conducted
between perceived autonomy and perceived integration success producing no evidence of
curvilinear relationships.
The interpretation of post-hoc testing was found to support the linear regression
results. Additional analysis and configuration experimentation failed to produce
materially different results. It can be concluded from the additional testing that the
regression findings are valid and reliable.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH
SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Discussion
Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive relationship between perceived autonomy and
perceived integration success. While the results of this study showed a negative and
significant relationship contrary to the original conjecture, these findings are not
contradictory to other studies. For instance, Datta and Grant (1990) demonstrated a
negative relationship between allocation of autonomy to acquired firms and integration
success of both related and unrelated large firms. The findings by Datta and Grant (1990)
suggested that unrelated acquired firms were typically allowed greater autonomy than
acquired firms that were closely related to the acquirer’s knowledge of acquired firm
product, processes and industry. The findings of this dissertation support the negative
direction of perceived autonomy and perceived success with related small and medium
enterprises. The Datta and Grant (1990) study also showed that the level of integration
was significantly associated with autonomy allocation. Acquired firms that were
significantly related to the acquiring firm’s existing markets and operations were more
likely to receive less autonomy (Datta & Grant, 1990). The relationship of integration,
industry relatedness and autonomy allocation are typically closely associated (Barney,
1988; Datta & Grant, 1990). Forty-two percent of the dissertation survey respondents
indicated their acquired firm remained as a stand-alone operation yet ranked their
relatedness to the acquiring firm at 64%, relatedness being measured on a score of 0-100,
89
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100 being completely related. Fifty-two percent reported that the acquired firm was
integrated into the acquiring firm operations with a relatedness score of 76%. Conversely,
the stand-alone operations indicated a slightly lower perceived average autonomy score
of 4.40 on a Likert scale of 1-7, 7 representing complete autonomy, compared to
integrated firms reporting an average autonomy score of 5.13. While the perceived
autonomy scores appear to align with the findings relatedness relationships reported by
Datta and Grant (1990), data received for this dissertation did not produce sufficiently
granular responses from firms or the degree of integration of surveyed firms to
empirically support or contradict the relatedness findings of Datta and Grant (1990).
Another recent study by Zaheer et al. (2013) also found a significant but negative
relationship between acquired firm post-acquisition autonomy and structural integration.
Structural integration refers to the consolidating the functional activities of the acquired
firm into its reporting hierarchy of the acquiring firm (Vancil & Buddrus, 1979). As does
Datta and Grant (1990, p. 13), Zaheer, et al. (2013) also define autonomy as “the amount
of day-to-day freedom that the acquired firm management is given to manage its business
without close control by the parent company”. Zaheer et al. (2013) measured autonomy
by using an average of a four item, four-point scale assessing decision-making authority
concerning strategy, marketing, R&D and operations. These items were also included
both in this dissertation and in the Datta and Grant (1990) study. Unlike the Datta and
Grant (1990) study, the results produced by Zaheer et al. (2013) did not demonstrate
significant differences in autonomy allocation and the degree of integration. The Zaheer
et al. (2013) focus rather was directed toward post acquisition autonomy allocations
associated with the integration of similar and complementary acquisitions. While
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similarity and complimentary are both dimensions of relatedness, they are a more finely
grained distinction of Datta and Grant’s (1990) relatedness. The use of the more granular
categories by Zaheer et al. (2013) was designed to further investigate the relationship of
post-acquisition autonomy and integration. The Zaheer et al. (2013) study suggested that
previous acquisition relatedness studies might have produced the appearance of a
negative relation between autonomy and level of integration in similar and
complementary acquisitions but did not address a distinction between related or unrelated
acquisitions. “Our results show, integration and autonomy are negatively correlated, and
integration has a significantly negative effect on autonomy granted” (Zaheer, 2013, p.
625). This dissertations’ results indicate that perceived autonomy has a negative
relationship with integration success, which might be partially explained by the Zaheer et
al. (2013) findings in that autonomy and similar or complimentary acquisitions might
predispose the authority allocated to acquired firms and degree of integration planned for.
The effects of industry relatedness were acknowledged in the dissertation and included as
a measurable control within the dependent variable, but not to the degree of granularity
measured in the Zaheer et al. (2013) study. Nonetheless, the dissertation findings do not
conflict with Zaheer et al. (2013), but provide additional support regarding the direction
of post-acquisition autonomy associated with integration and relatedness of the acquired
firm.
There were several unique aims of this inquiry such as measuring the perceptions
of the acquiring firm leaders and the focus on small to medium sized acquired firms that
were not considered in the Datta and Grant (1990) or the recent Zaheer et al. (2013)
studies. It is also noteworthy that the average score for acquired firm industry relatedness
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in this dissertation was 81% on a 0-100 relatedness scale. Both Datta and Grant (1990)
and Zaheer et.al. (2013) have similarly strong relatedness scores associated with target
acquisitions. Although 40% of the dissertation’s acquisitions sampled remained as
standalone operations, the respondents indicated significant industry relatedness.
Therefore, one may conclude that the findings of this dissertation do not contradict those
of Datta and Grant (1990) or Zaheer et al. (2013) but instead support those conclusions
through alternative measures. The high degree, 81% of industry relatedness, for firms that
were both integrated into acquiring firms operations and those not integrated could have
resulted in an absence of diversity in the perceived autonomy scores possibly masking the
hypothesized directional relationships of autonomy and success. The lack of unrelated
acquisitions may partially explain the absence of findings in this dissertation.
Central to the investigation of post–acquisition autonomy is the intended degree
of integration (Pablo, 1994; Singh & Zollo, 1998). Degree of integration can be defined
as the degree of post-acquisition change in an organization’s leadership and decisionmaking administrative controls (Pablo, 1994). The degree of integration is important to
successful acquisitions (Whitaker, 2012). High levels of integration may theoretically
enhance synergistic potential, but can also result in negative outcomes in the form of
increased coordination costs and/or inter-organizational conflicts (Pablo, 1994). As
discussed earlier, firms are acquired for many different reasons, such as new market
penetration, capacity expansion, diversification, access to technology and even
opportunism, to mention only a few examples (Napier, 1989; Veugelers & Cassiman,
1999). According to Lubatkin et al. (1999, p. 58), “the buying firm rarely allows the
acquired top management team full autonomy, even in conglomerate acquisitions, the
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motivation to acquire usually stems from the buyer's belief that it can utilize the acquired
firm's physical and human capital more efficiently than was the case beforehand”.
However, Datta and Grant’s (1990) conclusions acknowledged the importance of postmerger autonomy under degree of firm relatedness. The Datta and Grant (1990) findings
indicated that firms acquired in unrelated industries received greater decision-making
authority than firms acquired in related industries or those using processes similar to that
of the acquirer. Datta and Grant (1990) further concluded that firms wishing to integrate
or expand a familiar process into existing operations are more likely to structurally
integrate or merge the acquired business and its processes into the existing institutional
configuration under preexisting control and decision mechanisms. Firms acquiring
unfamiliar processes or market positions will rely on the acquired institutional structure
and leadership by allowing greater autonomy and decision-making authority to the
acquired firm’s management team (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). As Meyer and LiebDóczy (2003, p. 26) put it, “The outcome of post-acquisition transformation and
integration depends on managerial action taken during the process”. Even considering a
methodical, integrative process, local activities are usually managed in an interdependent
way since the integration approach and execution of integration activities require local
management and decision-making (Birkinshaw, et al., 2000; Haspeslagh & Jemison,
1991). Contrary to this view, Falkner et al. (2003) determined that however traumatic an
acquisition might be to a small new subsidiary, the result was in most cases a substantial
improvement in the acquired firm’s economic performance. This may not be the case
when firms acquire to expand their organizational knowledge. The acquisition of human
capital is often a strategic aim of the acquisition (Coff, 2002; Harding & Rouse, 2007).
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However, in the face of loss of autonomy, talent often leaves the organization (Krug &
Aguilera, 2005; Lubatkin, et al., 1999; Siehl & Smith, 1990). The likelihood of top team
turnover immediately following the acquisition may have contributed to the lack of
findings. Those respondents who remained may not have suffered a loss of autonomy or
may have gained autonomy in the restructuring.
An important determinant for level of integration is how useful are the existing
resources in the management of the acquired company (Paruchuri, et al., 2006;
Wernerfelt, 1984). If the acquisition was made for plant, property and equipment and not
the softer side of a firm – people, relationships and creativity – acquired firms are likely
to experience greater degree of integration and, therefore, less decision-making autonomy
(Ellis, 2011; Ranft & Lord, 2000). It is important to acknowledge that acquired firm
respondents may not have been privileged to the full intention of the acquiring firm and
therefore the true motivation for the purchases are undetermined. Since the dissertation
expressly address the perceptions of acquired firm respondents, the individual
interpretations of the acquiring firm cannot be measured and may also have contributed
to the lack of findings by masking external factors that may have affected the perceived
relationship of autonomy and integration.
The study of post-acquisition integration has long been restricted by ascertaining
the acquirers’ intended degree of integration (Ellis, 2011; Pablo, 1994; Ranft & Lord,
2000). Acquisitions made to diversify risk are commonly decentralized, allowing the
acquired firms greater autonomy to run and manage operations. Firms acquired outside
the acquiring firm’s experience are also allowed greater autonomy (Datta & Grant, 1990).
Because this dissertation assessed the acquired firm perspective in contrast to much of
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previous research, the acquiring firm planned strategy or intended level of structural
integration was difficult to identify with certainty. Again, the inability to ascertain with
certainty the strategic objectives and motivations of the acquiring firm may have limited
the opportunity to add additional variables or empirically account for effects unknown to
the respondents.
There are several additional observations, which may have influenced the results
consistent with the aforementioned considerations. Respondents in this dissertation were
asked if they felt the goals and objectives were reasonably communicated to the acquired
firm management and if the success measures were sufficiently understood through a
series of questions within the survey. Thirty-seven percent of the respondents indicated
the goals and objectives of the firm post-acquisition were comprehensively known to
them. Forty-nine percent indicated the goals were generally known. Sixty-nine percent of
the responses indicated that the goals and objects of the firm had changed little or not at
all. Of those respondents, 24% felt the goals and objectives were thoroughly
communicated to them, 38% reasonably communicated and 23% felt they had been
somewhat communicated. Only 14% responded that the post-acquisition goals and
objectives of the acquired firm were vaguely communicated or not at all communicated.
Overwhelmingly, the respondents indicated that they were familiar with the postacquisition goals and objectives. This increases confidence in the respondent’s capacity
to respond reasonably to the questions on integration success measures. The data are
significant because they indicate that the perceived integration success measurements that
include strategic and financial measurements similar to those in Datta and Grant (1990)
and Zaheer et al. (2013), are founded on established and known achievement
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measurements. Further, because the goals were generally believed to be reasonable and
achievable, the value of success measurements can be deemed valid. If it had been
determined that the goals were generally unknown, or considered unreasonable, it might
be concluded that the negative relationship of perceived autonomy and integration
success could be an effect of individual resistance to change causing a possible
impediment to integration (Choi, Holmberg, Löwstedt, & Brommels, 2011; Thomas &
Hardy, 2011). Because there was little indication of resistance to post-acquisition goals or
the reasonableness of the goals, it is unlikely that resistance to change accounted for the
negative direction of the relationship of autonomy to integration success (Colman &
Lunnan, 2011). Summary conclusions for lack of findings of Hypothesis 1 are provided
in Table 5.
Hypothesis 2 predicted founder owner-operated acquired firm leaders would have
a greater resistance to changes in authority and hence produce greater resistance to postacquisition integration (i.e. change) than non-founder leaders. The findings of the
dissertation analysis did not provide support for the prediction despite equal and
statistically meaningful representation for private, public and founder firm acquisitions as
demonstrated by the Bonferroni test. Although 34% of the respondents indicated senior
most positions, only two respondents indicated they were related to the founder and no
responses were received from a founder owner-operator. The observed lack of
distinctions across the organizational archetypes could be due to non-family respondents
who are accustomed to limited authority and execute duties at the will of the autonomous
founder (Stewart & Hitt, 2012). In the case of significant autonomy, other categories of
professionally managed private corporations and public corporations, did not differ
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greatly from non-owner founder owned and operated businesses. In small and medium
founder owned and operated businesses, the organization and the leader are typically
closely associated (Schein, 1995). Employees may remain separate and potentially
transferable to a different organization without the threat of autonomy loss; in fact the
opportunity to gain decision-making authority may exist (Bernhard & O'Driscoll, 2011).
Under such circumstances, the moderating effect of pre-acquisition organizational
archetype upon perceived autonomy and integration success of founder owned and
operated employees might be obfuscated by an expectation of greater autonomy than that
provided before the acquisition, by the founder owned and operated archetype. Family
and founder firms often retain non-family professional managers who can be allowed
significant decision-making authority (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Gedajlovic,
Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004). Employment contracts of family owned and founder owned
firms with performance factors and authority rights are not uncommon and may be
similar to the authority and rewards found in private and public firms (Verbeke & Kano,
2012) thereby negating the change effects pursued within the research model. The
likelihood that professional managers represented the founder owned and operated firm
in this study may well have obscured the founder-owner operated effects that I sought to
explore in the archetype.
Another possible impediment to quantifying the full impact of pre-acquisition
organizational archetype effects was a change of leadership during integration.
Respondents indicated that 51% of the acquired firm chief executive was retained at time
of acquisition; however, 48% of the chief executives were installed by the acquiring firm.
Of those chief executives installed, 93% originated from the acquiring publically traded
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firm. Considering that virtually half of the acquired firm chief executives actually
represented professional managers from public firms, the attempt to identify archetype
origination effects may have been handicapped. Consequently, the responses may not
have been truly indicative of acquired firm perspectives, which could have contributed to
a lack of findings. Installed chief executives of business units can heavily influence the
resource allocations, risk choice, and operational effectiveness of the acquired
organization (Davies, Finlay, McLenaghen, & Wilson, 2006; Schein, 1992). However,
contrary to this position, Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggested that, based on an upper
echelon’s perspective, the organization becomes a reflection of its top executives, and the
characteristics and functioning of the top management team have far greater potential for
predicting organizational outcomes, than do the characteristics of the chief executive.
Top management team characteristics consistently predict organizational outcomes better
than chief executive influences (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996). This view suggests that
the reflection of the acquired firm’s chief executive might not influence the responses of
the top team management. Nonetheless, the influence of the chief executive on the
strategic and operational decision making cannot be disregarded, especially in light of an
installed leader inserted in the midst of organizational change (DiGeorgio, 2001; Kim, et
al., 2010; Lee & Alexander, 1998; Papadakis & Barwise, 2002; Piccolo & Colquitt,
2006). Unfortunately, there were insufficient same-firm responses from the survey to
evaluate the influence of an installed chief executive from a different organizational
structure with the acquired firm’s pre-acquisition archetype or its impact on integration
success. The inability to control for top team turnover and installed leaders may have
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contributed to the absence of findings. Summary conclusions for lack of findings of
Hypothesis 2 are provided in Table 5.
Hypothesis 3 predicted perceived autonomy of the acquired leaders and the
relationship between integration successes was moderated by previous experience with
merger and acquisition integration of the acquired firm leadership. The findings did not
provide a significant moderating effect within the theoretical model. Literatures suggest
that acquiring firms with M&A experience were more successful integrating acquisitions
into their operations than firms that had no M&A experience (Very & Schweiger, 2001).
This dissertation tested for a possible moderating effect of acquired firm leaders M&A
learnings from previous experience on the relationship of perceived autonomy and
perceived integration success. The lack of significant findings could have been affected
by the use of organizational learning theories in place of residual effects of individual
learnings.
Organizational learning refers to the processes of institutionalizing rules,
practices, routines, and conventions of an organization (Levitt & March, 1988; March,
1991). Crossman, Lane and White (1999) described a framework of organizational
learning as four processes: intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing.
These processes are viewed to be inextricably inter-linked at individual, group and
organizational levels and involve tensions between the assimilation of new learnings and
reinforcement of historic learnings (Crossan, et al., 1999). Established learnings are
supported through the conventions and routines institutionalized within the organization.
“Routines are transmitted through socialization, education, imitation, professionalization,
personnel movement, mergers and acquisitions. They [routines and conventions] change
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as a result of experience within a community of other learning organizations” (Levitt &
March, 1988, p. 320). First-order organizational learnings are routines and processes that
serve to maintain organizational stability and sustain existing rules (Lant & Mezias,
1992; March, 1981). Second-order organizational learnings are characterized by the
exploration of alternative routines, rules, technologies, goals, and improved efficiency.
Second-order learning emerges from the realization that historical experiences and
practices may not be applicable to the current situation or new organizational structure
(Lant & Mezias, 1992; Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy, 2003).
Organizational learning in merger and acquisition studies takes two distinct
tracks. One is focused on how experience with assimilation of new groups has a higher
propensity for success when the acquirer has greater experience with integration and the
other is the benefit from incorporating knowledge and experience assets into the
acquiring company’s repository (McDonald, et al., 2008). According to McDonald,
Westphal, and Graebner (2008), the value of experience is recognized and dependent
upon successful integration in both directions. The importance of retaining that
knowledge from both acquired management and other firm resources is generally
understood (Marsh & Stock, 2006). Human capital resources are an integral element of
the resource-based view and contribute greatly to organizational learning (Barney, 1991b,
2001b; Coff, 2002).
Acquired business autonomy is recognized by Meyer and Lieb-Dóczy (2003) to
facilitate second-order learning. Their research further demonstrates the benefits of
extracting the human capital of the acquired firm while the enterprise benefits from the
additional resources provided by the new owners. Meyer and Lieb-Dóczy (2003)
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emphasize that organizational and behavioral learning is a two way process of give and
take, but concluded that learning and knowledge sharing required higher level of
autonomy, particularly when associated with significant cross-cultural and specific
localization experience is involved. If successful integration is dependent upon the
coordination of M&A experience of both the acquired and acquirer, as McDonald,
Westphal, and Graebner (2008) have asserted, one might expect to see an effect of
leaders with M&A experience in the tests for moderation effect within this dissertation.
The lack of significance detected for acquired firm leadership M&A experience could be
the result of differences between organizational learning and individual learning.
Organizational learning and experience with integration may also lead to
recognition of the depth and degree of integration. Pablo (1994) pointed out that
experienced acquirers will better understand the degree of integration needed and
therefore will allocate autonomy level better according to need. This concept brings into
view the perceived human capital of the acquired firm and equates that with the resource
base already in possession. The greater equipped the purchasing company is with tacit
knowledge of the firm and market, the less need for autonomy of the acquired firm
(Chatterjee, et al., 1992). The data analysis of this study revealed an acquired firm
segment average relatedness score of 81% and an overall average relatedness score of
72% combining segment relatedness, product relatedness and process relatedness scores
ranging from 0 being not at all related, to 100 completely related. Based on Chatterjee et
al. (1992) assertions, the significant weight of degree of relatedness of the surveyed
population, embedded knowledge of acquired firm leaders’ previous M&A experience
might not be recognizable through the methods applied in the dissertation model.
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Another perspective associated with the degree of organizational learning often
perceived as beneficial to the acquiring firm, is the opportunity to retain or install new
managers. Recognition of this parental choice may motivate retained leaders to cooperate
regardless of how much autonomy is given to the acquired organization. “Also, if the
acquisition is primarily motivated by the access to undervalued or underexploited assets,
such as brands or location, the decision on the retention of [autonomy] is only loosely
connected to the one on the degree of integration of the productive assets” (Zollo &
Singh, 2004, p. 1241). Zollo and Singh (2004) attempted to measure not only the degree
of integration, but tie it to the concept of perceived organizational learning and the
benefits of greater autonomy of the acquired firm (Westphal & Shaw, 2005). According
to Zollo and Singh (2004) the accumulation of tacit knowledge through acquisition,
experience turns out to be a non-significant predictor of performance. The Zollo and
Singh (2004), findings validate the mixed results of the previous literatures on the
performance implications of accumulating acquisition experience. Their conclusions
suggest that organizations, not individuals codify knowledge derived from previous
acquisition experiences. “Mere exposure to integration processes and events does not
seem to suffice” (Zollo & Singh, 2004, p. 1248). The dissertation results also did not find
significant evidence of a moderating effect produced by individual M&A experience on
the relationship of perceived autonomy and perceived integration success, which support
the Zollo and Singh (2004) findings.
Studies reflecting the benefits of organizational learning within the buy-side of an
acquisition identify the ways in which organizational experiences become imbedded into
the programs, processes and routines of an acquiring firm (Ranft, 2006). There is an
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unclear distinction in theory today regarding the retention and application of individual
learning and organizational learning (Popper & Lipshitz, 2000). Whereas organizational
learning is a basis available to, and shared by the organization through embedded
knowledge, it can be institutionalized into practice and process, however individual
learnings, despite that they may be retained by the individual, are not easily accessed by
others and may succumb to environmental circumstance and therefore mollified or not
leveraged (Argyris & Schön, 1999; Popper & Lipshitz, 2000). Gathering and anchoring
organizational learnings and their incorporation into practice differs greatly from
individual extraction and application (Weick, 1991). The institutionalization of
organizational experiences may be more robust and more easily accessed than individual
learnings that might not share the common foundation of the circumstance or players
involved (Zaheer, 2013). Information processing that is based upon the retrieval of
information from memory can differ among individuals as well (Lähteenmäki, et al.,
2002). Responses to situations also vary from individual to individual and the freshness
of the experience has significance upon the recall of the experience (Walsh & Ungson,
1991). If individual experience, unlike organizational experience is not codified or
entrenched into structural processes of individuals, variation can occur and benefits of
personal M&A experience among individuals may not have statistically determinable
effect on the relationship of perceived autonomy and perceived integration success. It
may have been inappropriate to attempt to evaluate institutionalized organizational
experience of the acquired firm, (a control variable) with individual experiences that may
or may not have been instituted within the acquired firm and therefore contributed to the
lack of findings.
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Because this study attempted to measure individual experiences from the
perspective of the acquired firm, survey respondents were asked about previous
experience with mergers or acquisitions. The question used to measure a possible
moderating effect was binary (i.e., did the respondent have prior experience or not). 70%
of the respondents indicated they had executive level experience with a merger or
acquisition before the measured event. Thirty percent indicated they did not. Of those
who did have experience, 89% responded that they had experience with more than one
event. Seventy-eight percent of all respondents indicated that the acquired firm had not
been acquired within the last three years. These results have two important inferences.
First, the acquired firm respondents who had no acquisition experience would not likely
have experiential learnings to process and incorporate into organizational knowledge.
Second, although many respondents indicated previous experience with M&A, their
individual experiences may not have been shared with other members of the acquired or
the acquiring firm. Summary conclusions for lack of findings are provided in Table 5.
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Table 5 Findings discussion summary
Context
Hypothesis 1
Higher perceived levels of postacquisition autonomy by the
acquired firm leaders will be
positively associated with
perceived post-acquisition
integration success.

Possible explanations for absence
of findings
1.

2.
3.
4.

Hypothesis 2
The relationship between
perceived post-acquisition
autonomy and post-acquisition
integration success is moderated
by the organizational archetype of
a firm acquired by a public
company; specifically, higher
levels of perceived success will be
experienced by leaders of
professionally managed private
firms than leaders of founder
owned and operated firms.

1.

2.
3.
4.

Lack of range in autonomy allocation
due to a strong relatedness factor
among surveyed firms might have
diminished differences in perceived
autonomy among responders
Insufficient granularity for degree of
integration measurements
Inability to survey departed acquired
management
Undetermined buy-side motivation for
acquisition may have obfuscated
meaningful antecedents

1.

Founder owner-operators did not
respond to survey limiting fair
representation of archetype
Professional managers were
uncovered in each archetype
Acquired firm leadership turnover
may have affected results
Insufficient same-firm responses
prevented from developing firm-wide
consensus

1.

2.

3.
4.

2.

3.

4.

1.

Identifiable organizational uniqueness
may be lost during the process of
institutional change

1.

The theory may not be
generalizable in this situation

1.

The use of empirically based selfreport perceptual measures may have
distorted results or limited data points

1.

Qualitative and narrative
responses might add
additional robustness to
response data
This study may be better
suited for a grounded theory
approach

The relationship between
perceived post-acquisition
autonomy and post-acquisition
integration success is moderated
by the previous experience with a
merger or acquisition of the
acquired firm’s leadership.

2.

Theoretical
Neo-institutionalism

Empirical method used

2.

2.

Web-based survey

Ensure founder participating
through direct personal
contact
Seek responses from only
senior most acquired firm
leaders
Seek measurement of prior to
turnover or disqualify
responses from respondents
not originally with the
acquired firm
Target a larger sample
ensuring same-firm responsesthis may require cooperation
of new parent firm but the fear
of repercussion could bias
responses

1.

1.

Methodological

Determining a better mix of
acquired firms from unrelated
industries
Incorporate measures for
depth of integration into the
acquiring firms existing
structure
Reach acquired firm managers
nearer to the transaction event
Conduct acquiring firm
interviews to augment
acquired firm perspectives

Individual experience may not be
quantitatively identifiable
Organizational and individual learning
theories may have been misapplied to
this study

Hypothesis 3

Empirical

Recommendations for future
research

1.

Mail invitations to internet based
survey did not reach all parties- there
were significant invitations returned
as undeliverable

1.

Qualitative study may be
better suited to determining
the effects of previous
experiences
Apply greater emphasis on
individual learning and the
ability to manage
organizational change on an
individual level

Either increase the sample
population or conduct
qualitative interviews with a
smaller sample of key
leadership personnel
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In summary, the negative relationship of perceived autonomy and integration
success is not contradictory to prior studies. Support for the negative direction could
indicate that acquired firms with greater autonomy have less integration success than
acquired firms that are more closely managed by the leadership of the acquiring entity. A
prevalence of industry, product and process relatedness might also have limited variance
in autonomy allocation. The lack of data from non-retained or departed acquired firm
representatives might also have affected the perceived autonomy responses.
The absence of moderating effects of the acquired firm preceding organizational
archetype may also be due to turnover or the absence of representative samples from
founder owner-operators. A greater sampling of same-firm respondents might have
provided a stronger representation of firm archetype affects. Very few same firm
responses were received from the sample despite ample representation in the initial
invitations.
The lack of moderation by acquired firm leaders with previous M&A experience
could be reflective of a differential between embedded organizational and individual
learnings, but is neither demonstrated nor repudiated by the results. Organizational and
individual learning theories could be misapplied or might have been measured
differently.
The case for using a neo-institutional theory to ground the hypotheses was
comprehensive; however, the theory may not be generalizable in the presence of
significant dynamic change. The absence of archetype artifacts may be the result
acquiring firm dominance that obfuscates acquired firm organizational characteristics
during the integration process.
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Empirically, this study may have been limited by self-report perceptive measures
of respondents who remained with the acquired entity and had become sufficiently
acculturated that vestiges of their previous organizational characteristics were no longer
relevant to their responses. Qualitative analysis might have provided greater granularity.
Finally, the use of web-based surveys has significant drawbacks including
response rate, suspect confidentiality, historically poor delivery and response rate and
lack of follow-up opportunity.
Implications
This dissertation attempted to explore perspectives of the acquired firm top team
management and the moderating effects of post-merger antecedents to integration efforts
on the acquired firm management. The majority of literature on post-merger integration
accesses information from post-event public data or relies on the perspective of the
acquiring management (McCarthy & Weitzel, 2009). The present investigation
endeavored to measure integration effects from the acquired firm’s perspective. Although
the anticipated relational direction of autonomy and integration success (H1) was not
demonstrated, the negative directional findings should be noteworthy for future
researchers and theorists. The results support the findings of two other studies by Datta
and Grant (1990) and more recently by Zaheer et al.(2013) that also determined a
negative relationship between autonomy allocation and integration success of recently
acquired firms. The findings of this dissertation along with those of Datta and Grant
(1990) and Zaheer et al. (2013) might infer that greater autonomy is allocated as a result
of continuous or increasing success.
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Although the moderating effects of pre-acquisition archetypes and individual
merger and acquisition experience of acquired firm leaders did not prove to be significant
in this study, the lack of support and the chosen approach may possibly stimulate other
research along the same lines with different methodologies. The model did attempt to
bridge two important gaps in literature. First, it sought to measure the acquired firm
perspective of post integrations issues, and second, it was focused on small and medium
acquisition events. The lack of literatures focusing on smaller firm acquisitions and target
firm perspectives was evident by the review of extant literature. At the very least, the
contribution to theory is the recognition of the need for future research in these areas.
For practitioners, the dissertation highlights the complexities involved with
acquisition integration on an individual and an organizational level. It could provide
integration managers new perspectives to small and medium enterprise transitions and
integration planning in relation to the type of organization acquired. Strategic planners
and human resource analysts should benefit from the outcomes of perceived integration
success by considering the perspective of the acquired leaders. Acquired firm leaders
might also be sensitized to the myriad of personal and organizational ramifications
involved in change of control and benefit from such recognitions.
Limitations and Future Research
There were several recognized obstacles and limitations to this study. The
research could have been limited by the number of respondents. Although an eight
percent response rate resulted in sufficient returns to meet power requirements, a larger
sample may have produced different results. Difficulty reaching and enlisting survey
participants involved in acquisitions is exacerbated by high rates of top team turnover,
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which often accompany a merger of acquisition event. Further complications might have
resulted from the attempt to solicit founder owner-operators who sold their business.
Securing these participants might have been compounded by a possible unwillingness to
share the details of a personal transaction and its aftermath.
Shortcomings regarding the prospect of common method/common source bias
resulting from some single source firm response did not appear to be an issue (Bowman
& Ambrosini, 2002; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). However, the concern cannot be
completely dismissed when using same source, self-reported data.
Several other limitations with the study were recognized during data organization
and analysis. This study does not measure respondents’ previous archetype experience
prior to the acquisition. Follow-up conversations with two respondents indicated that they
had multiple archetype experiences. Although the study investigated the acquired target
firm organizational orientation, previous organizational type learnings from other
archetypes could have influenced responses. Another limitation may have been the
number and degree of involvement in previous merger or acquisition experiences of the
respondents was not measured. The level of involvement and opportunity to affect
decisions or interact with acquiring firms might have had an unrecognized effect on
responses of those who indicated previous M&A experience. It was also noted that some
acquired firms had been traded several times. Although respondents were asked about the
most recent acquired firm merger and acquisition experience, there was no measurement
to account for generalized organizational learning of the acquired firm.
Substantial reliance on sourcing secondary data regarding acquiring firm size and
age was required. Many of the acquired firms were purchased and reported through
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subsidiaries of larger parent corporations. In some cases, the acquiring firm was two steps
away from the publicly traded parent firm. A decision arose whether to use subsidiary or
parent data. In most cases, the immediate operating company data was used, but when
that information was not determinable, the ultimate parent company data was recorded. It
is unknown if this methodology had significance on the findings.
Another important limiting factor was the original near-term transaction
requirement of eighteen to twenty four months. More recent studies have used evaluation
periods of up to six years (Zaheer, 2013). Information processing that is based upon the
retrieval of information from memory can differ among individuals (Lähteenmäki, et al.,
2002). Responses to situations may also vary from individual to individual and the
freshness of the experience has significance upon the recall of the experience (Walsh &
Ungson, 1991). Controlling recall distance of the acquisition event was important to
ensure accurate responses, but the limitation may have had a restraining effect on returns.
Some respondents reported on events outside of the prescribed eighteen to twenty four
months. Those responses were accepted, but there was no measurement to determine
possible recall effects.
It is not unlikely that some snowballing effect took place. Key personal contacts
were encouraged to share the survey with additional qualified individuals. While this is
not a violation of accepted participant prospecting practices, there was no methodology
included in which to segregate direct invitees from indirect invitees (Chin & Chignell,
2007; Coomber, 1997; Kitchenham & Pfleeger, 2002). Substantial attempts to validate all
cases were executed through the use of secondary sources. Although the target audience
was well defined with invitations sent to prospects of firms that had been acquired within
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18-24 months, surveys received from snowballing could have represented expanded
windows from original close dates limiting control of sample.
Additional prospect for a deeper inspection of the degree of family influence and
possible effects of degree of familiness on the relationship of perceived autonomy and
integrations could have provided additional opportunities (Habbershon, Williams, &
Daniel, 1998). Questions regarding the degree of family ownership were presented in the
survey, but the response rate to these question provided insufficient data for meaningful
analysis. Only one respondent indicated a direct relationship to the founder. It was
assumed that either the information was unknown to respondents or an unwillingness to
share this type of information persisted. Variations in the degree of family or founder
owned and operated businesses are a recognized limitation within the dissertation. The
use of Family Power Experience and Culture scale (F-PEC) or similar familiness scales is
an opportunity for future researchers directed more specifically at acquired family owned
businesses (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005).
Acquisitions by and of international and non-domestic, nationally different firms
could add an additional cross-cultural element to the perception of autonomy and the
integration pace. Cultural differentiation among acquisitions in relation to the
organizational type could also provide interesting and additional cross-cultural insight to
perceived autonomy and acquisition integration and performance relationships.
There are several possible opportunities to revisit the study with modified
indicators. The first might be to conduct in-person interviews of leaders of acquired firms
and control the balance of previous archetype orientation. The effort might also allow for
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more specific and direct interaction with founder owner-operators to ascertain a more
reflective representation of the founder owner-operated archetype.
The second is a longitudinal study measuring various points along the integration
timeline assessing changes in autonomy and the relationship with integration successes.
Comparing both the acquiring firm perspective and the acquired firm perspectives of such
a possible relationship could also add additional meaningful elements.
Next could be to revisit the degree of familiness in the three organizational
archetypes; public, professionally managed private, or founder owned and operated by
directly targeting acquired family owned and operated businesses. A deeper investigation
might determine a familiness effect in publically and/or privately acquired firms and
identify additional effects of familiness in founder owned and operated or family owned
private segments. Such an investigation could prove interesting to family business
researchers and provide insight for practitioners. Finally, adding greater emphasis on
cross-cultural dimensions to the area of perceived autonomy and its relationship to
perceived integration success might prove to be important to the scholarship of global
merger and acquisition processes.
Conclusions
This study investigated the relationship between perceived autonomy and
integration success in recently acquired firm integration (H1). It further tested the
existence of a moderating effect presented by the acquired firm organizational archetype
within a neo-institutional context (H2). Hypothesis 3 (H3) tested for an association with
individual organizational learning and its moderating effect upon the relationship
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between perceived autonomy and perceived integration success during post-acquisition
integration.
Results from testing hypothesis 1 demonstrated a statistically significant
relationship between perceived acquired firm leader autonomy and perceived integration
success, but the hypothesized direction was not supported. Contrary to the original
hypothesis, the results indicated a negative direction in the proposed relationship between
perceived autonomy and perceived integration success. Neither Hypothesis 2, the
proposed moderating effect of the acquired firm’ immediate organizational archetype
prior to integration, nor Hypothesis 3, the acquired firm leaders’ experience with previous
mergers and acquisitions, was found to have a significant impact on the relationship
between perceived autonomy and integration success.
The assumptions of the research hypotheses were grounded in organizational
literatures including neo-institutional and organizational learning literatures. Previous
research has established an association between individual successes within decisionmaking control systems and has been associated with familiarity of the unique
organizational archetype of the firm (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
The neo-institutional school supports organizational learning as a mechanism to sustain
the entrenched uniqueness of the firm (Reed, 2001; Suddaby, et al., 2010; Weber, 1947;
Zucker, 1983). The results of this study, however, did not identify a significant mediating
effect of previous work environment or organizational archetype through the perception
of autonomy and its impact upon the perception of integration success. Additional
deductions might infer that greater autonomy allocated to leaders of small and medium
firms acquired by public corporations results in lower perceived integration success by
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the acquired firm leaders. Based on the results of the data analysis, neither the acquired
firm’s pre-acquisition structure, nor acquired firm top management experience with
mergers and acquisitions had significant impact on the relationship of autonomy
allocation and integration success within the confines of the analyzed data or the model
parameters.
The results of this dissertation support the findings of Datta and Grant (Datta &
Grant, 1990) and Zaheer et al. (2013) that also produced a significant, but negative
direction in a relationship between post-acquisition acquired firm autonomy and acquired
firm integration under different but similar circumstances. This dissertation adds
additional supports for those findings through the lens of acquired small and medium
enterprises.

115
REFERENCES

AAPOR. (2011). Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome
Rates for Surveys. (Vol. 4.0). Ann Arbor: American Accociation for Public
Opinion Research.
ABA. (2011). Model Business Corporation Act (978-1-61632-930-3). Chicago: American
Bar Association.
Adler, P. S., & Borys, B. (1996). Two types of bureaucracy: Enabling and coercive.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(1), 61-89.
Ahlers, O., Hack, A., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2012). "Stepping into the buyers' shoes"The valuation of family firms. Working Paper 1-31.
Ajzen, I. (2002). Perceived behavioral control, self efficacy, locus of control, and the
theory of planned behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32(4), 665683.
Amason, A. C. (1996). Distinguishing the effects of functional and dysfunctional conflict
on strategic decision making: Resolving a paradox for top management teams.
Academy of management journal, 39(1), 123-148.
Amiot, C. E., Terry, D. J., Jimmieson, N. L., & Callan, V. J. (2006). A longitudinal
investigation of coping processes during a merger: Implications for job
satisfaction and organizational identification. Journal of Management, 32(4), 552574.
Anderson, E. (1988). Strategic implications of Darwinian economics for selling
efficiency and choice of integrated or independent sales forces. Management
Science, 34(5), 599-618.
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding‐Family Ownership, Corporate
Diversification, and Firm Leverage*. Journal of Law and Economics, 46(2), 653684.
Andrews, D., Nonnecke, B., & Preece, J. (2003). Electronic survey methodology: A case
study in reaching hard-to-involve Internet users. International Journal of HumanComputer Interaction, 16(2), 185-210.
Ang, S., Van Dyne, L., Koh, C., Ng, K. Y., Templer, K. J., Tay, C., & Chandrasekar, N.
A. (2007). Cultural intelligence: Its measurement and effects on cultural judgment
and decision making, cultural adaptation and task performance. Management and
Organization Review, 3(3), 335-371.

116
Antila, E. M. (2006). The role of HR managers in international mergers and acquisitions:
a multiple case study. The International Journal of Human Resource
Management, 17(6), 999-1020.
Antonacopoulou, E. P., & Gabriel, Y. (2001). Emotion, learning and organizational
change: towards an integration of psychoanalytic and other perspectives. Journal
of Organizational Change Management, 14(5), 435-451.
Appelbaum, S. H., Gandell, J., Shapiro, B. T., Belisle, P., & Hoeven, E. (2000). Anatomy
of a merger: Behavior of organizational factors and processes throughout the preduring-post-stages (part 2). Management Decision, 38(10), 674-684.
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (Eds.). (1999). On Organizational Learning (2nd ed.).
Walden, MA: Blackwell Bussines.
Ashford, R. (2010). QR codes and academic libraries reaching mobile users. College &
Research Libraries News, 71(10), 526-530.
Astley, W. G., & Zajac, E. J. (1991). Intraorganizational power and organizational
design: Reconciling rational and coalitional models of organization. Organization
Science, 399-411.
Astrachan, J. H., Klein, S. B., & Smyrnios, K. X. (2002). The F-PEC scale of family
influence: A proposal for solving the family business definition problem. Family
Business Review, 15(1), 45-58.
Astrachan, J. H., & Shanker, M. C. (2003). Family businesses’ contribution to the US
economy: A closer look. Family Business Review, 16(3), 211-219.
Auster, E. R., & Sirower, M. L. (2002). The dynamics of merger and acquisition waves.
The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 38(2), 216-244.
Ayyagari, M., Beck, T., & Demirguc-Kunt, A. (2007). Small and medium enterprises
across the globe. Small Business Economics, 29(4), 415-434.
Bachmann, R. (2001). Trust, power and control in trans-organizational relations.
Organization Studies, 22(2), 337-365.
Bacon, N., & Hoque, K. (2005). HRM in the SME sector: Valuable employees and
coercive networks. The International Journal of Human Resource Management,
16(11), 1976-1999.
Bains, W. (2007). When should you fire the founder? Journal of Commercial
Biotechnology, 13(3), 139-149.
Bala, H., & Venkatesh, V. (2007). Assimilation of interorganizational business process
standards. Information Systems Research, 18(3), 340-362.

117
Barney, J. (1991a). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of
Management, 17(1), 99-120.
Barney, J. B. (1988). Returns to bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions: Reconsidering
the relatedness hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal, 9(S1), 71-78.
Barney, J. B. (1991b). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of
Management, 17(1), 99-120.
Barney, J. B. (2001a). Is the resource-based view a useful perspective for strategic
management research? Yes. The Academy of Management Review, 26(1), 41-56.
Barney, J. B. (2001b). Resource-based theories of competitive advantage:A tenyear
retrospective on the resource based view. Journal of Management, 27(6), 643650.
Barón, J. D., Breunig, R. V., Cobb-Clark, D., Gørgens, T., & Sartbayeva, A. (2009).
Does the effect of incentive payments on survey response rates differ by income
support history? Journal of Official Statistics, 25(4), 483-507.
Barrett, P. F. (1973). The human implications of mergers and takeovers. London:
Institute of Personnel Management.
Bascha, A., & Walz, U. (2001). Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions in
venture capital finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(3), 285-306.
Bass, B. (1990). From transactional to transformational leadership: Learning to share the
vision. Organizational Dynamics, 18(3), 19-31.
Bass, B., Waldman, D., Avolio, B., & Bebb, M. (1987). Transformational leadership and
the falling dominoes effect. Group & Organization Management, 12(1), 73-87.
Bass, B. M., & Avolio, B. J. (1994). Transformational leadership and organizational
culture. International Journal of Public Administration, 17(3), 541-554.
Beckert, J. (2010). Institutional isomorphism revisited: Convergence and divergence in
institutional change. Sociological Theory, 28(2), 150-166.
Beckmann, M. J. (1977). Management production functions and the theory of the firm.
Journal of Economic Theory, 14(1), 1-18.
Beer, M., & Walton, A. E. (1987). Organization change and development. Annual Review
of Psychology, 38(1), 339-367.
Bellinger, L., & Hillman, A. J. (2000). Does tolerance lead to better partnering? The
relationship between diversity management and M&A success. Business &
Society, 39(3), 323-337.

118
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Review of Economic
Studies, 70(3), 489-520.
Benders, J., Batenburg, R., & van der Blonk, H. (2006). Sticking to standards; technical
and other isomorphic pressures in deploying ERP-systems. Information &
Management, 43(2), 194-203.
Bergh, D. (1997). Predicting divestiture of unrelated acquisitions: An integrative model
of ex ante conditions. Strategic Management Journal, 18(9), 715-731.
Bergh, D. (2001). Executive retention and acquisition outcomes: A test of opposing
views on the influence of organizational tenure. Journal of Management, 27(5),
603-622.
Bernhard, F., & O'Driscoll, M. P. (2011). Psychological ownership in small familyowned businesses: Leadership style and nonfamily-employees’ work attitudes and
behaviors. Group & Organization Management, 36(3), 345-384.
Bertoncelj, A., & Kovač, D. (2007). An integrated approach for a higher success rate in
mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Economics and Business 25(1), 167-188.
Bezrukova, K., Thatcher, S. M. B., Jehn, K. A., & Spell, C. S. (2012). The effects of
alignments: Examining group faultlines, organizational cultures, and performance.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 97(1), 77-94.
Biggadike, R. (1979). The risky business of diversification. Harvard Business Review,
57(3), 103-111.
Birkinshaw, J., Bresman, H., & Håkanson, L. (2000). Managing the post-acquisition
integration process: How the human integration and task integration processes
interact to foster value creation. Journal of Management Studies, 37(3), 395-425.
Boen, F., Vanbeselaere, N., Brebels, L., Huybens, W., & Millet, K. (2007). Post-merger
identification as a function of pre merger identification, relative representation,
and pre-merger status. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(2), 380-389.
Boone, C., & de Brabander, B. (1997). Self-reports and CEO locus of control research: A
note. Organization studies, 18(6), 949-971.
Boot, A. W. A., Gopalan, R., & Thakor, A. V. (2006). The entrepreneur's choice between
private and public ownership. The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 803-836.
Boot, A. W. A., Gopalan, R., & Thakor, A. V. (2008). Market liquidity, investor
participation, and managerial autonomy: Why do firms go private? The Journal of
Finance, 63(4), 2013-2059.

119
Bordia, P., Hunt, E., Paulsen, N., Tourish, D., & DiFonzo, N. (2004). Uncertainty during
organizational change: Is it all about control? European Journal of Work and
Organizational Psychology, 13(3), 345-365.
Bower, J. L. (2001). Not all M&As are alike - and that matters. Harvard Business
Review, 79(3), 93-101.
Bowman, C., & Ambrosini, V. (2002). Using single respondents in strategy research.
British Journal of Management, 8(2), 119-131.
Brannen, M. Y., & Peterson, M. F. (2008). Merging without alienating: interventions
promoting cross-cultural organizational integration and their limitations. Journal
of International Business Studies, 40(3), 468-489.
Breinlich, H. (2008). Trade liberalization and industrial restructuring through mergers
and acquisitions. Journal of International Economics, 76(2), 254-266.
Brock, D. M. (2003). Autonomy of individuals and organizations: Towards a strategy
research agenda. International Journal of Business and Economics, 2(1), 57-73.
Brockhaus, W. L. (1975). A model for success in mergers and acquisitions. Advanced
Management Journal, 40(1), 40-49.
Brouthers, K. (2002). Institutional, cultural and transaction cost influences on entry mode
choice and performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2), 203221.
Brouthers, K., Brouthers, L., & Werner, S. (2008). Resource-based advantages in an
international context. Journal of Management, 34(2), 189-217.
Brouthers, K., & Dikova, D. (2010). Acquisitions and real options: The greenfield
alternative. Journal of Management Studies, 47(6), 1048-1071.
Brouthers, K. D., & Nakos, G. (2004). SME entry mode choice and performance: a
transaction cost perspective. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 28(3), 229247.
Brush, C. G., & Vanderwerf, P. A. (1992). A comparison of methods and sources for
obtaining estimates of new venture performance. Journal of Business Venturing,
7(2), 157-170.
Bruton, G. D., Oviatt, B. M., & White, M. A. (1994). Performance of acquisitions of
distressed firms. Academy of Management Journal, 37(4), 972-989.
Buckley, P. J. (1989). Foreign direct investment by small and medium sized enterprises:
The theoretical background. Small Business Economics, 1(2), 89-100.

120
Buono, A., Bowditch, J., & Lewis III, J. (Eds.). (2002). When cultures collide: The
anatomy of a merger. London: Thompson.
Buono, A. F., & Bowditch, J. L. (1989). The human side of mergers and acquisitions. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Buono, A. F., Bowditch, J. L., & Lewis, J. W. (1985). When cultures collide: The
anatomy of a merger. Human Relations, 38(5), 477-500.
Burgman, R. J. (1983). A strategic explanation of corporate acquisition success. Ph.D.
Doctoral Dissertation, Purdue University Press, West Lafayette, IN.
Busenitz, L. W., & Barney, J. B. (1997). Differences between entrepreneurs and
managers in large organizations: Biases and heuristics in strategic decisionmaking. Journal of Business Venturing, 12(1), 9-30.
Cameron, K. S. (2008). Paradox in positive organizational change. The Journal of
Applied Behavioral Science, 44(1), 7-24.
Cannella Jr, A. A., & Hambrick, D. C. (1993). Effects of executive departures on the
performance of acquired firms. Strategic Management Journal, 14(S1), 137-152.
Capron, L., & Shen, J. C. (2007). Acquisitions of private vs. public firms: Private
information, target selection, and acquirer returns. Strategic Management Journal,
28(9), 891-911.
Carroll, G. R., & Richard Harrison, J. (2002). Come together? The organizational
dynamics of post-merger cultural integration. Simulation Modelling Practice and
Theory, 10(5), 349-368.
Cartwright, S., & Cooper, C. (1992). Mergers and acquisitions: The human factor.
Waltham: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Cartwright, S., & Cooper, C. L. (1990). The impact of mergers and acquisitions on
people at work: Existing research and issues. British Journal of Management,
1(2), 65-76.
Cartwright, S., & Cooper, C. L. (2005). The impact of mergers and acquisitions on
people at work: Existing research and issues. British Journal of Management,
1(2), 65-76.
Cartwright, S., & Schoenberg, R. (2006). Thirty years of mergers and acquisitions
research: Recent advances and future opportunities. British Journal of
Management, 17(S1), S1-S5.
Chatterjee, & Hambrick, D. (2007). It's all about me: Narcissistic chief executive officers
and their effects on company strategy and performance. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 52(3), 351-386.

121
Chatterjee, S. (1986). Types of synergy and economic value: The impact of acquisitions
on merging and rival firms. Strategic Management Journal, 7(2), 119-139.
Chatterjee, S. (1992). Sources of value in takeovers: Synergy or restructuring–
implications for target and bidder firms. Strategic Management Journal, 13(4),
267-286.
Chatterjee, S., Lubatkin, M. H., Schweiger, D. M., & Weber, Y. (1992). Cultural
differences and shareholder value in related mergers: Linking equity and human
capital. Strategic Management Journal, 13(5), 319-334.
Child, J. (1973). Strategies of control and organizational behavior. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 18(1), 1-17.
Chin, A., & Chignell, M. (2007). Identifying communities in blogs: roles for social
network analysis and survey instruments. International Journal of Web Based
Communities, 3(3), 345-363.
Choi, S., Holmberg, I., Löwstedt, J., & Brommels, M. (2011). Executive management in
radical change—The case of the Karolinska University Hospital merger.
Scandinavian Journal of Management, 27(1), 11-23.
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Bergiel, E. B. (2009). An agency theoretic analysis of the
professionalized family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(2), 355372.
Clark, S. M., Gioia, D. A., Ketchen Jr, D. J., & Thomas, J. B. (2010). Transitional
identity as a facilitator of organizational identity change during a merger.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(3), 397-438.
Clendenning, G., Field, D. R., & Jensen, D. (2013). A Survey of Seasonal and Permanent
Landowners in Wisconsin's Northwoods: Following Dillman and Then Some.
Society & Natural Resources, 26(2), 226-237.
Cobanoglu, C., Warde, B., & Moreo, P. J. (2001). A comparison of mail, fax and webbased survey methods. International Journal of Market Research, 43(4), 441-452.
Coff, R. W. (2002). Human capital, shared expertise, and the likelihood of impasse in
corporate acquisitions. Journal of Management, 28(1), 107-128.
Cohen, J. R., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. M. (2008). Form versus substance: The
implications for auditing practice and research of alternative perspectives on
corporate governance. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 27(2), 181-198.
Cohen, M. D. (1991). Individual learning and organizational routine: Emerging
connections. Organization Science, 2(1), 135-139.

122
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128-152.
Cohen, W. M. L., D.A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perepective on learning and
innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128-152.
Colbert, A. E., Kristof-Brown, A. L., Bradley, B. H., & Barrick, M. R. (2008). CEO
transformational leadership: The role of goal importance congruence in top
management teams. Academy of Management Journal, 51(1), 81-96.
Colman, H. L. (2008). Organizational identity and value creation in post-acquisition
integration. Doctoral Dissertation, Norwegian School of Management, Oslo.
Available from BI Norwegian School of Management (Research Publications)
Colman, H. L., & Lunnan, R. (2011). Organizational identification and serendipitous
value creation in post-acquisition integration. Journal of Management, 37(3), 839860.
Colombo, M. G., & Delmastro, M. (2004). Delegation of authority in business
organizations: An empirical test. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 52(1), 5380.
Colombo, M. G., & Zrilic, O. (2010). Acquisition integration and leadership continuity of
high-technology acquisitions. Department of Management, Economics and
Industrial Engineering. Politecnico di Milano. Milan.
Commons, J. R. (1921). Industrial Government. New York: The MacMillan Company.
Commons, J. R. (1924). Legal Foundations of American Capitalism. New York: The
MacMillan Company.
Commons, J. R. (1931). Institutional economics. The American Economic Review,
21(1931), 648-657.
Coomber, R. (1997). Using the Internet for Survey Research. Sociological Research
Online, 2(2), 1-13.
Cording, M., Christmann, P., & King, D. R. (2008). Reducing causal ambiguity in
acquisition integration: Intermediate goals as mediators of integration decisions
and acquisition performance. Academy of Management Journal, 51(4), 744-767.
Couper, M. P., Kapteyn, A., Schonlau, M., & Winter, J. (2007). Noncoverage and
nonresponse in an Internet survey. Social Science Research, 36(1), 131-148.
Couper, M. P., Traugott, M. W., & Lamias, M. J. (2001). Web survey design and
administration. Public Opinion Quarterly, 65(2), 230-253.

123
Covin, T., Kolenko, T., Sightler, K., & Tudor, R. (1997). Leadership style and postmerger satisfaction. Development, 16(1), 22-33.
Crampton, S. M., & Wagner, J. A. (1994). Percept-percept inflation in
microorganizational research: An investigation of prevalence and effect. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 79(1), 67-76.
Crittenden, V. (2011). Questionnaire Design. Global Scholar Lecture Series. Coles
College of Business. Kennesaw State University. Kennesaw, GA.
Crossan, M. M., Lane, H. W., & White, R. E. (1999). An organizational learning
framework: From intuition to institution. Academy of Management Review, 24(3),
522-537.
Cusatis, P., & Blumberg, M. (2009). Why can't we predict merger and acquisition
success? An analysis and preliminary test of a new approach. Southern Business
and Economic Journal, 32(3), 79-112.
Dacin, M., Goodstein, J., & Scott, W. (2002). Institutional theory and institutional
change: Introduction to the special research forum. Academy of Management
Journal, 45(1), 43-56.
Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1992). Financial performance of founder-managed versus
professionally managed small corporations. Journal of Small Business
Management, 30(2), 25-34.
Daily, C. M., & Dollinger, M. J. (1992). An empirical examination of ownership
structure in family and professionally managed firms. Family Business Review,
5(2), 117-136.
Dannefer, D. (1984). Adult development and social theory: A paradigmatic reappraisal.
American Sociological Review, 49(1), 100-116.
Datta, D. (1991). Organizational fit and acquisition performance: Effects of postacquisition integration. Strategic Management Journal, 12(4), 281-297.
Datta, D., Grant, J., & Rajagopalan, N. (1991). Management incompatibility,
postacquisition autonomy and performance: An empirical study of US
Manufacturing firms. Advances in Strategic Management, 7, 157–182.
Datta, D. K., & Grant, J. H. (1990). Relationships between type of acquisition, the
autonomy given to the acquired firm, and acquisition success: An empirical
analysis. Journal of Management, 16(1), 29.
Davies, J., Finlay, M., McLenaghen, T., & Wilson, D. (2006). Key risk indicators–their
role in operational risk management and measurement. ARM and RiskBusiness
International, Prague, 1-32.

124
Davis, K., & Moore, W. E. (1945). Some principles of stratification. American
Sociological Review, 10(2), 242-249.
Dawes, J. (2008). Do data characteristics change according to the number of scale points
used? An experiment using 5 Point, 7 point and 10 point scales. International
Journal of Market Research, 51(1), 61-78.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic Motivation and Self-determination in Human
Behavior. New York: Plenum Press.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1987). The support of autonomy and the control of behavior.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53(6), 1024-1037.
Demšar, J. (2006). Statistical comparisons of classifiers over multiple data sets. The
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 7, 1-30.
Dess, G. G. (2006). Consensus on strategy formulation and organizational performance:
Competitors in a fragmented industry. Strategic Management Journal, 8(3), 259277.
Dess, G. G., & Robinson Jr, R. B. (1984a). Measuring organizational performance in the
absence of objective measures: The case of the privately‐held firm and
conglomerate business unit. Strategic Management Journal, 5(3), 265-273.
Dess, G. G., & Robinson Jr, R. B. (1984b). Measuring organizational performance in the
absence of objective measures: The case of the privatelyheld firm and
conglomerate business unit. Strategic Management Journal, 5(3), 265-273.
Dickson, P. H., Weaver, K. M., & Hoy, F. (2006). Opportunism in the R&D alliances of
SMES: The roles of the institutional environment and SME size. Journal of
Business Venturing, 21(4), 487-513.
DiGeorgio, R. (2001). Making mergers and acquisitions work: What we know and don't
know–Part I. Journal of Change Management, 3(2), 134-148.
Dillman, D. A. (1978). Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method (Vol. 3).
New York: John Wiley & Sons.
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism
and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review,
48(2), 147-160.
Dobbin, F. (1994). Cultural models of organization: The social construction of rational
organizing principles. In R. Williams (Ed.), The Sociology of Culture (pp. 117142). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Doty, D. H., & Glick, W. H. (1998). Common methods bias: Does common methods
variance really bias results? Organizational Research Methods, 1(4), 374-406.

125
Dyer Jr, W. G., & Whetten, D. A. (2006). Family firms and social responsibility:
Preliminary evidence from the S&P 500. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,
30(6), 785-802.
Eddleston, K. A., Kellermanns, F. W., & Sarathy, R. (2008). Resource configuration in
family firms: Linking resources, strategic planning and technological
opportunities to performance. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1), 26-50.
Edelman, L. B., & Suchman, M. C. (1997). The legal environments of organizations.
Annual Review of Sociology, 23(1), 479-515.
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Schoonhoven, C. B. (1996). Resource-based view of strategic
alliance formation: Strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms.
Organization Science, 7(2), 136-150.
Ellemers, N., De Gilder, D., & Haslam, S. A. (2004). Motivating individuals and groups
at work: A social identity perspective on leadership and group performance. The
Academy of Management Review, 29(3), 459-478.
Ellis, K., Reus, T., Lamont, B., Ranft, A,. (2011). Transfer effects in large acquisitions:
How size-specific experience matters. Academy of Management Jornal, 54(6),
1261-1276.
Elsass, P. M., & Veiga, J. F. (1994). Acculturation in acquired organizations: A forcefield perspective. Human Relations, 47(4), 431-453.
Ensley, M. D., Pearson, A., & Pearce, C. L. (2003). Top management team process,
shared leadership, and new venture performance: A theoretical model and
research agenda. Human Resource Management Review, 13(2), 329-346.
Evans, M. G. (1985). A Monte Carlo study of the effects of correlated method variance in
moderated multiple regression analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 36(3), 305-323.
Evans, R. L., & Reiser, D. J. (2004). Role transitions for new clinical leaders in perinatal
practice. Journal of Obstetric, Gynecologic, & Neonatal Nursing, 33(3), 355-361.
Eysenbach, G., & Eysenbach, G. (2004). Improving the quality of Web surveys: the
Checklist for Reporting Results of Internet E-Surveys (CHERRIES). Journal of
medical Internet research, 6(3), e34.
Fahlenbrach, R. (2010). Founder-CEOs, investment decisions, and stock market
performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44(2), 439-466.
Fama, & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and
Economics, 26(2), 301-325.

126
Fama, E. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. The Journal of Political
Economy, 88(2), 288-307.
Faulkner, D., Child, J., & Pitkethly, R. (2003). Organisational change processes in
international acquisitions. Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions, 2(1), 59–80.
Ferguson, T. D., & Ketchen, D. J., Jr. (1999). Organizational configurations and
performance: The role of statistical power in extant research. Strategic
Management Journal, 20(4), 385-395.
Filion, L. J. (1990). Entrepreneurial performance, networking, vision and relations.
Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 7(3), 3-13.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (Eds.). (1975). Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An
introduction to theory and research. Reading: Addison-Wesley
Flanagan, D. J. (1996). Announcements of purely related and purely unrelated mergers
and shareholder returns: Reconciling the relatedness paradox. Journal of
Management, 22(6), 823-835.
Fligstein, N. (1985). The spread of the multidivisional form among large firms, 19191979. American sociological review, 377-391.
Fligstein, N. (2001). Social skill and the theory of fields. Sociological Theory, 19(2), 105125.
Fogarty, T. J., & Dirsmith, M. W. (2001). Organizational socialization as instrument and
symbol: An extended institutional theory perspective. Human Resource
Development Quarterly, 12(3), 247-266.
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P., & Norberg, J. (2005). Adaptive governance of socialecological systems. Annual Reviews Environment and Resources, 30, 441-473.
Foreman, P., & Whetten, D. A. (2002). Members' identification with multiple-identity
organizations. Organization Science, 13(6), 618-635.
Fugate, M., Prussia, G. E., & Kinicki, A. J. (2012). Managing employee withdrawal
during organizational change: The role of threat appraisal. Journal of
Management, 38(3), 890-914.
Gadiesh, O., Buchanan, R., Daniell, M., & Ormiston, C. (2002). A CEO’s guide to the
new challenges of M&A leadership. Strategy & Leadership, 30(3), 13-18.
Gedajlovic, E., Lubatkin, M. H., & Schulze, W. S. (2004). Crossing the threshold from
founder management to professional management: A governance perspective.
Journal of Management studies, 41(5), 899-912.

127
Gelinas, R., & Bigras, Y. (2004). The characteristics and features of SMEs: Favorable or
unfavorable to logistics integration? Journal of Small Business Management,
42(3), 263-278.
George, E., Chattopadhyay, P., Sitkin, S. B., & Barden, J. (2006). Cognitive
underpinnings of institutional persistence and change: A framing perspective.
Academy of Management Review, 31(2), 347-365.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration.
Berkley: Univ of California Press.
Gioia, D. A., Schultz, M., & Corley, K. G. (2000). Organizational identity, image, and
adaptive instability. Academy of Management Review, 25(1), 63-81.
Golden, B. R. (1992). The past is the past--or is it? The use of retrospective accounts as
indicators of past strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 35(4), 848-860.
Graebner, M. (2004). Momentum and serendipity: How acquired leaders create value in
the integration of technology firms. Strategic Management Journal, 25(8-9), 751777.
Graebner, M., & Eisenhardt, K. (2004). The seller's side of the story: Acquisition as
courtship and governance as syndicate in entrepreneurial firms. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 49(3), 366-403.
Graebner, M. E., Eisenhardt, K. M., & Roundy, P. T. (2010). Success and failure in
technology acquisitions: Lessons for buyers and sellers. The Academy of
Management Perspectives, 24(3), 73-92.
Greenberg, J. (1987). A taxonomy of organizational justice theories. Academy of
Management Review, 12(1), 9-22.
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R. (1993). Understanding strategic change: The
contribution of archetypes. Academy of Management Journal, 36(5), 1052-1081.
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R. (1996). Understanding radical organizational change:
Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism. Academy of Management
Review, 21(4), 1022-1054.
Groves, R. M. (2006). Nonresponse rates and nonresponse bias in household surveys.
Public opinion quarterly, 70(5), 646-675.
Groves, R. M., Singer, E., & Corning, A. (2000). Leverage-saliency theory of survey
participation: Description and an illustration. The Public Opinion Quarterly,
64(3), 299-308.

128
Guéguen, N., & Jacob, C. (2002). Solicitation by e-mail and solicitor's status: A field
study of social influence on the web. CyberPsychology & Behavior, 5(4), 377383.
Guetzkow, H., & Gyr, J. (1954). An analysis of conflict in decision-making groups.
Human Relations, 7(3), 367-382.
Guzey, Y. Y., & Yurtseven, K. (2011). Managing change in M&A projects. Paper
presented at the Technology Management in the Energy Smart World, Portland,
OR.
Habbershon, T., Williams, M., & Daniel, J. (1998). Toward a definition of ‘familiness’:
Working Paper. Snider Entrepreneurial Research Center, Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania.
Hager, M. A., Wilson, S., Pollak, T. H., & Rooney, P. M. (2003). Response rates for mail
surveys of nonprofit organizations: A review and empirical test. Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32(2), 252-267.
Hair, J., Black, W., Babin, B., & Anderson, R. (2010). Multivariate Data Analysis (Vol.
5). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall
Hair, J. F., Hult, G. T. M., Ringle, C. M., & Sarstedt, M. (2014). A Primer on Partial
Least Squares Structural Equations Modeling (PLS-SEM): SAGE Publications.
Hair Jr, J. F., Celsi, M. W., Money, A. H., Samouel, P., & Page, M. J. (2011). Essentials
of Business Research Methods. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe Inc.
Haleblian, J., Devers, C. E., McNamara, G., Carpenter, M. A., & Davison, R. B. (2009).
Taking stock of what we know about mergers and acquisitions: A review and
research agenda. Journal of Management, 35(3), 469-502.
Haleblian, J., & Finkelstein, S. (1999). The influence of organizational acquisition
experience on acquisition performance: A behavioral learning perspective.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(1), 29-56.
Hall, D. T., & Mansfield, R. (1971). Organizational and individual response to external
stress. Administrative Science Quarterly, 16(4), 533-547.
Hall, R. I. (1976). A System pathology of an organization: The rise and fall of the old
Saturday Evening Post. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(2), 185-211.
Hambrick, D. C. (1981). Strategic awareness within top management teams. Strategic
Management Journal, 2(3), 263-279.
Hambrick, D. C. (1997). Corporate coherence and the top management team. Strategy &
Leadership, 25(5), 24-29.

129
Hambrick, D. C. (2007). Upper echelons theory: An update. The Academy of
Management Review 32(2), 334-343.
Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella Jr, A. A. (1993). Relative standing: A framework for
understanding departures of acquired executives. Academy of Management
Journal, 36(4), 733-762.
Hambrick, D. C., Cho, T. S., & Chen, M.-J. (1996). The influence of top management
team heterogeneity on firms' competitive moves. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 659-684.
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a
reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9(2), 193-206.
Hamilton, A. L. G., D.A. (Ed.). (2010). Organizational Identity and Strategic Decision
Making (Vol. 4). Chichester: Wiley.
Hamilton, B. H., & Nickerson, J. A. (2003). Correcting for endogeneity in strategic
management research. Strategic Organization, 1(1), 51-78.
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1977). The population ecology of organizations.
American Journal of Sociology, 82(5), 929-964.
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1984). Structural inertia and organizational change.
American Sociological Review, 149-164.
Harding, D., & Rouse, T. (2007). Human due diligence. Harvard Business Review, 85(4),
124-133.
Haspeslagh, P., & Jemison, D. E. (1991). Managing acquisitions: Creating Value for
Corporate Renewal (Vol. 416). New York: Free Press.
Hasselbladh, H., & Kallinikos, J. (2000). The project of rationalization: a critique and
reappraisal of neo-institutionalism in organization studies. Organization Studies,
21(4), 697-720.
Hatch, M. J. (2010). Material and meaning in the dynamics of organizational culture and
identity with implications for the leadership of organizational change. In N. W.
Ashkanasy, C; Peterson, M (Ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Culture and
Climate (pp. 341-358). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Hayes, R. H. (1979). The human side of acquisitions. Management Review, 68(11), 4146.
Hellmann, T. (1998). The allocation of control rights in venture capital contracts. The
Rand Journal of Economics, 29(1), 57-76.

130
Hellmann, T., & Puri, M. (2002). Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up
firms: Empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance, 57(1), 169-197.
Heugens, P. P., & Lander, M. W. (2009). Structure! Agency!(and other quarrels): A
meta-analysis of institutional theories of organization. The Academy of
Management Journal 52(1), 61-85.
Hirsch, P. M. (1997). Sociology without social structure: Neoinstitutional theory meets
brave new world. American Journal of Sociology, 102(6), 1702-1723.
Hochberg, Y., & Benjamini, Y. (2006). More powerful procedures for multiple
significance testing. Statistics in medicine, 9(7), 811-818.
Howell, J. M., & Hall-Merenda, K. E. (1999). The ties that bind: The impact of leadermember exchange, transformational and transactional leadership, and distance on
predicting follower performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(5), 680-694.
Hussinger, K. (2010). On the importance of technological relatedness: SMEs versus large
acquisition targets. Technovation, 30(1), 57-64.
Jain, B. A., & Tabak, F. (2008). Factors influencing the choice between founder versus
non-founder CEOs for IPO firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 23(1), 21-45.
Jansen, J. J. P., Tempelaar, M. P., van den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. W. (2009).
Structural differentiation and ambidexterity: The mediating role of integration
mechanisms. Organization Science, 20(4), 797-811.
Jarrell, G. A., Brickley, J. A., & Netter, J. M. (1988). The market for corporate control:
The empirical evidence since 1980. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(1),
49-68.
Jehn, K. A. (1997). A qualitative analysis of conflict types and dimensions in
organizational groups. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1), 530-557.
Jemison, D. B., & Sitkin, S. B. (1986). Corporate acquisitions: A process perspective.
Academy of Management Review, 11(1), 145-163.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305360.
Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983). The market for corporate control: The scientific
evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(4), 5-50.
Johnson, T., & Owens, L. (2003). Survey response rate reporting in the professional
literature. Paper presented at the 58th Annual Meeting of the American
Association for Public Opinion Research, Nashville.

131
Johnson, T. P., & Wislar, J. S. (2012). Response rates and nonresponse errors in surveys.
JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association, 307(17), 1805-1806.
Joslin, F., Waters, L., & Dudgeon, P. (2010). Perceived acceptance and work standards as
predictors of work attitudes and behavior and employee psychological distress
following an internal business merger. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 25(1),
22-43.
Judge, T. A., Bono, J. E., Ilies, R., & Gerhardt, M. W. (2002). Personality and leadership:
A qualitative and quantitative review. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(4), 765780.
Judge, W. Q., Douglas, T. J., & Kutan, A. M. (2008). Institutional antecedents of
corporate governance legitimacy. Journal of Management, 34(4), 765-785.
Kaiser, R. B., Hogan, R., & Craig, S. B. (2008). Leadership and the fate of organizations.
American Psychologist, 63(2), 96-110.
Kanter, R. M. (2009). Mergers that stick. Harvard Business Review, 87(10), 121-125.
Kaplan, S., & Weisbach, M. (1992). The success of acquisitions: Evidence from
divestitures. Journal of Finance, 47(1), 107-138.
Kaplowitz, M. D., Hadlock, T. D., & Levine, R. (2004). A comparison of web and mail
survey response rates. Public Opinion Quarterly, 68(1), 94-101.
Karim, S. (2006). Modularity in organizational structure: the reconfiguration of internally
developed and acquired business units. Strategic Management Journal, 27(9),
799-823.
Karim, S., & Mitchell, W. (2000). Path-dependent and path-breaking change:
Reconfiguring business resources following acquisitions in the US medical sector,
1978-1995. Strategic Management Journal, J.(21), 1061-1081.
Kavanagh, M. H., & Ashkanasy, N. M. (2006). The impact of leadership and change
management strategy on organizational culture and individual acceptance of
change during a merger. British Journal of Management, 17(S1), S81-S103.
Kellermanns, F. W., Walter, J., Lechner, C., & Floyd, S. W. (2005). The lack of
consensus about strategic consensus: Advancing theory and research. Journal of
Management, 31(5), 719-737.
Kemery, E. R., & Dunlap, W. P. (1986). Partialling factor scores does not control method
variance: A reply to Podsakoff and Todor. Journal of Management, 12(4), 525530.
Kiesler, S., & Sproull, L. S. (1986). Response effects in the electronic survey. Public
Opinion Quarterly, 50(3), 402-413.

132
Kiessling, T., Harvey, M., & Heames, J. T. (2008). Acquisition issues. Journal of
Leadership & Organizational Studies, 14(4), 287-302.
Kim, B., Lee, G., & Carlson, K. D. (2010). An examination of the nature of the
relationship between Leader-Member-Exchange (LMX) and turnover intent at
different organizational levels. International Journal of Hospitality Management,
29(4), 591-597.
King, D. R., Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., & Covin, J. G. (2004). Meta analyses of post
acquisition performance: Indications of unidentified moderators. Strategic
Management Journal, 25(2), 187-200.
King, G. (2002). Crisis management & team effectiveness: A closer examination. Journal
of Business Ethics, 41(3), 235-249.
Kirkpatrick, I., & Ackroyd, S. (2003). Archetype theory and the changing professional
organization: a critique and alternative. Organization, 10(4), 731-750.
Kitchenham, B., & Pfleeger, S. L. (2002). Principles of survey research: part 5:
populations and samples. ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, 27(5), 1720.
Kitching, J. (1967). Why do mergers miscarry. Harvard Business Review, 45(6), 84-101.
Klein, S. B., Astrachan, J. H., & Smyrnios, K. X. (2005). The F PEC scale of family
influence: Construction, validation, and further implication for theory.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(3), 321-339.
Knudsen, C. (1995). Theories of the firm, strategic management, and leadership. In C. A.
Montgomery (Ed.), Resource-based and evolutionary theories of the firm:
Towards a synthesis (pp. 179-218). Boston: Kluwer Academic Press.
Kolb, D. A., Boyatzis, R. E., & Mainemelis, C. (2001). Experiential learning theory:
Previous research and new directions. In R. J. Z. Sternberg, L. (Ed.), Perspectives
on Thinking, Learning, and Cognitive Styles (Vol. 1, pp. 227-247). Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Kormanik, M. B., & Rocco, T. S. (2009). Internal versus external control of
reinforcement: a review of the locus of control construct. Human Resource
Development Review, 8(4), 463-483.
Kotabe, M., Martin, X., & Domoto, H. (2003). Gaining from Vertical Partnerships:
Knowledge Transfer, Relationship Duration, and Supplier Performance
Improvement in the U.S. and Japanese Automotive Industries. Strategic
Management Journal(4), 293-316.

133
Kowal, J., & Fortier, M. S. (1999). Motivational determinants of flow: Contributions
from self-determination theory. The Journal of Social Psychology, 139(3), 355368.
Kraatz, M. S., & Block, E. S. (2008). Organizational implications of institutional
pluralism. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, S. Sahlin-Anderson & R. Suddaby (Eds.),
The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (pp. 840). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Krasner, S. D. (1988). Sovereignty. Comparative Political Studies, 21(1), 66-94.
Krishnan, H. A., Miller, A., & Judge, W. Q. (1997). Diversification and top management
team complementarity: Is performance improved by merging similar or dissimilar
teams? Strategic Management Journal, 18(5), 361-374.
Krishnan, R., Martin, X., & Noorderhaven, N. G. (2006). When Does Trust Matter to
Alliance Performance? The Academy of Management Journal(5), 894-917.
Krug, & Aguilera, R. (2005). Top management team turnover in mergers and
acquisitions. Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions - Special Edition 4, 121–149.
Krug, J. (2003). Executive turnover in acquired firms: An analysis of resource-based
theory and the upper echelons perspective. Journal of Management and
Governance, 7(2), 117-143.
Krug, J. A., & Hegarty, W. H. (2001). Predicting who stays and leaves after an
acquisition:A study of top managers in multinational firms. Strategic
Management Journal, 22(2), 185-196.
Krug, J. A., & Shill, W. (2008). The big exit: Executive churn in the wake of M&As.
Journal of Business Strategy, 29(4), 15-21.
Lähteenmäki, S., Toivonen, J., & Mattila, M. (2002). Critical aspects of organizational
learning research and proposals for its measurement. British Journal of
Management, 12(2), 113-129.
Langlois, R. N. (1989). Economics as a process: Essays in the new institutional
economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lant, T. K., & Mezias, S. J. (1992). An organizational learning model of convergence and
reorientation. Organization Science, 3(1), 47-71.
Larsson, R., & Lubatkin, M. (2000). Achieving acculturation in mergers and
acquisitions: A case survey study. Institute of Economic Research. Business
Administration, School of Economic Management. Lund University. Lund,
Sweden.

134
Lee, S., & Alexander, J. (1998). Using CEO succession to integrate acquired
organizations: A contingency analysis. British Journal of Management, 9(3), 181197.
Leiblein, M. J. (2003). The choice of organizational governance form and performance:
Predictions from transaction cost, resource-based, and real options theories.
Journal of Management, 29(6), 937-961.
Leung, A., Zhang, J., Wong, P. K., & Foo, M. D. (2006). The use of networks in human
resource acquisition for entrepreneurial firms: Multiple “fit” considerations.
Journal of Business Venturing, 21(5), 664-686.
Levitt, B., & March, J. G. (1988). Organizational learning. Annual Review of Sociology,
14(1), 319-340.
Lewin, K. (1951). Field theory in social science:selected theoretical papers. London:
Taylor and Francis.
Liang, H., Saraf, N., Hu, Q., & Xue, Y. (2007). Assimilation of enterprise systems: The
effect of institutional pressures and the mediating role of top management. MIS
Quarterly, 31(1), 59-87.
Ling, Y., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2009). The effects of family firm specific sources of
TMT diversity: The moderating role of information exchange frequency. Journal
of Management Studies, 47(2), 322-344.
Lipponen, J., Olkkonen, M. E., & Moilanen, M. (2004). Perceived procedural justice and
employee responses to an organizational merger. European Journal of Work and
Organizational Psychology, 13(3), 391-413.
López, S. P., Peón, J. M. M., & Ordás, C. J. V. (2005). Organizational learning as a
determining factor in business performance. The Learning Organization, 12(3),
227-245.
Love, L. G., Priem, R. L., & Lumpkin, G. T. (2002). Explicitly articulated strategy and
firm performance under alternative levels of centralization. Journal of
Management, 28(5), 611-628.
Lubatkin, M., Schweiger, D., & Weber, Y. (1999). Top management turnover related
M&A’s: An additional test of the theory of relative standing. Journal of
Management, 25(1), 55-73.
Lubatkin, M. H., Schulze, W. S., Ling, Y., & Dino, R. N. (2005). The effects of parental
altruism on the governance of family managed firms. Journal of Organizational
Behavior, 26(3), 313-330.

135
Lubatkin, M. H., Simsek, Z., Ling, Y., & Veiga, J. F. (2006). Ambidexterity and
performance in small-to medium-sized firms: The pivotal role of top management
team behavioral integration. Journal of Management, 32(5), 646-672.
Luoma, P., & Goodstein, J. (1999). Research notes. Stakeholders and corporate boards:
institutional influences on board composition and structure. Academy of
Management Journal, 42(5), 553-563.
Macer, T. (2011). Making it fit: How survey technology providers are responding to the
challenges of handling web surveys on mobile devices. Paper presented at the
Proceedings of the Sixth ASC International Conference: Shifting the Boundaries
of Research, University of Bristol.
Mael, F., & Ashforth, B. (1995). Loyal from day one: Biodata, organizational
identification, and turnover among newcomers. Personnel Psychology, 48(2),
309-333.
Mahoney, J. T., & Pandian, J. (1992). The resource-based view within the conversation
of strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 13(1), 204-231.
Malone, D. (2002). Knowledge management: A model for organizational learning.
International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, 3(2), 111-123.
Manne, H. G. (1965). Mergers and the market for corporate control. The Journal of
Political Economy, 73(2), 110-120.
March, J. G. (1981). Footnotes to organizational change. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 26(4), 563-577.
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning.
Organization Science, 2(1), 71-87.
Marks, M. L., Mirvis, P. H., & Brajkovich, L. F. (2001). Making mergers and
acquisitions work: Strategic and psychological preparation and executive
commentary. The Academy of Management Executive 15(2), 80-94.
Marsh, S. J., & Stock, G. N. (2006). Creating dynamic capability: The role of
intertemporal integration, knowledge retention, and interpretation. Journal of
Product Innovation Management, 23(5), 422-436.
McCarthy, K. J., & Weitzel, U. (2009) Theory and evidence on mergers and acquisitions
by small and medium enterprises. Vol. 9. Discussion Paper Series (pp. 3-30).
Utrect, NL: Koopmans Research Institute.
McDonald, M. L., Westphal, J. D., & Graebner, M. E. (2008). What do they know? The
effects of outside director acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance.
Strategic Management Journal, 29(11), 1155-1177.

136
McNulty, T., & Ferlie, E. (2004). Process transformation: Limitations to radical
organizational change within public service organizations. Organization Studies,
25(8), 1389-1412.
Mehta, M., & Hirschheim, R. (2004). A framework for assessing IT integration decisionmaking in mergers and acquisitions. Paper presented at the 37th Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences.
Melnyk, S. A., Page, T. J., Wu, S. J., & Burns, L. A. (2012). Would you mind completing
this survey: Assessing the state of survey research in supply chain management.
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 18(1), 35-45.
Merton, R. K. (1938). Social structure and anomie. American Sociological Review, 3(5),
672-682.
Meyer, C. B. (2001). Allocation processes in mergers and acquisitions: An organizational
justice perspective. British Journal of Management, 12(1), 47-66.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as
myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 82(2), 340-363.
Meyer, K. E., & Lieb-Dóczy, E. (2003). Post acquisition restructuring as evolutionary
process. Journal of Management Studies, 40(2), 459-482.
Michalisin, M. D., Karau, S. J., & Tangpong, C. (2004). Top management team cohesion
and superior industry returns an empirical study of the resource-based view.
Group & Organization Management, 29(1), 125-140.
Mickelson, R., & Worley, C. (2003). Acquiring a family firm: A case study. Family
Business Review, 16(4), 251-268.
Miller, D., De Vries, M. F. R. K., & Toulouse, J. M. (1982). Top executive locus of
control and its relationship to strategy-making, structure, and environment.
Academy of Management Journal, 25(2), 237-253.
Miller, D., & Friesen, P. (1980). Archetypes of organizational transition. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 25(2), 268-299.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. (2012). Family firm governance,
strategic conformity, and performance: Institutional vs. strategic perspectives.
Organization Science, Forthcoming.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R. H., & Cannella Jr, A. A. (2007). Are family
firms really superior performers? Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(5), 829-858.
Mintzberg, H. (1979). The structuring of organizations: A synthesis of the research.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

137
Mintzberg, H., & Bourgault, J. (2000). Managing Publicly. Toronto, Ontario, CA:
Institute of Public Administration of Canada.
Mizruchi, M. S., & Fein, L. C. (1999). The social construction of organizational
knowledge: A study of the uses of coercive, mimetic, and normative
isomorphism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(4), 653-683.
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P., & Stulz, R. M. (2003). Do shareholders of acquiring
firms gain from acquisitions? NBER Working Paper Series. National Bureau of
Economic Research. Cambridge, MA.
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P., & Stulz, R. M. (2004). Firm size and the gains from
acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2), 201-228.
Moore, S. B., & Manring, S. L. (2009). Strategy development in small and medium sized
enterprises for sustainability and increased value creation. Journal of Cleaner
Production, 17(2), 276-282.
Nahavandi, A., & Malekzadeh, A. (1988). Acculturation in mergers and acquisitions.
Academy of Management Review, 13(1), 79-90.
Napier, N. K. (1989). Mergers and acquisitions, human resource issues and outcomes: A
review and suggested typology*. Journal of Management Studies, 26(3), 271-290.
Napier, N. K. (2007). Mergers and acquisitions, human resource issues and outcomes: A
review and suggested typology. Journal of Management studies, 26(3), 271-290.
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (1995). Recent evolotionary theorizing about economic
change. Journal of Economic Literature, 33(3), 48-90.
Nelson, T. (2003). The persistence of founder influence: Management, ownership, and
performance effects at initial public offering. Strategic Management Journal,
24(8), 707-724.
Nikandrou, I., Papalexandris, N., & Bourantas, D. (2000). Gaining employee trust after
acquisition. Employee Relations, 22(4), 334-355.
North, D. C. (1986). The new institutional economics. Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics 142(1), 230-237.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New
Yout, NY: Cambridge University Press.
OECD. (2012). Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) Definition Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development Glossary of Statistical Terms (pp. 17).
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

138
Oliver, C. (1988). The collective strategy framework: An application to competing
predictions of isomorphism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33(4), 543-561.
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management
Review, 16(1), 145-179.
Oliver, C. (1992). The antecedents of deinstitutionalization. Organization Studies, 13(4),
563-588.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups.
In S. Visitchaichan (Ed.), (Vol. 124). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univiversity
Press.
Omerzel, D. G., & Antoncic, B. (2008). Critical entrepreneur knowledge dimensions for
the SME performance. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 108(9), 11821199.
Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S. (2000). Motivation, knowledge transfer, and organizational
forms. Organization Science, 11(5), 538-550.
Oxley, J. E. (1997). Appropriability hazards and governance in strategic alliances: A
transaction cost approach. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 13(2),
387-409.
Pablo, A. L. (1994). Determinants of acquisition integration level: A decision-making
perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 37(4), 803-836.
Panchal, S., & Cartwright, S. (2001). Group differences in post-merger stress. Journal of
Managerial Psychology, 16(6), 424-433.
Papadakis, V. M., & Barwise, P. (2002). How Much do CEOs and Top Managers Matter
in Strategic Decision‐Making? British Journal of Management, 13(1), 83-95.
Park, C. (2002). The effects of prior performance on the choice between related and
unrelated acquisitions: Implications for the performance consequences of
diversification strategy. Journal of Management Studies, 39(7), 1003-1019.
Parsons, T., Bales, R. F., & Shils, E. (1953). Working Papers in the Theory of Action.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Paruchuri, S., Nerkar, A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2006). Acquisition integration and
productivity losses in the technical core: Disruption of inventors in acquired
companies. Organization Science, 17(5), 545-562.
Pearce, C. L., & Ensley, M. D. (2004). A reciprocal and longitudinal investigation of the
innovation process: The central role of shared vision in product and process
innovation teams (PPITs). Journal of Organizational Behavior, 25(2), 259-278.

139
Pedersen, J. S., & Dobbin, F. (2006). In search of identity and legitimation bridging
organizational culture and neoinstitutionalism. American Behavioral Scientist,
49(7), 897-907.
Pelham, A. M., & Wilson, D. T. (1996). A longitudinal study of the impact of market
structure, firm structure, strategy, and market orientation culture on dimensions of
small-firm performance. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 24(1), 2743.
Peng, M. W., & Jiang, Y. (2010). Institutions behind family ownership and control in
large firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47(2), 253-273.
Perry, J. L., & Rainey, H. G. (1988). The public-private distinction in organization
theory: A critique and research strategy. Academy of Management Review, 13(2),
182-201.
Pfeffer, J. (1981). Management as symbolic action: The creation and maintenance of
organizational paradigms. Research in Organizational Behavior, 3(1), 1-52.
Pfeffer, J. (1983). Organizational demography. Research in Organizational Behavior,
5(1), 299-357.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (2003). Social control of organizations. In J. Greenman
(Ed.), The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence
Perspective (pp. 39-61). New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Piccolo, R., & Colquitt, J. (2006). Transformational leadership and job behaviors: The
mediating role of core job characteristics. Academy of Management Journal,
49(2), 327-340.
Pieper, T. (2003). Corporate governance in family firms: A literature review. INSEAD
Working Paper Series, 2003(97).
Pieper, T. M., & Klein, S. B. (2007). The bulleye: A systems approach to modeling
family firms. Family Business Review, 20(4), 301-319.
Pieper, T. M., Klein, S. B., & Jaskiewicz, P. (2008). The impact of goal alignment on
board existence and top management team composition: Evidence from family
influenced businesses. Journal of Small Business Management, 46(3), 372-394.
Pinkley, R. L. (1992). Dimensions of conflict frame: Relations to disputant perceptions
and expectations. The International Journal of Conflict Management, 3(2), 95113.
Pinnington, A., & Morris, T. (2002). Transforming the architect: Ownership form and
archetype change. Organization studies, 23(2), 189-210.

140
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common
method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and
recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879-903.
Podsakoff, P. M., & Organ, D. W. (1986). Self-reports in organizational research:
Problems and prospects. Journal of Management, 12(4), 531-544.
Podsakoff, P. M., & Todor, W. D. (1985). Relationships between leader reward and
punishment behavior and group processes and productivity. Journal of
Management, 11(1), 55-73.
Popper, M., & Lipshitz, R. (2000). Organizational learning mechanisms, culture, and
feasibility. Management learning, 31(2), 181-196.
Porter, M. E. (1987). From competitive advantage to corporate strategy. Harvard
Business Review, 5(3), 43-59.
Powell, W. W., & DiMaggio, P. J. (1991). The new institutionalism in organizational
analysis (Vol. 1). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Preston, C. C., & Colman, A. M. (2000). Optimal number of response categories in rating
scales: reliability, validity, discriminating power, and respondent preferences.
Acta Psychologica, 104(1), 1-15.
Priem, R. L., & Butler, J. E. (2001). Is the resource-based view a useful perspective for
strategic management research? The Academy of Management Review, 26(1), 2240.
Priem, R. L., & Price, K. H. (1991). Process and outcome expectations for the dialectical
inquiry, devil's advocacy, and consensus techniques of strategic decision making.
Group & Organization Management, 16(2), 206-225.
Puranam, P., Singh, H., & Zollo, M. (2006). Organizing for innovation: Managing the
coordination-autonomy dilemma in technology acquisitions. The Academy of
Management Journal ARCHIVE, 49(2), 263-280.
Puranam, P., & Srikanth, K. (2007). What they know vs. what they do: How acquirers
leverage technology acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal, 28(8), 805-825.
Raghavendra Rau, P., & Vermaelen, T. (1998). Glamour, value and the post-acquisition
performance of acquiring firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 49(2), 223-253.
Ranft, A. L. (2006). Knowledge preservation and transfer during post-acquisition
integration. Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions, 5(1), 51-67.
Ranft, A. L., Butler, F. C., & Sexton, J. C. (2011). A review of research progress in
understanding the acquisition integration process: Building directions for future

141
research. In F. Kellermanns, W,; Mazzola,P. (Ed.), Handbook of research on
strategy process (pp. 412). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Ranft, A. L., & Lord, M. D. (2000). Acquiring new knowledge: The role of retaining
human capital in acquisitions of high-tech firms. The Journal of High Technology
Management Research, 11(2), 295-319.
Raquib, M. A., Musif, M. P. B., & Mohamed, M. B. (2003a). Strategic issues relating to
corporate mergers and acquisitions for small and medium companies: A
thoughtful analysis from the viewpoint of challenges of changes. Asia Pacific
Management Review, 8(1), 99-111.
Raquib, M. A., Musif, M. P. B., & Mohamed, M. B. (2003b). Strategic issues relating to
corporate mergers and acquisitions for small and medium companies:A thoughtful
analysis from the viewpoint of challenges of changes. Asia Pacific Management
Review, 8(1), 99-111.
Ravenscraft, D. J., & Scherer, F. M. (1989). The profitability of mergers. International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 7(1), 101-116.
Reed, M. I. (2001). Organization, trust and control: A realist analysis. Organization
Studies, 22(2), 201-228.
Reise, S. P., Waller, N. G., & Comrey, A. L. (2000). Factor analysis and scale revision.
Psychological Assessment, 12(3), 287-297.
Ringle, C. M., Wende, S., & Will, S. (2005). SmartPLS 2.0 (M3) Beta, Hamburg.
Available in http://www. smartpls. de.
Risberg, A. (2001). Employee experiences of acquisition processes. Journal of World
Business, 36(1), 58-84.
Robins, J. A. (1987). Organizational economics: Notes on the use of transaction-cost
theory in the study of organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32(1), 6886.
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of
reinforcement. Psychological Monographs: General & Applied, 80(1), 1-28.
Rotter, J. B. (1990). Internal versus external control of reinforcement: A case history of a
variable. American Psychologist, 45(4), 489-493.
Rummel, A., & Feinberg, R. (1988). Cognitive evaluation theory: A meta-analytic review
of the literature. Social Behavior and Personality, 16(2), 147-164.
Ryan, R. M. (1982). Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: An extension of
cognitive evaluation theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43(3),
450-461.

142
Sale, H. A. (2011). The New “Public” Corporation. Law and Contemporary Problems,
74(1), 137-148.
Sax, L. J., Gilmartin, S. K., & Bryant, A. N. (2003). Assessing response rates and
nonresponse bias in web and paper surveys. Research in higher education, 44(4),
409-432.
Saxton, T., & Dollinger, M. (2004). Target reputation and appropriability: Picking and
deploying resources in acquisitions. Journal of Management, 30(1), 123-147.
Schein, E. H. (1983). The role of the founder in the creation of organizational culture.
Organizational Dynamics, Summer(1), 1-28.
Schein, E. H. (1990). Organizational culture. American Psychologist, 45(2), 109-119.
Schein, E. H. (1992). The role of the CEO in the management of change: The case of
information technology: Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schein, E. H. (1995). The role of the founder in creating organizational culture. Family
Business Review, 8(3), 221-238.
Schein, E. H. (2010). Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Fransisco: JosseyBass.
Schlingemann, F. P. (2004). Financing decisions and bidder gains. Journal of Corporate
Finance, 10(5), 683-701.
Schoenberg, R. (2006). Measuring the performance of corporate acquisitions: An
empirical comparison of alternative metrics. British Journal of Management,
17(4), 361-370.
Schraeder, M., & Self, D. R. (2003). Enhancing the success of mergers and acquisitions:
an organizational culture perspective. Management Decision, 41(5), 511-522.
Schreiber, J. B., Nora, A., Stage, F. K., Barlow, E. A., & King, J. (2006). Reporting
structural equation modeling and confirmatory factor analysis results: A review.
The Journal of Educational Research, 99(6), 323-338.
Schulze, W., Lubatkin, M., Dino, R., & Buchholtz, A. (2001). Agency relationships in
family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science, 12(2), 99-116.
Schweiger, D., & DeNisi, A. (1991). Communication with employees following a
merger: A longitudinal field experiment. Academy of Management Journal, 34(1),
110-135.
Schwenk, C. R. (1985). The use of participant recollection in the modeling of
organizational decision processes. Academy of Management Review, 10(3), 496503.

143
Scott, W. R. (1987). The adolescence of institutional theory. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 10(1), 493-511.
Scott, W. R. (2008a). Approaching adulthood: The maturing of institutional theory.
Theory and Society, 37(5), 427-442.
Scott, W. R. (2008b). Institutions and organizations: Ideas and interests. Thousand Oaks:
Sage Publications.
Scott, W. R. (2010). Reflections: The past and future of research on institutions and
institutional change. Journal of Change Management, 10(1), 5-21.
Selznick, P. (1948). Foundations of the theory of organization. American Sociological
Review, 13(1), 25-35.
Shanley, M. T., & Correa, M. E. (1992). Agreement between top management teams and
expectations for post-acquisition performance. Strategic Management Journal,
13(4), 245-266.
Sheehan, K. B., & McMillan, S. J. (1999). Response variation in e-mail surveys: An
exploration. Journal of Advertising Research, 39(4), 45-54.
Shih, T. H., & Fan, X. (2008). Comparing response rates from web and mail surveys: A
meta-analysis. Field Methods, 20(3), 249-271.
Shimizu, K., & Hitt, M. A. (2005). What constrains or facilitates divestitures of formerly
acquired firms? The effects of organizational inertia. Journal of Management,
31(1), 50-72.
Shivers-Blackwell, S. (2006). The influence of perceptions of organizational structure &
culture on leadership role requirements: The moderating impact of locus of
control & self-monitoring. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies,
12(4), 27-49.
Shrivastava, P. (1986). Postmerger integration. Journal of Business Strategy, 7(1), 65-76.
Shrivastava, P. (2007). A typology of organizational learning systems. Journal of
Management Studies, 20(1), 7-28.
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., van Laar, C., & Levin, S. (2004). Social dominance theory: Its
agenda and method. Political Psychology, 25(6), 845-880.
Siegel, D. S., & Simons, K. L. (2010). Assessing the effects of mergers and acquisitions
on firm performance, plant productivity, and workers: new evidence from
matched employer - employee data. Strategic Management Journal, 31(8), 903916.

144
Siegel, D. S., Simons, K. L., & Lindstrom, T. (2009). Ownership change, productivity,
and human capital: New evidence from matched employer-employee data.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Siehl, C., & Smith, D. (1990). Avoiding the loss of a gain: Retaining top managers in an
acquisition. Human Resource Management, 29(2), 167-185.
Simon, H. A. (1997). Models of bounded rationality: Empirically grounded economic
reason (Vol. 3). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Simons, T., & Ingram, P. (1997). Organization and ideology: Kibbutzim and hired labor,
1951-1965. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1), 784-813.
Singh, H., & Montgomery, C. A. (1987). Corporate acquisition strategies and economic
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 8(4), 377-386.
Singh, H., & Zollo, M. (1998). Creating Value in Post-Acquisition Integration Processes.
The Wharton Working Paper Series. Financial Institution Center. Univ. Of
Pennsylvania.
Sitkin, S., & Pablo, A. (2005). The neglected importance of leadership in mergers and
acquisitions. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Snow, C. C., & Hrebiniak, L. G. (1980). Strategy, distinctive competence, and
organizational performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 317-336.
Spector, P. E. (1982). Behavior in organizations as a function of employee's locus of
control. Psychological Bulletin, 91(3), 482-497.
Spector, P. E. (1988). Development of the Work Locus of Control Scale. Journal of
Occupational Psychology, 61(1), 335-340.
Spector, P. E., & Brannick, M. T. (1995). The nature and effects of method variance in
organizational research International Review of Industrial and Organizational
Psychology (Vol. 10, pp. 249-274). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Stahl, G., & Voigt, A. (2005). Impact of cultural differences on merger and acquisition
performance: A critical research review and an integrative model. Advances in
Mergers and Acquisitions, 4(1), 51–82.
Stewart, A., & Hitt, M. A. (2012). Why can’ta family business be more like a nonfamily
business? Modes of professionalization in family firms. Family Business Review,
25(1), 58-86.
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1965). Social structure and organizations Advances in Strategic
Management (pp. 142-193).

145
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1968). Constructing Social Theories. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace &
World.
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches.
Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571-610.
Suddaby, R. (2010). Challenges for institutional theory. Journal of Management Inquiry,
19(1), 14-20.
Suddaby, R., Elsbach, K. D., Greenwood, R., Meyer, J. W., & Zilber, T. B. (2010).
Organizations and their institutional environments-bringing meaning, values, and
culture back in: Introduction to the "Special Research Forum". Academy of
Mangement Journal, 53(6), 1234-1240.
Sutinen, J. G., & Kuperan, K. (1999). A socio-economic theory of regulatory compliance.
International journal of social economics, 26(1/2/3), 174-193.
Swanson, V., & Power, K. (2001). Employees' perceptions of organizational
restructuring: The role of social support. Work & Stress, 15(2), 161-178.
Teece, D., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic
management, . Strategic Management Journal, 18, 509-533.
Teerikangas, S. (2012). Dynamics of acquired firm pre-acquisition employee reactions.
Journal of Management, 38(2), 599-639.
Teerikangas, S., & Very, P. (2006). The culture–performance relationship in M&A: From
yes/no to how. British Journal of Management, 17(S1), S31-S48.
Thomas, J. B., Sussman, S. W., & Henderson, J. C. (2001). Understanding “strategic
learning”: Linking organizational learning, knowledge management, and
sensemaking. Organization Science, 12(3), 331-345.
Thomas, R., & Hardy, C. (2011). Reframing resistance to organizational change.
Scandinavian Journal of Management, 27(3), 322-331.
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical contingency
of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education
publishing industry, 1958-1990. American Journal of Sociology, 105(3), 801-843.
Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (1999). The institutionalization of institutional theory.
Studying Organization: Theory & Method, 169-184.
Trautwein, F. (1990). Merger motives and merger prescriptions. Strategic Management
Journal, 11(4), 283-295.

146
Trouteaud, A. R. (2004). How you ask counts : A test of internet-related components of
response rates to a web-based survey. Social Science Computer Review, 22(3),
385-392.
Tung, R. L., & Verbeke, A. (2010). Beyond Hofstede and GLOBE: Improving the quality
of cross-cultural research. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(8), 12591274.
Useem, M., & Gottlieb, M. M. (2006). Corporate restructuring, ownership‐disciplined
alignment, and the reorganization of management. Human Resource
Management, 29(3), 285-306.
USITC. (2010). Small and medium-sized enterprises:Overview of participation in U.S.
exports USITC Publication 4125 (Vol. 332-508). Washington, DC: United States
International Trade Commission.
Vaara, E. (2002). On the discursive construction of success/failure in narratives of postmerger Integration. Organization Studies 23(2), 211-248.
Van de Ven, A. H. (1993). The institutional theory of John R. Commons: A review and
commentary. The Academy of Management Review, 18(1), 139-152.
Van Knippenberg, D., Van Knippenberg, B., Monden, L., & de Lima, F. (2002).
Organizational identification after a merger: A social identity perspective. British
Journal of Social Psychology, 41(2), 233-252.
Van Teeffelen, A., & Peek, M. (2008). Successor's actions and post transfer performance
in SME's. Paper presented at the International Council of Small Business
Conference, June 2008.
Vancil, R. F., & Buddrus, L. E. (1979). Decentralization, managerial ambiguity by
design: a research study and report: Dow Jones-Irwin.
Vasilaki, A., & O'Regan, N. (2008). Enhancing post-acquisition organisational
performance: the role of the top management team. Team Performance
Management, 14(3/4), 134-145.
Veblen, T. (1898). Why is economics not an evolutionary science? The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 12(4), 373-397.
Veblen, T. (1909). The limitations of marginal utility. The Journal of Political Economy,
17(9), 620-636.
Veliyath, R., & Hermanson, H. M. (1997). Organizational control systems: Matching
controls with organizational levels. Review of Business, 18(2), 20-27.

147
Venkatraman, N., & Ramanujam, V. (1986). Measurement of business performance in
strategy research: A comparison of approaches. Academy of Management Review,
801-814.
Venkatraman, N., & Ramanujam, V. (1987). Measurement of business economic
performance: An examination of method convergence. Journal of Management,
13(1), 109-122.
Verbeke, A., & Kano, L. (2012). The Transaction Cost Economics Theory of the Family
Firm: Family-Based Human Asset Specificity and the Bifurcation Bias.
Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 36(6), 1183-1205.
Vermeulen, F., & Barkema, H. (2001). Learning through acquisitions. Academy of
management journal, 457-476.
Very, P., Lubatkin, M., Calori, R., & Veiga, J. (1997). Relative standing and the
performance of recently acquired European firms. Strategic Management Journal,
18(8), 593-614.
Very, P., & Schweiger, D. M. (2001). The acquisition process as a learning process:
Evidence from a study of critical problems and solutions in domestic and crossborder deals. Journal of World Business, 36(1), 11-31.
Veugelers, R., & Cassiman, B. (1999). Make and buy in innovation strategies: evidence
from Belgian manufacturing firms. Research Policy, 28(1), 63-80.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management
affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385-417.
Villalonga, B., & McGahan, A. M. (2005). The choice among acquisitions, alliances, and
divestitures. Strategic Management Journal, 26(13), 1183-1208.
Vince, R. (2001). Power and emotion in organizational learning. Human Relations,
54(10), 1325-1351.
Vinski, M. T., & Watter, S. (2012). Priming honesty reduces subjective bias in self-report
measures of mind wandering. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(1), 451-455.
Vosselman, E. G. J. (2002). Towards horizontal archetypes of management control: a
transaction cost economics perspective. Management Accounting Research, 13(1),
131-148.
Wageman, R. (1995). Interdependence and group effectiveness. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 40(1), 145-180.
Waldman, D. A., Ramirez, G. G., House, R. J., & Puranam, P. (2001). Does leadership
matter? CEO leadership attributes and profitability under conditions of perceived
environmental uncertainty. Academy of Management Journal, 44(1), 134-143.

148
Walsh, J. (1988). Top management turnover following mergers and acquisitions.
Strategic Management Journal, 9(2), 173-183.
Walsh, J. (1989). Doing a deal: Merger and acquisition negotiations and their impact
upon target company top management turnover. Strategic Management Journal,
10(4), 307-322.
Walsh, J. P., & Ellwood, J. W. (1991). Mergers, acquisitions, and the pruning of
managerial deadwood. Strategic Management Journal, 12(3), 201-217.
Walsh, J. P., & Ungson, G. R. (1991). Organizational memory. Academy of Management
Review, 16(1), 57-91.
Weber, K., & Glynn, M. A. (2006). Making sense with institutions: Context, thought and
action in Karl Weick’s theory. Organization studies, 27(11), 1639-1660.
Weber, M. (1946). The Sociology of Charismatic Authority. Milton Park: Routledge.
Weber, M. (1947). The Theory of Economic and Social Organization. New York: The
Free Press Simon & Schuster.
Weber, R. A., & Camerer, C. F. (2003). Cultural conflict and merger failure: An
experimental approach. Management Science, 49(4), 400-415.
Weber, Y. (1996). Corporate cultural fit and performance in mergers and acquisitions.
Human Relations, 49(9), 1181-1202.
Weber, Y., Shenkar, O., & Raveh, A. (1996). National and corporate cultural fit in
mergers/acquisitions: An exploratory study. Management Science, 42(8), 12151227.
Weick, K. E. (1991). The nontraditional quality of organizational learning. Organization
Science, 2(1), 116-124.
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management
Journal, 5, 171-180.
Westphal, & Fredrickson. (2001). Who directs strategic change? Director experience, the
selection of new CEOs, and change in corporate strategy. Strategic Management
Journal, 22(12), 1113-1137.
Westphal, T. G., & Shaw, V. (2005). Knowledge transfers in acquisitions-An exploratory
study and model. Management International Review, Special Issue(2), 75-100.
Whitaker, S. C. (2012). Mergers & Acquisitions Integration Handbook: Helping
Companies Realize the Full Value of Acquisitions. Hoboken: Wiley.

149
Williams, M. L., Podsakoff, P. M., & Huber, V. (1992). Effects of group‐level and
individual‐level variation in leader behaviours on subordinate attitudes and
performance. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 65(2),
115-129.
Williamson, O., E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets,
relational contracting. New York: Free Press.
Williamson O., E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications:
A study in the economics of internal organization. Paper presented at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial
Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship., Urbana, IL.
Williamson, O. E. (1973). Markets and hierarchies: some elementary considerations. The
American Economic Review, 63(2), 316-325.
Williamson, O. E. (1986). Transforming merger policy: the pound of new perspectives.
The American Economic Review, 76(2), 114-119.
Williamson, O. E. (2002). The theory of the firm as governance structure: from choice to
contract. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3), 171-195.
Wissema, J., Van der Pol, H., & Messer, H. (1980). Strategic management archetypes.
Strategic Management Journal, 1(1), 37-47.
Wooten, M. H., A. (2008). Organizational fields:Past present and future. Los Angeles:
SAGE Publications Limited.
Wright, P., Kroll, M., Lado, A., & Van Ness, B. (2002). The structure of ownership and
corporate acquisition strategies. Strategic Management Journal, 23(1), 41-53.
Zaheer, A., Castañer, X., & Souder, D. (2011). Synergy sources, target autonomy, and
integration in acquisitions. Journal of Management, Forthcomming.
Zaheer, A. C., X.; Souder, D. (2013). Synergy sources, target autonomy, and integration
in acquisitions. Journal of Management, 39(3), 604-632.
Zaheer, S., Schomaker, M., & Genc, M. (2003). Identity versus culture in mergers of
equals. European Management Journal, 21(2), 185-191.
Zajac, C. (2009). Barriers to cultural and organizational integration in international
holding groups–nature, scope and remedial measures. Journal of Intercultural
Management, 1(2), 50-58.
Zellweger, T., Eddleston, K., & Kellermanns, F. (2010). Exploring the concept of
familiness: Introducing family firm identity. Journal of Family Business Strategy,
1(1), 54-63.

150
Zellweger, T. M., & Astrachan, J. H. (2008). On the emotional value of owning a firm.
Family Business Review, 21(4), 347-363.
Zollo, M., & Singh, H. (2004). Deliberate learning in corporate acquisitions: post
acquisition strategies and integration capability in US bank mergers. Strategic
Management Journal, 25(13), 1233-1256.
Zucker, L. G. (1977). The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. American
sociological review, 726-743.
Zucker, L. G. (1983). Organizations as institutions. Research in the Sociology of
Organizations, 2(1), 1-47.
Zucker, L. G. (1987). Institutional theories of organization. Annual review of sociology,
13, 443-464.
Zucker, L. G. (1988a). Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and
environment. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger
Zucker, L. G. (1988b). Organizations as actors in social systems. Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger.

151
APPENDIX I

152
Literature Review Supplement
Table 6: Related Behavioral and Economic Choice Literatures

Theoretical
Basis
Attribution
Theory; Theories
of the Firm;
Bounded
Rationality;
Force-field
Theory of
Change;
Environmental
Change Theory;
Job
Characteristics
Theory; Equity
Theory; Social
Identity Theory;

Application
Organizational
change and
socio-cultural
adaptation

Contextual Synthesis
 Individuals are
affected by the ability
to adjust loyalties,
bond with new
organizations, and
adapt to different
interpersonal
relationships when
change is forced upon
them.
 Individual leader
behavior may
significantly affect
the behavior of
groups, and hinder or
help the integration
process.
 Post-acquisition
autonomy levels and
perceived
management power
during the integration
period has meaningful
and lasting impact on
the acquired group
and can be
significantly related
to acquisition
performance.

Authors
(Beer & Walton,
1987; Buono, et al.,
2002; Buono,
Bowditch, & Lewis,
1985; Cartwright &
Schoenberg, 2006;
Chatterjee, et al.,
1992; Cording,
Christmann, & King,
2008; Datta, 1991;
DiGeorgio, 2001;
Elsass & Veiga, 1994;
Guzey & Yurtseven,
2011; Hayes, 1979;
Lipponen, Olkkonen,
& Moilanen, 2004;
Nahavandi &
Malekzadeh, 1988;
Risberg, 2001; Schein,
1990, 2010; Schraeder
& Self, 2003;
Shrivastava, 1986;
Teerikangas & Very,
2006; Williams,
Podsakoff, & Huber,
1992; Zajac, 2009)

153
Theoretical
Basis
Transformational
Leadership
Theory

Application
Leadership
changemanagement;
Leader
behavior

Contextual Synthesis
 Leadership of both
the acquired and
acquiring firm is
recognized as a key
success factor in
acquisition
assimilation.
 Transformational
Leaders must be able
to bridge the sociopolitical differences
within combined
groups and establish
new hierarchal
relationships.
 Replaced or newly
installed leaders may
be viewed by the
remaining employees
as a significant
symbolic gesture
signaling that the
acquiring firm is
securely in-charge
and operational
idiosyncrasies of the
acquired firm must
conform to new rules
and processes.
 Retained executives
were less likely to
depart when granted
greater autonomy and
maintained or
improved their
relative standing
among the acquired
management team.

Authors
(Beer & Walton,
1987; Evans & Reiser,
2004; Hambrick &
Cannella Jr, 1993;
King, 2002; Krishnan,
et al., 1997; Krug &
Aguilera, 2005; Krug,
2003; Krug & Shill,
2008; Lubatkin, et al.,
1999; Pfeffer, 1981;
Piccolo & Colquitt,
2006; Ranft & Lord,
2000; Walsh, 1988)

154
Theoretical
Basis
Selfdetermination

Application
Top
management
turnover

Contextual Synthesis
 The relative sociopolitical standing and
decision-making
authority of
executives in acquired
units had significant
association with the
inclination to leave.
 The link between
autonomy, executive
turnover and firm
performance, are key
factors.
Successful integration
of post-merger
leadership was
positively associated
with lower executive
turnover and higher
post-acquisition
performance.

Authors
(Amiot, et al., 2006;
Colombo & Zrilic,
2010; Cusatis &
Blumberg, 2009;
DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Graebner, 2004;
Graebner, Eisenhardt,
& Roundy, 2010;
Guetzkow & Gyr,
1954; Jehn, 1997;
Jemison & Sitkin,
1986; Joslin, et al.,
2010; Kavanagh &
Ashkanasy, 2006;
Krug & Aguilera,
2005; Krug &
Hegarty, 2001;
Lubatkin, et al., 1999;
Mizruchi & Fein,
1999; Pinkley, 1992;
Priem & Price, 1991;
Ranft & Lord, 2000;
Walsh, 1988)

155
Theoretical
Basis
Theory of
Relative
Standing

Application
Sociobehavioral
adjustment to
change

Contextual Synthesis
 The behavior of
acquired leaders has
been found to have
significant association
with the success of
integration following
an acquisition.
 A leader’s perception
of relative standing
among peers is
closely associated
with the perceived
membership among
the upper echelons of
the new organization.
 Autonomy allocation
has significant
bearing on leadership
attitude and
commitment.
 Inability to maintain a
perceived relational
position to peers and
subordinates
subsequent to an
organizational change
can have dour
consequences for the
individual and the
workgroup.
 The reaction to
change of a leaders’
relative standing can
ripple through an
organization.

Authors
(Bass, Waldman,
Avolio, & Bebb,
1987; Buono, et al.,
2002; Buono &
Bowditch, 1989;
Cannella Jr &
Hambrick, 1993;
Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007;
Chatterjee, 1992;
Colombo & Zrilic,
2010; Covin,
Kolenko, Sightler, &
Tudor, 1997; Datta,
1991; Datta, et al.,
1991; Hall, 1976;
Judge, Bono, Ilies, &
Gerhardt, 2002;
Kaiser, Hogan, &
Craig, 2008;
Kavanagh &
Ashkanasy, 2006;
Kiessling, Harvey, &
Heames, 2008; Kowal
& Fortier, 1999;
Larsson & Lubatkin,
2000; Lubatkin, et al.,
1999; Miller &
Friesen, 1980; Piccolo
& Colquitt, 2006;
Schein, 2010; Very, et
al., 1997)
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Theoretical
Basis
Upper Echelons
Theory

Application
Group effects
of leadership
autonomy
change

Contextual Synthesis
 The Upper Echelons
Theory argues that
executives’
background and
authoritative power in
relation to the
management team has
a significant impact
on decision-making
choice and
homogeneity of the
management team.
 Top management
team perception of
status and authority
upon the congealing
and ultimate
performance of a new
organization.
 The performance and
fit of the upper
echelon team can
have impact on
individuals as well as
the group.

Authors
(Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1996;
Fugate, Prussia, &
Kinicki, 2012;
Hambrick, 2007;
Hambrick & Mason,
1984; Joslin, et al.,
2010; Very, et al.,
1997)
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Theoretical
Basis
Locus of
Control;
Cognitive
Evaluation
Theory;
Selfdetermination
Theory

Application
Individual
adaptation to
change

Contextual Synthesis
 Locus of control is
the expectancy that
rewards
reinforcements or
outcomes in life that
are controlled by
either one’s own
actions and choices or
limited by external
forces.
 The removal of
autonomy and /or
decision-making
authority can have
significant impact on
the attitude and
effectiveness of
acquired leaders,
which trickles down
throughout the entire
organization.
 Changes in decisionmaking authority can
have negative effects
upon locus of control,
individual selfefficacy (self-worth),
self-determination.
 When leaders are
dissatisfied with the
decision-making
authority granted to
them, percieved or
institutionalized, it
can have detrimental
effect on the
performance of the
organization.

Authors
(Ajzen, 2002; Boone
& de Brabander,
1997; Datta, 1991;
Deci & Ryan, 1985,
1987; Fama, 1980;
Graebner, 2004;
Hambrick & Cannella
Jr, 1993; Jemison &
Sitkin, 1986;
Kiessling, et al., 2008;
Kormanik & Rocco,
2009; Lubatkin, et al.,
1999; Miller, De
Vries, & Toulouse,
1982; Rotter, 1966,
1990; Rummel &
Feinberg, 1988; Ryan,
1982; Shanley &
Correa, 1992; ShiversBlackwell, 2006;
Spector, 1982, 1988;
Trautwein, 1990;
Vaara, 2002; Very, et
al., 1997; Wageman,
1995)
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Theoretical
Basis
The Resource
Based View

Application
Value
determination
of acquired
human capital

Contextual Synthesis
 The resource-based
view suggests that a
firm’s internal
resources, including
intellectual capital,
are valuable and rare
and these resources
cannot be transferred
across firms without
incurring costs.
 The resource-based
view of the firm also
supports the
contention that
unrelated firm
knowledge adds
resources and
expertise that cannot
be provided by the
acquiring firm.



Allowing subject matter
experts of the new entity
to continue to express
autonomy over the
activities of the
unrelated firm should be
in the best interest of the
firm.

Authors
(Astley & Zajac,
1991; Brouthers,
Brouthers, & Werner,
2008; Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007;
Cohen & Levinthal,
1990; Datta & Grant,
1990; Graebner &
Eisenhardt, 2004;
Karim, 2006; Karim
& Mitchell, 2000;
Manne, 1965; Meyer
& Lieb-Dóczy, 2003;
Park, 2002; Priem &
Butler, 2001; Teece,
Pisano, & Shuen,
1997; Vermeulen &
Barkema, 2001; Zollo
& Singh, 2004)
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Theoretical
Basis
Theory of
Dynamic
Capabilities

Application
Interpretation
of acquired
assets and
human capital

Contextual Synthesis
 Dynamic capabilities
are a firm's ability to
integrate, build and
reconfigure internal
and external
competencies to
address changing
environments.
 Leveraging acquired
assets in a resourcebased view is
recognized through
the concept of
dynamic capabilities.
 When the entrenched
knowledge of the
acquired firm is
perceived to be a
significant resource
for the acquiring
company, the
dynamic capabilities
are deemed valuable,
difficult to replace
and therefore worthy
of allowing to remain.
 Allowing greater
autonomy of acquired
firms to develop their
own capabilities is
more successful than
those allowed less
decision-making
authority.
 If human assets are
new and add to the
resource-based
dynamic capability
and knowledge of an
organization, they
will more likely be
granted greater
autonomy.

Authors
(Cohen, 1990; Meyer
& Lieb-Dóczy, 2003;
Teece, et al., 1997;
Villalonga &
McGahan, 2005;
Zollo & Singh, 2004)
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Theoretical
Basis
Transaction Cost
Economic
Theory

Application
Integration
costs/values of
acquired human
capital

Contextual Synthesis
 Transaction cost
economics are
generally used to
understand decisions
of control and
governance between
two independent
agents entering into
cooperative
endeavors.
 The reconfiguring
organizational
hierarchy and
decision authority
when a firm is
merged or acquired
meets the intentions
of transaction cost
considerations by
eliminating
unnecessary
transaction costs,
redundancies and
decision-making
conflict that might
occur.
 Redeploying existing
resources to augment
new assets and
choosing the
deployment of those
assets also often leads
to the redistribution of
power, decisionmaking authority and
hence autonomy of
the acquired group
and its leaders.

Authors
(Anderson, 1988;
Colombo &
Delmastro, 2004;
Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1996;
Kellermanns, Walter,
Lechner, & Floyd,
2005; Leiblein, 2003;
Mahoney & Pandian,
1992; Manne, 1965;
Oxley, 1997; Priem &
Butler, 2001; Ranft,
2006; Ranft, et al.,
2011; Robins, 1987;
Villalonga &
McGahan, 2005;
Williamson O., 1975;
Williamson, 1973,
1986, 2002)
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Theoretical
Basis
Agency Theory

Application
Autonomy
allocation to
retained
acquired
leaders; Trust
and adaptation

Contextual Synthesis
 Allocation of
decision-making
authority can have
great impact on the
agency relationship in
a new organization.
 The trust and faith the
new owners have in
an acquired leader can
be demonstrated
through the allocation
of authority.
 Management controls
are leveraged to limit
risks of free-rider
issues and may be
amplified in situations
where the acquired
firm was a private or
closely held company.
 This issue may even
be greater in acquired
leaders retained for a
finite period to assist
with transition.

Authors
(Cannella Jr &
Hambrick, 1993; Ellis,
2011; Graebner, 2004;
Jensen & Meckling,
1976; Kanter, 2009;
Lubatkin, et al., 2005;
Moeller,
Schlingemann, &
Stulz, 2003; Osterloh
& Frey, 2000;
Puranam, et al., 2006;
Puranam & Srikanth,
2007; Saxton &
Dollinger, 2004;
Wageman, 1995;
Walsh & Ellwood,
1991)
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Theoretical
Basis
Theory of
Organizational
Learning

Application
Embedded
organizational
patterns of
control and
institutionalized
processes

Contextual Synthesis
 Organizational
learning refers to the
processes of
institutionalizing
rules, practices,
routines, and
conventions and rules
of an organization.
 Organizational
routines are
inextricably crosslinked through
individual, group and
organizational
processes that involve
tensions between the
assimilation of new
learnings and
reinforcement of
historic learnings.
 Established learnings
are supported through
the conventions and
routines
institutionalized
within the
organization.

Authors
(Barney, 1991a;
Barney, 2001a;
Chatterjee, 1992;
Coff, 2002; Crossan,
et al., 1999; Lant &
Mezias, 1992; Levitt
& March, 1988;
March, 1981, 1991;
McDonald, et al.,
2008; Meyer & LiebDóczy, 2003; Pablo,
1994; Westphal &
Shaw, 2005; Zollo &
Singh, 2004)
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Survey Materials

Survey Instructions
Thank you for taking the time to provide your feedback regarding the effects of
perceived autonomy on integration success. This survey should take only five to
seven minutes to complete. Please answer all questions in relation to your current
perspectives when you take this survey. Only fully completed surveys can be used in the
research. All responses are confidential and will not be shared. Neither you nor your
company will be identifiable in the results. Please click your mouse on the desired
location of each line to indicate your response to the question. Use the forward and back
arrows at the bottom of each page to move forward and backward in the survey. The
survey will automatically close when completed. At the end of the survey, you will be
given an opportunity to provide an email address if you are interested in receiving the
research results (optional). If you have any questions about this survey or the research
results, please contact Robert W. Reich at rreich@students.kennesaw.edu at any time.
Thank you again in advance for your valuable participation. Note: Your participation is
voluntary and may be withdrawn without penalty. The research has no risks or implied
responsibility to the respondents. Research at Kennesaw State University that involves
human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board.
Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to Dr. Christine
Ziegler, Chairperson of the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 1000
Chastain Road, #2202, Kennesaw, GA 30144, (770) 423-6407.
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Post-Acquisition Survey Instrument

Q1-Is the recently acquired firm currently operating as a stand-alone business unit or do
the strategic objectives of the acquirer call for operations and management to
be integrated to other existing operations?
o Stand-alone operation
o Integrated into existing operations of acquirer
Q2-Using your best judgment, please rank the industry relatedness (industry segment,
product or process) of the pre-acquisition firm.
______ Industry segment
______ Product offering
______ Mfg. processes
Q3-To what extent would you say the acquirers' strategic objectives for the acquired
firm are known to the current top management team of the acquired firm?
o Comprehensively known
o Generally known
o Not well known
o Not at all known
Q4-To what extent have the strategic objectives of the acquired unit changed since the
acquisition, e.g. profit center vs. resource center.
o Significantly changed
o Changed a little
o Not much changed
o Not at all changed
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Answer If To what extent have the strategic objectives of the acqui... significantly changed Is
Selected

Q4.2-You have indicated that the strategic objectives of the acquired firm have
significantly changed since the business has been acquired; please indicated how. Select
all that apply:
o Gain access to Intellectual property or patents
o Acquire new customers
o Augment product line of acquiring company
o Access plant or faculties
o Expand geographic distribution
o Eliminate competitive position of acquired firm
o Supplier to acquiring firm
Q5-Do you feel the performance goals of the acquiring firm have been sufficiently
communicated to the management team of the acquired firm?
o Thoroughly communicated
o Reasonably communicated
o Somewhat communicated
o Vaguely communicated
o Not at all communicated
Q6-Do you feel the performance expectations are reasonable?
o Very reasonable
o Reasonable
o Somewhat reasonable
o Neutral
o Somewhat unreasonable
o Unreasonable
o Very unreasonable
Q7-Have you had direct executive-level experience with mergers or acquisitions?
o Yes
o No
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Answer If Have you had direct executive-level experience with ... Yes Is Selected

Q48-Please indicate how many merger or acquisition integration events you in which you
have actively participated.
o 1
o 2-3
o 4-5
o 5-7
o 8-9
o 10+
Q8-Has the recently acquired firm been previously acquired within the last three years?
o Yes
o No
o Do not know

Q9- Has the recently acquired firm acquired or merged with another firm in the last three
years?
o Yes
o No
o Do not know
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Q10 To what extent have the managers of the buying firm involved themselves in the
decisions concerning your (acquired) firm since taking possession?
Your
firm
decides
Setting key
performance
goals
Defining the
portfolio of
businesses
Setting key
competitive
strategies
Defining key
administrative
policies
Deciding
major capital
investments
Defining
marketing
budgets
Developing
marketing
techniques
Setting
research and
development
(R&D)
budgets
Setting
production
schedules
Setting senior
manager
rewards
Defining
recruitment
policies
Defining
promotion
policies

Consensus,
both firms
decide

Buying
firm
decides
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Q11-Assess the following areas of post-acquisition performance compared to
your interpretation of the parent company's expectations at this point in time since the
company has been acquired:
Much below
current stage
expectations
1
New product/service
development
Market development
Sales growth rate
Employment growth
rate (+/-)
Market share
Operating profits
Profit to sales ratio
Cash flow from
operations
Return on investment
Return on assets

Meets current
stage
expectations
2

3

4

Much above
current stage
expectations
5

6

7
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Q12-Please indicate the organizational type of the recently acquired firm based on the
following definitions: Select the one that BEST describes the acquired firm.
o Public Company- a publicly traded company is a limited liability company that
offers company securities including but not limited to; stocks, bonds and other
equity backed instruments for sale to the public, typically through a security
exchange.
o Private Firm- ownership is closely held and not available to the public through
open exchanges and is not required to meet the strict Securities and Exchange
Commission filing requirements of public companies. Private companies may
issue stock and have shareholders; however, shares are not traded on public
exchanges and are not issued through an initial public offering.
o Founder owned and operated business - a firm that is actively operated by the
founder-CEO whose stock is closely held, majority controlled by founder, and not
available to public markets.
o Non-founder owned and operated business- a non-franchise firm that is actively
managed by the owner, but not the founder of the firm.
Answer If Please indicate the organizational type of the recen... Non-founder owned and operated
business- a non-franchise firm that is actively managed by the owner, but not the founder of the
firm. Is Selected

Q12.1-Relationship to the founder
o No relation
o Sibling
o 1st generation
o 2nd generation
o Family member CEO representing multiple family member ownership
o Related by marriage
o adopted
o Other relation
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Answer If Please indicate the organizational type of the ... Private Firm- ownership is
closely held and not available to the public through open exchanges and are not required
to meet the strict Securities and Exchange Commission filing requirements of public
companies. Private companies may issue stock and have shareholders; however, shares
are not traded on public exchanges and are not issued through an initial public offering. Is
Selected Or Please indicate the organizational type of the ... Family founder owned and
operated business - a firm that is actively operated by the founder-CEO whose stock is
closely held, majority controlled by founder, and not available to public markets. Is
Selected
Q12.2-Please indicate the percentage (%) of family ownership if known, otherwise leave
blank and continue to next question.
• Ownership means ownership of stock or company capital.
• Founder owned and operated business - a firm that is actively operated by the founderCEO whose stock is closely held, majority controlled by founder, and not available to
public markets.
• Family is defined as a group of persons including siblings and those who are offspring
of a couple (no matter what generation) and their in-laws as well as their legally adopted
children.
• Non-family refers to unrelated institutional or private holders of capital stock.
Founder

Other family members
of founder

Non-family

%

Q13-Please identify your current responsibility level in the acquired firm:
o Senior-most executive (e.g. President, CEO)
o Top management team member (other than senior-most executive)
o Other management
o Non-management
Q14-Please identify whether the current (acquired) firm's senior executive is a retained
executive from the acquired firm or installed by the acquiring firm from outside the
acquired organization during post acquisition activities.
o Retained
o Installed (pre-integration activities)
o Installed sometime during the integration process
Answer If Please identify whether the current (acquired) firm's se... Installed sometime
during the integration process Is Selected
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Q14.2-a Please indicate when the current installed leader assumed responsibility for the
acquired entity.
o Assumed responsibilities immediately following change of ownership
o Replaced retained leader during post-acquisition activities
o Replaced installed leader during post acquisition activities
Answer If Please identify whether your current (acquired) firm's se... Installed (pre-integration
activities) Is Selected

Q14.2-b-If leader was installed, please indicated the immediate source. This question
does not pertain to leaders retained through target acquisition.
o Installed from within parent company (acquirer)
o Installed from outside public firm
o Installed from outside private firm
Q15-How many full time employees were in the (acquired) firm at the time of
acquisition?
Q16-What year was the (acquired) firm founded? If unknown, please proceed to next
question.
Q18-The following descriptive questions are demographic in nature and will simply
identify unique characteristics of the respondents. Answering these questions is not
required for data gathering of the key research questions. The following questions are
voluntary and remain confidential. If you do not wish to provide this information, please
proceed to question 19. This standard is in compliance with the definitions and
procedures included in the 1997 revision of the OMB Statistical Policy Directive No. 15
and the U.S. Department of Education Final Guidance on Maintaining, Collecting, and
Reporting Racial and Ethnic Data to the Department of Education (Federal Register, Vol.
72, No. 202, 10/19/2008).
Q18.1-Your gender
o Male
o Female
Q18.2-Age
______ Click to select choice
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Q18.3-What is the highest educational level you have achieved
o High School degree
o Some college
o College degree
o Graduate degree (MBA, MS, MA etc.)
o Post graduate work
o Post Graduate Degree (PhD, DBA, Ed.D., MD etc.)
Q18.4-What is your national origin?
o North American
o South American
o Western Europe
o Eastern Europe
o Asia Pacific
o Middle Eastern
o Arab
o Indian
Q18.5-What is your Ethnic origin?
o American Indian or Alaska Native
o Asian
o Black or African American
o Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
o White
o Two or more races ____________________
Q18.6-Please enter your current position/title
Q19-If you would like to receive a synopsis of the survey results, please provide your
name and e-mail address below. Your identity and contact information will remain
confidential. Thank you for participating. Please allow up to 90 days for results. Click to
write the question text
Name ____________________
Firm ____________________
Email-address ____________________
o I am interested in participating in future merger and acquisition research.
o I am not interested in participating in future merger and acquisition research.
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APPENDIX III
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Survey Cover Letter

Date XXXX
Dear __________,
I am a fellow business leader whose company has been acquired, and has in turn participated in the acquisition of other
firms. The rising challenges that leaders like us face during the transition to new ownership can prove challenging for
management, employees, and shareholders.
Few studies have focused on the link between changes in autonomy or decision-making authority and integration
success. That is where I need your help. I have recently teamed up with Kennesaw State University in Kennesaw,
Georgia to conduct focused research on the relationship between acquired firm autonomy and integration performance.
Public records indicate that your firm has been recently acquired. I am seeking your professional expertise in an effort
to understand the effects of management autonomy on acquired firm performance to assist other leaders and managers
in similar circumstances.
All I am asking is that you complete a short survey. The electronic survey (click here or the links below) contains fewer
than 50 questions and pre-tests indicate it may be completed in less than 10 minutes. Other members of your
management team may also receive a survey invitation. The research is designed to incorporate multiple responses
from the same firm. Rest assured that all surveys will remain completely confidential and neither you nor your
organization will be identifiable in the results.
This research project is not affiliated with any firm or commercial enterprise and the results are intended for academic
use only. Survey results will be available to those who participate. Should you have any questions about the study or its
application, please contact me, Robert W. Reich at rreich@students.kennesaw.edu or (865) 405-2584.
Your experience and expertise with this subject will have meaningful and important impact on the effort to enhance the
success of mergers and acquisitions in the future. Fellow professionals and I thank you for your participation.
If you are receiving this letter via the internet, click here to start the survey: Link to Survey. If you are receiving this
invitation by mail post, you may type https://coles.qualtrics.com/autonomy.edu into your internet browser or use your
mobile reader to begin the survey.
Note: Your participation is voluntary and may be withdrawn without penalty. The research has no risks or implied
responsibility to the respondents. Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out
under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities should be
addressed to Dr. Christine Ziegler, Chairperson of the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 1000
Chastain Road, #2202, Kennesaw, GA 30144, (770) 423-6407.
Most Sincerely,

Robert W. Reich
Kennesaw State University

